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## **Editorial Note**

Once again I am delighted to dish out this fresh issue of *Ānvīkṣikī* in quick succession. Research Journals are, in fact, the mobile and readymade repository of newly created knowledge, besides being the archive of researched ideas. They also aim at disseminating the explored knowledge at a faster pace for the present time and also for the posterity.

While presenting this issue of *Ānvīkṣikī* before the academia a close and vigilant watch has been kept to ensure that the aforesaid parameters of standard journal be strictly stuck to. The research articles contributed in this volume are written by noted scholars in their field. I am sure that researchers and explorers engaged in philosophical enquiries will get sufficient kinetic academic energy from these thoughtful articles to keep the wheel of ongoing research in motion.

At the end, I congratulate the contributors for their help and prompt cooperation. I also thank the teaching fraternity of philosophy of various Universities for enriching our treasure-trove of collective wisdom.

**Shriprakash Pandey**



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## अद्वैतवेदान्तसम्मत अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवाद

अम्बिकादत्त शर्मा

‘श्रुतिरेव अद्वैते प्रमाणम्’— अद्वैत वेदान्त को मूलगामी स्वरूप में एक श्रुतिप्रामाण्यवादी दर्शन माना जाता है जो उपनिषद्, गीता और ब्रह्मसूत्र नामक त्रिविध प्रस्थानों के माध्यम से वेदान्तों के तात्पर्य को ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ इत्यादि श्रुतियों में प्रतिष्ठापित करता है। ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ श्रुति एक शाश्वत चैतन्य तत्त्व की वाचक है जो इस जगत् का अधिष्ठान है और ब्रह्म, आत्मा इत्यादि इसकी अपर संज्ञाएं हैं। यद्यपि वेदान्त परम्परा के अन्य दार्शनिक सम्प्रदाय भी ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ को आधारभूत रूप से स्वीकार करते हैं लेकिन इसके साथ जिस अन्य श्रुति का योग दिखाकर अपने-अपने दार्शनिक चिन्तन की व्यावर्तक मूलाकृति को निर्धारित करते हैं वह भिन्न-भिन्न होता है। अद्वैत वेदान्त की व्यावर्तक विशेषता ‘एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ के साथ ‘नेहा नानास्ति किंचन’ का योग दिखाकर पारमार्थिक अद्वैत और मायिक द्वैत की उपस्थापना करते हुए एतद्विषयक दार्शनिक चिन्तन की अवधारणात्मक मूलाकृति को केवलाद्वैत के रूप में प्रतिपादित करना है। केवलाद्वैत का तात्पर्य यह है कि निर्गुण, निर्विशेष, कूटस्थ ब्रह्म ही त्रिकालाबाधित रूप में सत् है और इसके अतिरिक्त जो कुछ भी है वह मायिक होने से मिथ्या है। प्रश्न उठता है कि ऐसे किसी श्रुत्याधारित दार्शनिक तन्त्र की प्रतिष्ठा में तर्कप्रमाण या किसी विशेष प्रकार की तर्कणा-पद्धति के लिए कितना अवकाश है? अद्वैत वेदान्त के प्रणेता आचार्य भगवत्पाद शंकर के भाष्यों में श्रुतिप्रामाण्य का अवलम्बन ही अधिक दिखाई पड़ता है, यद्यपि ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य का उपोद्घात लिखते हुए उन्होंने अध्यास विषयक एक तार्किक और ज्ञानमीमांसीय उपक्रम को अवश्य प्रस्तावित किया है जिसे अद्वैत वेदान्त के तार्किक विकास में एक महत्त्वपूर्ण पहल कहा जा सकता है।

अद्वैतवेदान्त की मौलिक प्रस्थापना ‘ब्रह्म सत्यम् जगत् मिथ्या’ है। ब्रह्म सबके द्वारा अन्तर्ज्ञात सत्ता का अनुभवातीत स्वरूप और जगत्

अनुभवपूर्व अविद्या द्वारा ब्रह्म-विवर्तन का विश्व इतिहास है। ब्रह्म विवर्तन का अविद्यात्मक विश्व इतिहास कोई ब्रह्म का स्वतः दूषण नहीं, वरन् यह मिथ्यात्व का भी मिथ्यात्व है। इसलिए अद्वैत वेदान्त की दृष्टि से सत् त्रिकालाबाधित है। वह वैसा ही था जैसा वह है और वैसा ही रहेगा जैसा वह था। देश, काल और वस्तु से अनन्त इस सत् में सभी प्रकार के सम्भाव्य परिवर्तनों का पूर्ण अभाव “अव्ययीभाव” उसका तात्त्विक स्वरूप है। वेदान्त की ऐसी तत्त्वमीमांसीय प्रस्थापना कदाचित् गहन रहस्यवाद प्रतीत हो सकती है, लेकिन वेदान्त के प्रति ऐसी दृष्टि शंकर की दार्शनिक चेतना के साथ न्याय नहीं कर सकती। यह स्वात्म बोध रहित कोई वैचारिक प्रलाप मात्र नहीं है। वेदान्त का अद्वैतवाद एक ओर तो अनुभूति का विषय है तो दूसरी ओर तर्कबुद्धि द्वारा सत्य की अन्वीक्षा की चरम परिणति है। विषय और विषयी के द्वैत में चैतन्य का वैविध्यपूर्ण यह स्थूल और सूक्ष्म जगत् मिथ्या है। इसे केवल प्रत्याक्षात्मक मूल्य की सीमा में ही यथार्थ स्वीकार किया जा सकता है। परन्तु यही अन्तिम नहीं है। प्रत्यक्षात्मक अनुभव की तर्क बुद्धिपरक संपरीक्षा को उस सीमा तक पहुंचाया जा सकता है जहां अद्वैतसत् समस्त द्वैत अनुभव की अर्न्तवस्तु के रूप में प्राप्त होता है या नेति-नेति की अन्तिम परिणति में अर्थापत्ति प्रमाण से सर्वातीत रूप में इंगित होता है।

अद्वैत परमार्थ है। उसका कार्यरूप भेद (विवर्त) द्वैत बनता है। कठोपनिषद् (4/11) के अनुसार विश्व में नानात्व नहीं है और ऋग्वेद (6/47/18), बृहदारण्यक (2/5/10) एवं कठोपनिषद् (5/9) में कहा गया है कि इन्द्र अपनी मायाओं से बहुलता में प्रकट होता है। इसका आशय यह है कि उत्पत्ति न करता हुआ भी वह अद्वैत तत्त्व बहुधा जन्म लेता हुआ नानात्व में भासित होता है।<sup>1</sup>

मायाशक्ति की अनिर्वचनीय विलक्षणता से अजायमान तत्त्व विजायमान बनता है। द्वैत को परमार्थ नहीं माना जा सकता है क्योंकि अद्वैतवाद ही श्रुतिप्रतिपादित सिद्धांत है। यद्यपि उपनिषदों में उपमाएं द्वैतपरक पायी जाती हैं, व्यवहार जगत् में सभी उपमान द्वैत की सीमा में आते हैं, अतः द्वैत को ही पारमार्थिक क्यों न माना जाए? इसके प्रत्युत्तर में अद्वैतवादी कहते हैं कि उपनिषदों में अनेकत्र अद्वैत सिद्धांत ही प्रतिपादित

है, अतः द्वैत परमार्थ नहीं हो सकता। विकार को नाममात्र एवं वाचालम्बन कहने से प्रमाणित है कि जिस प्रकार घटादि विकार मृत्तिकादि से अभिन्न हैं, ठीक उसी प्रकार जीव जगत् का ब्रह्म से अद्वैत है। ब्रह्म एकमात्र तथा अद्वितीय है जिससे सत्ता का अन्ययोगव्यवच्छेद अर्थ फलित होता है और यह भी कहा गया है कि सब ब्रह्म ही है। ऐसी स्थिति में व्यवहारतः द्वैत जैसा भास होने के कारण ही परमात्मा से आत्मा का पार्थक्य बनता है, अतः जीवात्मा परमार्थ न होकर परमात्मा का अविद्याकृत अवच्छेद से जनित प्रभेदमात्र है।<sup>2</sup>

अविद्या ही वह शक्ति है जो जीव को ब्रह्म से पृथक् भासित कराती है अन्यथा पारमार्थिक एकत्व ही व्यवस्थित है। द्वैत मानते ही परिच्छेद का प्रश्न उपस्थित हो जाता है जिससे ब्रह्म की अनवच्छिन्न सत्ता, चैतन्यरूपता तथा आनन्दमयता का परिच्छेदातीत होना सिद्ध नहीं हो सकता। अतः जिस प्रकार रज्जुगत सर्प की प्रतीति मिथ्या है ठीक उसी प्रकार भेदों के अवभास का मिथ्यात्व सिद्ध है। जीव जगत् का परमात्मा से पृथक्त्व नहीं है। भ्रमवश अधिष्ठान तत्त्व ही नानात्व में प्रतीतिगोचर होता है किन्तु अधिष्ठान में आरोपित वैविध्य की पारमार्थिक सत्ता नहीं है। इस प्रकार द्वैत मायामात्र (इन्द्रजालवत् मिथ्या) है। परमार्थ दृष्टि से अद्वैत का प्रतिपादन श्रुतियां करती हैं और सुषुप्ति में उसका साक्षात् अनुभव भी होता है।<sup>3</sup>

भेद कथमपि वस्तु का स्वरूप नहीं हो सकता। चित्सुखाचार्य के अनुसार चार हेतुओं से सिद्ध होता है कि भेद वस्तु का स्वरूप नहीं हो सकता—

1. भेद प्रतीतिसापेक्ष होता है किन्तु वस्तु का स्वरूप निरपेक्ष होता है
2. यदि प्रतियोगी को अवधि मानकर भेद की व्याख्या की जाय तो प्रतियोगियों के धर्मस्वरूप होने से अद्वैत ही फलित होगा, भेदों का धर्मी भिन्न नहीं होता किन्तु भेदरूप धर्म ही द्वैताभास दे सकते हैं, फलतः प्रतियोगी भी अनुयोगी का ही स्वरूप बनता है।
3. भेद विदारणरूप होता है जिसे वस्तु का स्वरूप मानने पर भेद भी एक नहीं हो सकता कि एक अनेकत्व सिद्ध कर सके, क्योंकि जो स्वयं भिन्न है उससे भेद की सिद्धि नहीं हो सकती,
4. और भेद यदि वस्तु का स्वरूप है तो वस्तु को देखने पर स्वरूपभेद के देखने का संदेश नहीं हो सकता कि दृष्ट वस्तु एक है

या अनेक? अधिष्ठान को एक मानने पर अनेक होने की व्याख्या संशय तथा विपर्यय रूप में की जा सकती है।<sup>4</sup> उक्त कारिका का विस्तृत विवरण देते हुये चित्सुखाचार्य कहते हैं कि—

भेद वस्तु का स्वरूप नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि भेद को प्रतियोगी की अपेक्षा होगी जिससे परिमाणवत् सापेक्षता का प्रसंग होगा। जिस प्रकार प्रदेश मात्र परिमाण का हर्षदीर्घादि व्यवहार होता है उसी प्रकार सविकल्पक व्यवहार भेद की प्रतियोगिसापेक्षता वैषम्यवश नहीं पायी जाती क्योंकि स्वरूप ही भेद है।<sup>5</sup>

यदि उक्त अनुपपत्ति के परिहारार्थ “इससे यह भिन्न है” इस रूप से प्रतियोगी घटित भेद की प्रतीति मानते हुए भेद को वस्तुस्वरूप स्वीकार किया जाय तो प्रतियोगी के सहित वह भेद अनुयोगी के स्वरूप में अन्तर्भूत हो जायेगा क्योंकि भेद सहित प्रतियोगी भी अनुयोगी का स्वरूप बनेगा। फलतः अनुयोगी में निमग्न हो जाने से अद्वैत का ही तात्पर्य निकलेगा। प्रतियोगी तथा अनुयोगी का स्वरूप ही जब भेद है तब अधिकरणभूत अनुयोगी के स्वरूप से बाहर प्रतियोगी तथा भेद नहीं रह सकते हैं।<sup>6</sup>

यदि विदारणात्मक भेद को भाव का स्वरूप मान लिया जाय तो अवच्छेद ही प्रधान हो जायगा और तब कोई वस्तु एक नहीं होगी क्योंकि अभेद के एक ही अधिकरण में रहने वाली एकता का भेद से विरोध है। इसके अतिरिक्त परमाणु भी अखण्ड एक नहीं है, अतः उसका समाहाररूप समूह अनेक भी नहीं हो सकेगा, क्योंकि एकत्व के असिद्ध रहने पर अनेकत्व संख्या भी कैसे सिद्ध होगी?<sup>7</sup> इसी तरह जब स्वरूप ही भेद है तब धर्मी के देखते ही स्वरूप का प्रत्यक्ष हो जायेगा। उस अवस्था में संशय एवं विपर्यय के लिए अवकाश नहीं रहेगा।<sup>8</sup>

भेदवादी भेद को वस्तु का स्वरूप मानकर संसर्ग द्वारा भेदमूलक अभेद की प्रतिपत्ति स्वीकार करते हैं। अद्वैतवादी की स्थापना है कि भेद को मूल स्वरूप मानने पर न केवल भेद की सिद्धि असम्भव होगी अपितु किसी भी पदार्थ का अभिन्न स्वरूप न बन सकेगा। शुक्ति एवं रजत का भेद ही जब स्वरूप है तब शुक्ति के दिखते ही रजतभेद भी दिखेगा और तब संशय एवं भ्रम का अवकाश नहीं रहेगा। प्रतियोगी का अनुयोगी में भेद रहेगा जिससे प्रतियोगी के सहित भेद को अनुयोगी का स्वरूप होगा।

इस स्थिति में अद्वय अनुयोगी की ही प्रतीति होगी और प्रतियोगी सहित भेद को अनुयोगी कवलित कर लेगा। इस प्रकार द्वैत को वस्तु का स्वरूप न मानने पर अद्वैत ही जगत् का अधिष्ठान एवं स्वरूप सिद्ध होता है। अद्वैत ही वस्तु है जिसमें अवस्तरूप नानात्व का अध्यास होता है।

अद्वैत के लक्षण के सम्बन्ध में कहा गया है कि ये दो प्रकार के होते हैं 1. तात्त्विक द्वैत से रहित सत् वस्तु अद्वैत है। अद्वैत ही तत्त्व है जिसमें अतात्त्विक प्रपंच का अध्यास होता है। 2. बृहदारण्यक के अनुसार अद्वैत वह है जिसे जानने पर सभी कुछ ज्ञात हो जाय, और वह आत्मा है।<sup>9</sup>

मृत्तिका को जानकर उसके सभी विकारों को मृत्तिकारूप से जान लिया जाता है क्योंकि यह सब मिट्टी ही है। इसी प्रकार अद्वैतज्ञान से विवर्तरूप जगत् की ब्रह्मरूपता ज्ञात हो जाती है और यही अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व है जो अद्वैतवादियों के लिए स्वतः सिद्ध है। ईश्वर अपने मायिक संकल्प से जीवों के कर्मविपाकार्थ जिस द्वैत की सृष्टि करता है उसका मिथ्यात्व जानकर अद्वैतवादी अद्वय ब्रह्म को जान सकता है क्योंकि विकार जगत् का ब्रह्म से पृथग्भाव नहीं है। प्रलय में ब्रह्मलीन होने पर अद्वैत की अपरोक्षानुभूति नहीं होती।<sup>10</sup> प्रपंच के रहने पर भी प्रपंचातीत अद्वैत की प्रतीति हो सकती है परन्तु प्रलय में द्वैत की निवृत्ति हो जाने पर भी आचार्य एवं शास्त्रादि के न रहने से अद्वैत का ज्ञान नहीं हो सकता। यद्यपि अद्वैत विरोधी द्वैत का अभाव प्रलय में रहता है तथापि उसकी अनुभूति नहीं होती है। अद्वैत की प्रतीति में द्वैताभाव तन्त्र नहीं है किन्तु उपदेशादि द्वारा उस द्वैत के अवस्तुत्व का ज्ञान प्रयोजन है। द्वैत के अवस्तुत्व के ज्ञान के पश्चात् उसका होना भी न होने के समान हो जाता है।<sup>11</sup> ऊपर ईश्वर निर्मित द्वैत का विवेचन किया गया है जो ज्ञान में बाधक नहीं है प्रत्युत् उसी के मिथ्यात्व को जानने से अद्वैत की उपलब्धि होती है, अतः वह साधक है। यदि उसे निरस्त नहीं किया जा सकता है तो रहने दिया जाय। फिर भी उससे द्वेष करने की कोई कारण नहीं है, परन्तु जीव निर्मित द्वैत संसार है जिसका निवारण होना ही चाहिए।<sup>12</sup> जीवकृत द्वैत द्विधा विभक्त है— शास्त्रीय तथा अशास्त्रीय। तत्त्वज्ञान होने तक शास्त्रीय द्वैत का ग्रहण आवश्यक है। आत्मा से अभिन्न ब्रह्म के विचार को शास्त्रीय द्वैत कहा गया है। तदनुसार जगत् केवल मानसी सृष्टि है। श्रुति का

अनुशासन है कि तत्त्वानुभूति हो जाने पर उसका भी त्याग कर देना चाहिए। इसका तात्पर्य यह है कि त्रिपुटीरूप द्वैत जीव की मानस कल्पना है जिसे मान कर ही प्रमाण-प्रमेय-निरूपण शास्त्रों में होता है, अतः तत्त्वबोध के पश्चात् उसका भी त्याग हो जाता है।<sup>13</sup>

द्वैतवादी जब अद्वैत का प्रत्याख्यान करते हैं तब अद्वैतवादियों का प्रश्न होता है कि निषेध के लिए द्वैतवादी भी अद्वैत को स्वीकार कर लेते हैं। इस प्रकार द्वैतवादी कहते हैं कि अद्वैत को मान्य न करके हम अद्वैतियों के वचन का अनुवाद मात्र करते हैं और उसके दूषण हेतु तर्क उपस्थित करते हैं। यदि यह प्रतिपक्ष यथावत् लिया जाय तो भी प्रश्न उठता है कि जब द्वैत उत्पन्न नहीं हुआ तब क्या था? अद्वैत एवं द्वैत से भिन्न तृतीय कोटि प्रमाणित नहीं है और द्वैत अनुत्पन्न था। ऐसी स्थिति में यही स्वीकरणीय है कि सृष्टि से पूर्व अद्वैत ब्रह्म ही था।<sup>14</sup> स्वयंप्रकाश ब्रह्मतत्त्व निरुपाधि है जिसमें त्रिपुटी नहीं होती, अतः वह अद्वैत है। उसी को उपनिषदों में भूमा आनन्द कहा गया है।<sup>15</sup> अपरिमित की "भूमा" संज्ञा है।<sup>16</sup> भूमा ही सुख है किन्तु अल्प में सुख नहीं होता। इसका तात्पर्य यह है कि जहां ज्ञाता, ज्ञान एवं ज्ञेय आदि की त्रिपुटी रहती है वहां अल्पता है क्योंकि परिच्छिन्न में ही त्रिपुटी होती है किन्तु जब त्रिपुटी रहित परमतत्त्व ही शेष रहता है तब वह भूमा परम सुख है।<sup>17</sup> उसी भूमा की मात्रा को बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् (4/3/32) में अल्प सुख गया है। मात्रा रूप अल्प सुख दुःखविद्ध रहता है, अतः वह निरपेक्ष आनन्द नहीं है।

जागरित अवस्था में शब्दादि विषय संवेद्यरूप से पृथक्-पृथक् पाये जाते हैं किन्तु उनकी संविद् उनसे भिन्न रहती हुई अपनी एकरूपता में स्वरूपतः अभिन्न रहती है। स्वप्नावस्था के संवेद्य अस्थायी और जागरित के स्थायी पाये जाते हैं, यह दोनों अवस्थाओं में भेद रहता है किन्तु उभयत्र एकरूप रहने वाली संविद् में कोई भेद नहीं पाया जाता है। सुषुप्ति अवस्था से जागरण में आया हुआ पुरुष उस अवस्था के अज्ञान का स्मरण करता है कि मैंने कुछ नहीं जाना, यह स्मृति ज्ञात विषय की ही हो सकती है और सुषुप्ति में अज्ञान में अज्ञान का ही सूक्ष्म ज्ञान होता है। सुषुप्त का यह बोध भी विषय रूप अज्ञान से भिन्न होकर भी बोध से भिन्न नहीं है किन्तु स्वप्न संवित् के समान वह भी संवित् ही है। इस प्रकार तीनों

अवस्थाओं से संवित् का एक ही स्वरूप रहता है। दूसरे दिन भी तीनों की एक ही संविद् पायी जाती है। मास, वर्ष, युग एवं कल्प तथा भूत भविष्य में विषयों के अनुसार अनेकधा होती हुई भी स्वयं प्रकाश संवित् एक रहती है जो न कभी उदय लेती है और न ही अस्त होती है। यह संवित् ही आत्मा एवं परमानन्द है क्योंकि यह परम प्रेम का विषय है। आत्मा में ही प्रेम पाया जाता है कि मेरा अभाव न हो और मैं सदा रहूं। इसी संवित्स्वरूप आत्मा में प्रपंच की विविधता का अध्यास या अध्यारोप होता है। प्रपंच में भी अद्वैत ही रहता है। जागरित का स्थूल, स्वप्न का सूक्ष्म तथा सुषुप्ति का कारण प्रपंच कहा गया है। इनकी समष्टि एकीभूत रूप में महाप्रपंच बनता है। जिस प्रकार अवान्तर वनों की एक समष्टि महावन अथवा अवान्तर जलाशयों की एक समष्टि महाजलाशय होता है ठीक उसी प्रकार तीनों प्रपंचों की समष्टि अपृथग्भूत महाप्रपंच है। इनसे उपहित चैतन्यों को क्रमशः वैश्वानर, सूत्रात्मा तथा ईश्वर कहा गया है। अवच्छेदवाद के अनुसार ये तीनों अवान्तरवनावच्छिन्न आकाशवत् और प्रतिबिम्बवाद के अनुसार अवान्तर जलाशयों में प्रतिबिम्बाकाशवत् (तीनों ही) एक हैं। महाप्रपंच तथा उपहित चैतन्य को तप्त लोह गोलक के समान अपृथग्भाव से लेने पर अनुपहित चैतन्य ही रहता है, अग्नि से गोलक का पार्थक्य नहीं। इस प्रकार सब कुछ ब्रह्म ही कहा गया है। जिस प्रकार अग्नि को अयोगोलक से पृथक् मानकर लिया जाय तो लाक्षणिक अद्वैत व्यवहार में आता है उसी प्रकार चैतन्य का लाक्षणिक अद्वैत बनता है। इस प्रकार वस्तुरूप आत्मा में अवस्तुरूप प्रपंच का अध्यारोप व्याख्या पाता है। शुक्ति में भ्रान्त रजतारोप के समान यह मिथ्या प्रपंच है। रजतभ्रम हटने पर शुक्तिवत् ब्रह्म ही शेष रहता है जिसके लिये अपवादरीति अपेक्षित है।

वस्तु के विवर्तरूप अवस्तु का वस्तुरूप रहना अपवाद है। जैसे, रज्जुविवर्त सर्प रज्जुमात्र होता है। इस अपवादरीति के अज्ञानादि समस्त अवस्तुरूप प्रपंच की ब्रह्मरूपता शेष रहती है। जरायुजादि चतुर्विध स्थूल शरीर भोगायतन है, अन्नपानादि भोग्यविषय है, इन तीनों के आयतनभूत चतुर्दश लोक हैं और उन सबका आयतन ब्रह्माण्ड है। ये सब पंचीकृत भूत मात्र हैं। शब्दादि विषयों के सहित पंचीकृत भूत तथा सूक्ष्म शरीर का संघात अपने कारणभूत अपंचीकृत भूतमात्र से अभिन्न है। सत्त्वादि गुणों के

सहित अपंचीकृत भूत उत्पत्ति के व्युत्क्रम से अपने कारणभूत अज्ञानोपहित चैतन्य मात्र हैं। अज्ञान तथा ईश्वररूप अज्ञानोपहित चैतन्य अपने आधारभूत अनुपहित चैतन्य मात्र है। अनुपहित चैतन्य तुरीय ब्रह्म मात्र है।

अद्वैत वेदांत के अनुसार प्रपंच ब्रह्म का विवर्त है। माया प्रपंचरूप से परिणाम लेती है। ब्रह्म की संवित् माया है जो उससे भिन्न नहीं है। शक्तिबलरूप में ब्रह्म को ईश्वर कहा जाता है। प्रपंच का ब्रह्म पर अध्यारोप होता है जिसका कारण जीवों की अनादि वासना है। जीवों के स्वरूप की ब्रह्मरूपता मुख्यार्थतः अद्वैत है। यह अद्वैत प्रपंच के विलय से होता है जो इस दर्शन में अपवाद कहा जाता है और इसी को प्रतिप्रसव एवं प्रतिलोमविवर्त या संवर्त कहा गया है। जिस जीव की अविद्या क्षीण हो जाती है उसके प्रति यह अपवाद पूर्णता प्राप्त करता है जिससे जीव का जीवत्व न रहकर ब्रह्मत्व उपलब्ध होता है। प्रापंचिक द्वैत ईश्वरकृत है और अहंताममतारूप द्वैत जीवकृत माना गया है। जीवकृत द्वैत के हटने पर प्रपंच का मिथ्यात्व प्रतीत होता है और यही जीवन्मुक्ति है। जब द्वैत रहता है तब अन्य अन्य को जानता है। तब किसी पुरुष के प्रति सब आत्मा ही हो गया तब किससे जाना जाय? जिससे सब विज्ञात होता है उसे किस साधन से जाना जा सकता है? ज्ञाता के जानने का कोई साधन नहीं है। अतएव “नेति-नेति” की अपवाद प्रणाली से प्रपंच का निषेध कर अद्वैत तत्त्व की अपरोक्षानुभूति व्यवस्थित है।<sup>18</sup>

### अध्यास की उपस्थापना

उपर्युक्त विवरण में अद्वैत वेदान्त तत्त्व दृष्टि इतना ही फलित होता है कि इस जगत् का अधिष्ठान तत्त्व है। परन्तु यह अधिष्ठान रूप अद्वैत तत्त्व किस प्रकार द्वैत में विस्तीर्ण होता है, यह एक समस्या है। इसीलिए शंकराचार्य के अद्वैत वेदांत में ‘अध्यास’ का अपना एक महत्त्वपूर्ण स्थान है। ‘अध्यास’ को पूरी तरह से समझे बिना शंकराचार्य की जगत् को मिथ्या मानने (‘ब्रह्म सत्यम् जगत् मिथ्या’) की अवधारणा को नहीं समझा जा सकता। इसीलिए शंकराचार्य ने ब्रह्मसूत्र पर भाष्य से पहले भूमिका के रूप में अध्यासभाष्य लिखा है। उस अध्यासभाष्य पर विचार करने के पूर्व यह देखें कि शंकराचार्य ने अध्यासभाष्य प्रारम्भ क्यों किया। इस प्रश्न पर

विचार करने से कई तथ्यों पर प्रकाश पड़ेगा। अध्यास पर सर्वप्रथम दार्शनिक दृष्टि से विचार करना अत्यंत आवश्यक है क्योंकि प्रत्येक दर्शन का उद्देश्य किसी न किसी रूप में अविद्या या अज्ञान का नाश होता है। अतः यह जानना जरूरी है कि अविद्या क्या है और इसका स्वरूप क्या है? सम्भवतः इन्हीं प्रश्नों को दृष्टि में रखकर शंकराचार्य ने सर्वप्रथम यह सिद्ध किया है कि अध्यास है और वह अध्यास अविद्या के कारण ही हो सकता है। दूसरी बात जो शंकराचार्य अध्यासभाष्य में दिखाना चाहते हैं वह यह है कि अविद्या नैसर्गिक है और सभी अनर्थों का कारण है अर्थात् बिना अविद्या का नाश किये तज्जन्य अनर्थों से मुक्ति नहीं मिल सकती।<sup>19</sup>

‘अध्यास’ पर विचार करने पर एक और भी दार्शनिक कारण ज्ञात होता है। वह यह है कि उससे हमको सत्यासत्य के स्वरूप के विषय में भी संकेत मिलता है, क्योंकि इसी प्रसंग में शंकराचार्य का यह कहना है कि अध्यास में अध्यस्त और अध्यासवान दो तत्त्व होते हैं। वे दोनों न तो सत् हो सकते हैं और न दोनों असत् हो सकते हैं क्योंकि इन दोनों ही स्थितियों में बाध नहीं हो सकता है। अध्यास का बाध होता है। अतः अध्यस्त को मिथ्या मानना आवश्यक है जो सत् और असत् दोनों से भिन्न होता है। इस प्रकार मिथ्यात्व के स्वरूप का ज्ञान होने पर (मिथ्या वह है जिसका बाध होता है) सत्य के स्वरूप की ओर से संकेत मिलता है, क्योंकि तब हम यह कह सकते हैं कि सत् वह है जिसका बाध नहीं होता है (त्रिकालाबाधित सत्) और जो समस्त अध्यास का अधिष्ठानभूत है।

शंकराचार्य ने अध्यास का लक्षण बताते हुए कहा है कि— “स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः”<sup>20</sup> अर्थात् अन्य स्थान पर पहले देखी हुई वस्तु का स्मृति जैसा अवभास होना। इसमें “परत्र अवभास” इतना ही अध्यास का लक्षण है। “स्मृतिरूप और पूर्वदृष्टावभास” ये दोनों अध्यास के साधक हैं।

दर्शन की विधि की दृष्टि से भी अध्यासभाष्य में महत्त्व की बात मिलती है। अध्यासभाष्य में शंकराचार्य हमारे अनुभव और व्यवहार का विश्लेषण करते हैं। उसमें अध्यास और अविद्या भी सिद्ध करते हैं और उसी विश्लेषण से सत्यासत्य के स्वरूप पर पहुंचते हैं। इसका अर्थ यह हुआ है कि दर्शन को अनुभव का आधार लेकर चलना चाहिये और अनुभव का विश्लेषण करके सत्यासत्य का विचार करना चाहिये। दर्शन की यह

कल्पना पाश्चात्य दर्शन में प्राप्त दो कल्पनाओं से सर्वथा भिन्न है, वहां पर एक तो अनुभववाद है जो हमारे साधारण अनुभव को सर्वथा सत्य मानकर उसकी छानबीन करता है और दूसरा बुद्धिवाद है जो अनुभव से कोई सम्बन्ध न रखते हुये बुद्धि के सहारे तत्त्वातत्त्व पर विचार करता है। ये दोनों विधियां अपूर्ण ही नहीं वरन् दोषपूर्ण भी हैं। यदि हमारा साधारण अनुभव सत्य है तो दर्शन की आवश्यकता ही क्या है? अतः अनुभववादी दर्शन के वास्तविक अर्थ को नहीं समझते हैं और बुद्धिवादी यह नहीं समझते कि तत्त्व को यदि हम अनुभव के किसी स्तर पर नहीं प्राप्त करेंगे तो केवल बुद्धि— प्रत्ययों द्वारा प्राप्त तत्त्व को ही कल्पना मात्र होगा। अतः शंकराचार्य अनुभव का विश्लेषण तो करते हैं किन्तु अनुभव को सर्वथा सत्य न मानकर उसमें क्या सत्य है और क्या असत्य है, इस प्रकार का प्रश्न उठाते हैं। इस अनुभव में जो सबसे महत्त्व का है वह अध्यास है। इसी आधार पर हमारे जीवन का सुख दुःख निर्भर करता है और वह है 'अहं विषयक अध्यास'। इसलिए शंकराचार्य किसी अन्य विषयक अध्यास को न लेकर अहं विषयक अध्यास से प्रारम्भ करते हैं क्योंकि उनको यही दिखाना है कि अहं विषयक अध्यास ही सर्व अनर्थों का मूल है। अहं का विश्लेषण ही प्रधान दार्शनिक प्रश्न है और सभी प्रश्न प्रासंगिक हैं।<sup>21</sup>

शंकराचार्य अध्यास की सिद्धि के लिए युस्मद् और अस्मद् प्रत्यय अर्थात् मैं और तुम को विषयी और विषय के रूप में लेकर कहते हैं कि ये दोनों तमः प्रकाशवत् विरुद्ध स्वभाव के हैं तब भी हम एक पर दूसरे का आरोप करते हैं यह सिद्ध है। शंकर अध्यास की परिभाषा पुनः इस प्रकार देते हैं— "अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धि"<sup>22</sup> अर्थात् अतद् में तद्बुद्धि ही अध्यास है। यह परिभाषा पूर्व में दी गयी परिभाषा "स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः का संक्षिप्त रूप है।"

शंकराचार्य युस्मद् और अस्मद् के अध्यास को इसलिए लेते हैं कि अहं विषयक प्रश्न ही दर्शन का मुख्य प्रश्न है। जीवन की दृष्टि से अहं विषयक प्रश्न सबसे अधिक महत्त्व का है क्योंकि हम अपने विषय में क्या धारणा रखते हैं उसी पर हमारे सारे दुख—सुख, सारे व्यवहार और मूल्य निर्भर करते हैं। पदार्थों की गणना करना या सृष्टि सम्बन्धी प्रश्न अहं विषयक प्रश्न के ही प्रसंग में आते हैं। अतः यह प्रश्न गौण है। यही यहां

पर शंकराचार्य का ध्येय है। तमः प्रकाशवत् विरुद्ध स्वभाव कहने का अर्थ यह न समझ लिया जाय कि जैसे प्रकाश अंधकार का नाश कर देता है वैसे ही विषयी विषय का नाश करता है। विषय और विषयी विरुद्ध स्वभाव वाले हैं किन्तु विरुद्धत्व का अर्थ यह है कि एक ही वस्तु दोनों नहीं हो सकती। (विषय और विषयी दोनों नहीं हो सकती)। स्वभाव शब्द भी यहां पर स्वरूप के अर्थ में आया है अर्थात् विषय और विषयी दोनों स्वरूपतः विरुद्ध हैं। इसलिये उनके गुणों को या धर्मों को विरुद्ध कहना भी ठीक ही है। यहां पर एक और प्रश्न विचारणीय है कि वे क्यों अस्मद् को ही विषय विषयी के रूप में लेते हैं क्यों नहीं अहं सः को या त्वं सः को लेते हैं। इसका कारण यह है कि व्यवहार में प्रथम और अन्य पुरुष अथवा मध्यम पुरुष और अन्य पुरुष का योग या सम्बन्ध मिलता है जैसे एते वयम् इमे वयं, तत्त्वयम् आदि प्रयोग मिलते हैं किन्तु प्रथम पुरुष और मध्यम पुरुष योग नहीं बनता है। अतः उनको विरुद्ध कहना ठीक नहीं है। अहंत्वम् को ही विरुद्ध कहा जा सकता है।<sup>23</sup>

यदि हम विषय और विषयी का अध्यारोप एक दूसरे पर करते हैं जबकि वे विरुद्ध स्वभाव वाले हैं, तो यह अध्यारोप मिथ्या ही हो सकता है। यहां सर्वप्रथम यह विचारणीय है कि यह कैसे सिद्ध है कि हम इस प्रकार का अध्यारोप करते ही हैं? इसका कारण यह है कि हम अहं शब्द का प्रयोग शरीर के लिए करते हैं जब कहते हैं कि मैं बालक हूँ या वृद्ध हूँ, या लम्बा हूँ या नाटा हूँ और शरीर को हम चैतन्य समझते हैं। इससे यह सिद्ध हुआ कि हम अहं को शरीर और शरीर को अहं समझकर व्यवहार करते हैं। यद्यपि विषयी रूप से अहं और विषय रूप से शरीर दोनों विरुद्ध स्वभाव वाले हैं। दूसरा प्रश्न यह उठता है कि इस प्रकार के परस्पर आरोपण को मिथ्या क्यों कहा गया है और किस अर्थ में मिथ्या कहा गया है? मिथ्या इसलिए कहा गया है कि दोनों एक नहीं हो सकते क्योंकि विरुद्ध स्वभाव वाले हैं, परन्तु प्रश्न यह है कि इस अध्यास के मिथ्यारोप का अर्थ क्या है? क्या ये दोनों सत् हैं और इनका अध्यारोप मिथ्या है? अथवा ये तीनों मिथ्या हैं (विषय-विषयी और उनका अध्यारोप) अथवा इसमें से एक मिथ्या है इसलिए अध्यास ही मिथ्या है। यदि एक मिथ्या है तो उनमें से कौन मिथ्या है? इनमें से विषय और विषयी दोनों को सत् नहीं

कहा जा सकता क्योंकि उनका सम्बन्ध (अध्यारोप) मिथ्या है और दो सत् वस्तुओं का अध्यारोप (सम्बन्ध) मिथ्या नहीं हो सकता। दोनों को असत् भी नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि इन दोनों में जो विषयी है उसका निराकरण कभी नहीं किया जा सकता इसलिए यह कहना कि ये तीनों (विषय, विषयी, अध्यारोप) मिथ्या हैं यह ठीक नहीं है। अतः यही कहना पड़ेगा कि दोनों में से एक ही मिथ्या है— विषय अथवा विषयी। किन्तु जैसा कि हम बता चुके हैं विषयी का कभी निराकरण नहीं हो सकता, अतः विषय और उसके अध्यारोप को मिथ्या कहना शेष रह जाता है क्योंकि जैसा रज्जु सर्प के दृष्टांत से स्पष्ट है, जो आरोपित है उसका बाध होता है। बाध ही मिथ्यात्व है जिसे हम ख्यातिवाद के प्रसंग में स्पष्ट करेंगे।<sup>24</sup>

इस प्रकार यद्यपि विषय और विषयी नितान्त विरुद्ध वाले हैं और उनके धर्म भी नितान्त विरुद्ध हैं फिर भी उनका परस्पर अध्यास अविवेकजन्य ही हो सकता है। इस अविवेक के ही कारण हम सत्य और असत्य का समिश्रण करके अहं इदं, मम इदं आदि शब्दों का व्यवहार करते हैं। शंकराचार्य के (सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य)<sup>25</sup> शब्दों से स्पष्ट है कि अध्यास में सब कुछ मिथ्या नहीं होता बल्कि सत्यासत्य का समिश्रण होता है। जैसे यह सर्प है इसमें 'यह' सत्य है और सर्पांश मिथ्या है वैसे ही अहं में अहं सत्य है और इदं मिथ्या है। आगे शंकराचार्य कहते हैं कि अहं इदं मम इदं व्यवहार नैसर्गिक है। इस व्यवहार को नैसर्गिक कहने का शंकराचार्य का तात्पर्य यह है कि यह व्यवहार (अध्यास) कोई जानबूझकर नहीं करता बल्कि अज्ञात रूप से होता है अर्थात् (अध्यास) अचेतन मन की प्रतीति है और यह प्रतीति सर्वमान्य है किसी एक या दो की नहीं, किन्तु यह प्रतीति मिथ्या है। यहां पर व्यंजना इस बात की है कि प्रतीति मात्र होने से हम किसी वस्तु को सत्य नहीं कह सकते भले ही वह प्रतीति सर्वमान्य ही क्यों न हो। जैसे सर्वसामान्य प्रतीति है कि सूर्य और चन्द्रमा छोटे आकार के हैं एवं गतिमान हैं, फिर भी विचार करने पर हम इस प्रतीति को मिथ्या ठहराते हैं। शंकराचार्य प्रतीति और ज्ञान का भेद स्पष्ट करना चाहते हैं। ज्ञान विवेकपूर्ण है और प्रतीति अविवेकपूर्ण। इसी से ज्ञान द्वारा प्रतीति का बाध होता है। किन्तु ज्ञान का बाध सम्भव नहीं है। बहुत से दार्शनिक हमारी सामान्य प्रतीतियों के आधार पर ही दर्शन का महल खड़ा करना

चाहते हैं किन्तु यह प्रक्रिया ठीक नहीं है। सामान्य प्रतीति को दर्शन का आधार सत्या-सत्य के विचार के बाद ही बनाया जा सकता है, पहले नहीं। अर्थात् प्रतीति को ही ज्ञान मानकर के दार्शनिक विचार शुरू करना गलत है।

इसके अनन्तर शंकराचार्य के विषय में विभिन्न दार्शनिक धारणाओं का उल्लेख करते हैं। उनकी मीमांसा करके यह दिखाते हैं कि उनमें कौन सा अंश ग्राह्य है और कौन सा अंश अग्राह्य है। अध्यास के विषय में दो-तीन प्रश्न महत्वपूर्ण हैं जिनको ध्यान में रखकर हम अध्यास के स्वरूप का निर्णय करेंगे। प्रथम प्रश्न तो यह है कि रज्जुसर्प अध्यास में सर्प दिखायी पड़ता है या नहीं? दूसरा प्रश्न यह है कि क्या वह सर्प अन्य स्थल या अन्य काल में कहीं प्राप्त हो सकता है? तीसरा महत्वपूर्ण प्रश्न यह कि भ्रम निवारण के बाद उस सर्प की क्या स्थिति होती है?<sup>26</sup> इस सभी महत्वपूर्ण प्रश्नों को ध्यान में रखकर ही अध्यास की अवधारणा की पृष्ठभूमि में हम आगे अद्वैत वेदांत सम्मत ख्याति विचार की विवेचना करने का प्रयास करेंगे।

### अध्यास और ख्याति विचार

**अतस्मिन् तद्बुद्धि-** के रूप में अध्यास को परिभाषित करने के पश्चात् अद्वैतवेदांतियों के समक्ष स्वाभाविक प्रश्न उठता है कि क्या अध्यास का यह लक्षण अन्य दार्शनिक मतों को स्वीकार्य हो सकता है? अवधेय है कि अद्वैत वेदांत की दृष्टि में अतस्मिन् तद्बुद्धि अविद्यामूलक है। परन्तु इसकी अविद्यामूलकता को उसी तरह स्वीकार न करते हुए अन्य दार्शनिक सम्प्रदाय इसकी व्याख्या दूसरे रूप में कर सकते हैं। विभिन्न भारतीय दर्शनों के द्वारा ख्याति अर्थात् भ्रम की व्याख्या में इस बात को देखा जा सकता है। अतएव शंकराचार्य ने अपने अध्यासभाष्य में ही अध्यास को सर्वसम्मत रूप प्रदान करने के लिए एतद् विषयक तीन विकल्पों को प्रस्तावित किया है इसमें पहला विकल्प है- अन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यासः<sup>27</sup> (एक में दूसरे के धर्म का आरोप अध्यास है), दूसरा विकल्प है- यत्र यदध्यासस्तद्विवेकाग्रहनिबन्धनो भ्रमः<sup>28</sup> (जिसमें जिसका अध्यास है उसका भेदाग्रह निमित्तिक भ्रम अध्यास है), और तीसरा विकल्प है- यत्र

तदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामाचछते<sup>29</sup> (जिसमें जिसका अध्यास है उसमें विवरीत धर्मत्व की कल्पना को अध्यास कहते हैं)।

इन तीनों विकल्पों पर विचार किया जाये तो प्रतीत होता है कि उपर्युक्त तीनों विकल्प अतस्मिन् तदबुद्धि रूप अध्यास की सम्भावनाओं के तार्किक विकल्प हैं। इन तीनों विकल्पों से भिन्न किसी ऐसी स्थिति की कल्पना नहीं की जा सकती, जहां अतद् में तद् बुद्धि होती हो। अर्थात् इन तीनों विकल्पों में शंकराचार्य ने अध्यास अथवा भ्रम की सभी सम्भावनाओं को समीकृत किया है। इन तीन विकल्पों के निर्धारण में इस बात का भी ध्यान रखा गया है कि उस समय तक प्रसिद्ध और प्रचलित ख्याति विषयक विभिन्न सिद्धान्तों का अन्तर्भाव हो जाये। उदाहरणार्थ प्रथम विकल्प में आत्मख्यातिवादी-योगाचार मत और अन्यथाख्यातिवादी नैयायिक मत का अन्तर्भाव हुआ है। दूसरे विकल्प में सांख्य और मीमांसा दर्शन के ख्याति विषयक सिद्धान्तों का अन्तर्भाव हुआ है। एवं तीसरे विकल्प में असत् ख्यातिवादी माध्यमिक बौद्धमत का अन्तर्भाव किया गया है। यहां द्रष्टव्य है कि उस समय तक 'ख्यातिपंचक' की ही प्रसिद्धि थी। इसीलिये उपर्युक्त तीनों विकल्पों में ख्याति पंचक का ही अन्तर्भाव दिखाया गया है। परन्तु आज यदि भारतीय दर्शन में प्रसिद्ध ख्याति सिद्धान्तों की संख्या पांच से अधिक रूप में पहचानी जाये तो उनका भी अन्तर्भाव शंकराचार्य द्वारा प्रस्तावित त्रिविध विकल्पों में किया जा सकता है, क्योंकि ये विकल्प अध्यास की तार्किक सम्भावनाओं से सम्बन्धित हैं।

अध्यास के स्वरूप विषयक तीनों विकल्पों को प्रस्तुत करने के पीछे शंकराचार्य के दो उद्देश्य प्रतीत होते हैं इसमें पहला उद्देश्य अध्यास की उस सामान्य विशेषता को सामने लाना है जो तीनों विकल्पों में समान रूप से प्रसक्त होता है। वह विशेषता है 'अन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यास' अर्थात् अन्य में अन्य का अवभास होना। दूसरा उद्देश्य यह है कि अन्य में अन्य के अवभास को सभी दर्शन अपने-अपने तरीके से व्याख्यायित करते हैं। अतः 'अन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यासः' की अद्वैतवेदांतेतर व्याख्याओं का निराकरण करते हुए इसकी अद्वैत सम्मत व्याख्या को सर्वसम्मत रूप से प्रतिपादित करना। यहां द्रष्टव्य है कि स्वयं शंकराचार्य ने अन्य में अन्य के अवभास को अलग-अलग तरीके से व्याख्यायित करने वाले ख्यातिविषयक सिद्धान्तों की

आलोचना नहीं की है। उन्होंने बीज रूप में इसका संकेत मात्र किया है। शंकराचार्य के परिवर्ती आचार्यों ने इस बीजभूत दृष्टि को विकसित करते हुए ख्याति विषयक विभिन्न सिद्धांतों की अद्वैतमुखेन आलोचना की है। अतएव आगे हम इसी आलोचना को प्रस्तुत करने का प्रयास करेंगे।

**असत्ख्याति सिद्धांत**— माध्यमिकों का कहना है कि तत्त्व का स्वरूप शून्य है। भ्रम के कारण हमको तरह-तरह की वस्तुएँ दिखायी पड़ती हैं। वास्तव में माध्यमिक रज्जुसर्प आदि प्रत्यक्ष सम्बन्धी भ्रम का विचार नहीं करते। ये विचार सम्बन्धी भ्रम को ही लेते हैं और कहते हैं कि बुद्धि द्वारा प्रदत्त चतुष्कोटि या चारों प्रकार के सम्भव सिद्धान्त असत्य हैं क्योंकि वे असंगत हैं और तब प्रश्न यह है कि माध्यमिक जिसे मिथ्या कहते हैं उसका स्वरूप क्या है? अवश्य ही वह आकाशपुष्प के समान नहीं है क्योंकि वह प्रतीति का विषय है। परन्तु वह सत् भी नहीं है अतः उसे सत् और असत् से भिन्न कहना पड़ेगा। किन्तु माध्यमिक ऐसा नहीं कहते। वे लोग प्रत्यक्ष अनुभव वाले रज्जु-सर्प का दृष्टांत भी स्वीकार नहीं करते। वास्तव में ये किसी प्रकार दृष्टांत सामने नहीं रखते। अतः वे न तो यह कह सकते हैं कि भ्रम का कोई अधिष्ठान है और वे यह भी नहीं कह सकते हैं कि शून्य जगत् का अधिष्ठान है।

इनके अनुसार सभी वस्तुएँ तत्त्वतः अभावरूप ही हैं, क्योंकि आदि व अन्त में जो वस्तु जैसी हो मध्य में भी वह वैसी ही होती है। समस्त सांसारिक पदार्थ न अपनी उत्पत्ति से पूर्व हैं, न विनाश के पश्चात् रहते हैं, अतः आदि व अन्त में अभाव या शून्यरूप होने के कारण मध्य में भी तत्त्वतः वे असत् ही हैं। जो कुछ भी 'है' कहलाता है वह वर्तमान काल-युक्त होता है, और यह वर्तमानत्व भी कुछ है नहीं, क्योंकि यह भी निर्देश से पहले 'भविष्यत्' और निर्देश के पश्चात् 'अतीत' होता है। यह वर्तमान होना, भावी होना, अतीत होना भी वस्तुतः कुछ है नहीं अर्थात् असत् या शून्य ही है। ज्ञान की एक शक्ति अविद्या है जो असत् वस्तु का प्रकाशन करने में समर्थ है। इस विषय में बौद्ध मत का उल्लेख करते हुए वाचस्पति मिश्र में भामती में प्रायः समान शब्दों में कहा है कि विषय में प्रकाशित होने की कोई सामर्थ्य न रहने पर भी ज्ञान ऐसा है कि विषय अपने प्रत्यय (ज्ञान) की

सामर्थ्य से ही प्राप्त स्वरूप वाला रहता हुआ असत् (शून्य) होते हुए प्रकाशित होता है। असत् को प्रकाशित करने की शक्ति ही अविद्या है।<sup>30</sup>

**असत्ख्याति का अद्वैतमुखेन खण्डन—** माध्यमिक बौद्धों के इस तर्क कि ज्ञान में असत् को प्रकाशित करने की शक्ति है, इस पर आनन्दबोध न्यायमकरन्द में विकल्प उठाते हैं कि अगर ज्ञान में असत् को प्रकाशित करने की शक्ति है तो उस शक्ति का शक्य क्या है? (उस शक्ति का उपयोग कहां है?) यदि असत् ही उसका शक्य (उपयोगस्थल) है तो वह असत् इस विज्ञान में रहने वाली शक्ति का कार्य है या इसके द्वारा ज्ञाप्य है? यदि कार्य है तो फिर असत् कैसे? और असत् है तो इसके कारण भूत शक्ति में प्रकाशसामर्थ्य कैसी? न ही इसे ज्ञाप्य या प्रकाश्य कहा जा सकता है, क्योंकि इस 'इदं रजतं' भ्रम से अतिरिक्त तो कोई अन्य असद्विषयक भ्रम इस शक्ति से उत्पन्न होता नहीं। क्योंकि प्रकाश्य का अर्थ है उक्त शक्ति द्वारा नित्य ज्ञान का विषय। अब इस शक्ति द्वारा जनित ज्ञान कोई अन्य है, या इस शक्ति का आश्रय भूत ज्ञान यहां अभिमत है? यदि कोई दूसरा ज्ञान उपलब्ध हो तो उसके प्रकाश के लिये पुनः अन्य ज्ञान की अपेक्षा होने से अनवस्था होगी।<sup>31</sup>

**सदसत्ख्याति सिद्धान्त—** सांख्य दर्शन में इस ख्याति को मान्यता प्रदान की गई। इसके अनुसार भ्रम स्थल पर शुक्ति में जो रजत ज्ञान की प्रतीति होती है उसमें सत् एवं असत् दोनों का ही ज्ञान होता है; क्योंकि 'यह रजत है' इस प्रतीति में 'यह' अंश तक का ज्ञान किसी भी प्रकार गलत या झूठा या सत्यभिन्न नहीं, सुतरां उतने अंश में सत् ही है। जो रजत अंश है, वह वहां (जहां सीप पड़ी है) है नहीं, जो नहीं है वह असत् है, उसी का यह ज्ञान है। अतः 'यह रजत है' यह सत् तथा असत् दोनों का एक साथ ज्ञान है। वाचस्पति मिश्र ने भामती में इसका पक्ष रखते हुए कहा है कि वस्तुओं का तत्त्व दो प्रकार का है— सत्त्व तथा असत्त्व, पहला स्वरूपतः होता है दूसरा परतः (अन्य की अपेक्षा से)। वस्तु सदसदात्मक है, उसमें स्वरूप व अन्य के रूप की अपेक्षा से कभी कोई सत्त्व देखता है कोई असत्त्व।<sup>32</sup>

**सदसत्ख्याति का अद्वैतमुखेन खण्डन—** अद्वैतवेदांतियों के अनुसार यह सिद्धांत किसी भी प्रकार से ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि यहां सत् होने तथा

असत् होने का अभिप्राय निर्धारित नहीं। यदि प्रसिद्ध अर्थ लिया जाये तो असत् है तुच्छ आकाशकुसुम आदि। उनकी ख्याति (प्रतीति) कभी नहीं होती। तथा जो असत् है, वह तो है नहीं, तो एक वस्तु से दो ज्ञान कैसे उत्पन्न होंगे? 'यह' तथा 'रजत' पद के वाच्य दो पदार्थ वहां हों तभी तो दो ज्ञान हों। वहां तो वस्तु (सीप) एक ही है।<sup>33</sup> अतः सांख्यवादी भ्रम की उचित व्याख्या नहीं करते हैं।

**सत्ख्याति सिद्धांत—** इस सिद्धांत के प्रतिपादकों में रामानुज एवं प्राचीन सांख्य का वैचारिक मत है कि – 'सर्व सर्वात्मकं विश्वं' के अनुसार शुक्ति के अवयवों के साथ ही रजत के अवयव भी सदा रहते हैं। वे दोनों समान रूप से सत्य हैं। शुक्ति में स्थिर रजतपरमाणुओं से दोषयुक्त नेत्र सम्बन्ध होता है, इसलिए वहां सीप न दिखकर चांदी दिखती है। अथवा उस पुरः स्थित वस्तु में सभी प्रकार के परमाणु विद्यमान हैं, उनमें से शुक्ति-परमाणु उद्भूत रूप वाले हैं, अतः शुक्ति ही सामान्य इन्द्रिय संयोग से दिखायी पड़ती है, और उपयोग में आती है। दोषयुक्त इन्द्रियसम्पर्क (दोष चाहे इन्द्रिय में हो, चाहे सम्पर्क में या दोनों में) होने पर तथा चमकीलेपन के सादृश्य के कारण वहां शुक्ति के परमाणुओं के ढकते हुये रजत के परमाणु उद्भूत रूप वाले हो जाते हैं, अतः सचमुच का रजत उत्पन्न हो जाता है। अतः सत्ख्यातिवादियों के अनुसार इन्द्रिय द्वारा इस सद्योजात रजत का ही ग्रहण होता है।

विमुक्तात्मा ने इष्टसिद्धि में अत्यंत संक्षेप में सत्ख्यातिवाद का अभिप्राय बताया है कि शशशृंग या उसके समान शब्दमात्र से की जाने वाली वस्तुओं की प्रतीति नहीं होती है, भ्रम में शुक्ति के स्थान पर रजत प्रतीत हो रहा है; अतः वह रजत शशशृंग आदि के समान तुच्छ नहीं है इसलिए सत् ही है। ख्याति ही उसकी सत्ता में प्रमाण है।<sup>34</sup>

**सत्ख्याति का अद्वैतमुखेन खण्डन—** अद्वैतवेदांती चित्सुखाचार्य ने तत्त्वप्रदीपिका में सत्ख्याति का निरास करते हुए कहा कि— भ्रम में प्रतीत होने वाला पदार्थ सत् ही नहीं है क्योंकि यदि वह सत् होता तो निषेध का प्रतियोगी न होता अथवा उसका बाध न होता। सत् होते हुए उसका बाधित होना विरुद्ध है।<sup>35</sup>

सत्ख्याति के विरोध में एक सामान्य युक्ति यह है कि भ्रमस्थलों में द्रव्य—मात्र के परमाणु रहना कदाचित् सम्भव भी हो किन्तु क्रियायुक्त जीव—तुल्य या सजीव वस्तु तथा अतिविस्तीर्ण गन्धर्वनगर आदि की परमाणु—कल्पना तो अशक्य है। अतः भ्रमस्थल में भी किसी विद्यमान सत् वस्तु का ही ज्ञान होता है यह कहना युक्ति सिद्ध नहीं है।

**आत्मख्याति सिद्धांत—** योगाचार बौद्धों द्वारा मान्य ख्याति सिद्धान्त में आत्मख्याति या विज्ञान ख्याति कहा जाता है। विज्ञानवादियों के अनुसार क्षणिक विज्ञानों की धारा (एक के बाद दूसरे ज्ञानों का उत्पन्न होते रहना) ही तत्त्व है। विज्ञान तत्त्व का त्रिविध परिणाम होता है— विपाक, मनन और विषय—विज्ञप्ति या विषयप्रत्यवभास। कुशल अकुशल कर्म वासना के परिपाक से आक्षेप के अनुरूप फल की प्राप्ति विपाक है; जो स्थूल अनुभव में रूप से चलती हुई विज्ञानधारा है, यही आलय विज्ञान है। द्वितीय है मन, जिसका स्वभाव है मनन या वृत्ति। यह आलयविज्ञान पर आश्रित है और उसी को आलम्बन (विषय) बना कर कार्य करता है। तृतीय परिणाम है 'विषयप्रत्यवभास' जो मुख्यतः छः प्रकार का होता है— रूप, रस, गंध, स्पर्श, शब्द व धर्म। इनके आधार हैं स्थूल, सूक्ष्म घट—पट आदि पदार्थ, जो कि तत्त्वतः : विज्ञानधारा में विज्ञानगत आकार ही हैं, वास्तव में कुछ नहीं इनका नाम प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद है। विज्ञान ही एक मात्र तत्त्व या अर्थ है उससे पृथक् कुछ नहीं, वह (विज्ञान) ही विविध आकारों या सभी वस्तुरूपों में ख्यात या प्रतीत होता है, अतः अपने आप ही ख्यात होने से ज्ञान—मात्र आत्मख्याति है। विमुक्तात्मा ने आत्मख्याति पक्ष को स्पष्ट करने हुए कहा है कि तदनुसार ज्ञान का आकार होना ही वस्तु का स्वरूप है। ज्ञान आन्तर वस्तु है, अतः रजत आदि सभी कुछ आन्तर ही है। 'यहां बाहर रजत दिखाई देता है' उसमें से दिखाई देना तो ठीक ही है, बाहर होना ही भ्रान्ति है। 'यह रजत नहीं है' कहने से उस बाह्य स्थित होने का ही बाध होता है। एक अंश (बाह्यता) में ही बाध की उत्पत्ति सम्भव रहते पूरे अर्थ या दूसरे अंश में भी बाध की कल्पना करने से गुरुता ही बढ़ती है। अतः धी (विज्ञान) का वासनाकृत रूप ही स्वरूप है जिसका ऐसा रजत वहां है ही। वही ख्यात होता है, अतः ज्ञान मात्र आत्मख्याति है।'<sup>36</sup>

**आत्मख्याति का अद्वैतमुखेन खण्डन—** आत्मख्याति के खण्डन के सम्बन्ध में अद्वैतवेदांतियों का कथन है कि ज्ञान का आकार रूप ही रजत भ्रमस्थल में भी दिखाई पड़ता है यह कहना ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि रजत आन्तर (ज्ञान के सुख-दुःख आदि आकारों के समान) वस्तु हो ऐसा अनुभव किसी को नहीं होता। भ्रम स्थल में अथवा यथार्थ स्थल में रजतादि की आन्तरता किसी प्रमाण से सिद्ध नहीं, तब कैसे कहा जा सकता है रजत वस्तुतः ज्ञानाकार (आन्तर वस्तु) है, उसका बाहर दिखाई देना ही भ्रम है और यदि ऐसा मानें तो सभी ज्ञानों में भ्रम होना ही प्रसक्त होता है, फिर यथार्थ तथा अयथार्थ का अन्तर क्या होगा और यदि रजत आन्तर हो तो 'मैं सुखी हूँ' के समान मैं रजत हूँ या 'मुझमें रजत है' ऐसी प्रतीति होनी चाहिये।

आत्मख्यातिवाद का तर्क है, कि अत्यन्त (बाहर-भीतर सर्वत्र)— असत् (अलीक) का भान नहीं हो सकता, रजत का भान है, अतः बुद्धि रूप में रजत को सत् मान लेना होगा। चित्सुखाचार्य ने तत्त्वप्रदीपिका में कहा है कि उक्त तर्क असंगत है क्योंकि जैसे (आत्मख्यातिवाद के अनुसार) अत्यन्त असत् (अलीक) बाह्यता (इदन्ता) का भास रजत में हो जाता है, उसी प्रकार अत्यन्त असत् रजत का भी प्रतिभास क्यों नहीं हो सकता।<sup>37</sup>

**अन्यथाख्याति सिद्धांत—** इस सिद्धांत को मानने वाले नैयायिक एवं भाट्टमीमांसक मतों में भ्रम एक ज्ञान से विशिष्ट दूसरा ज्ञान है, जो यथार्थ (वस्तु के अनुरूप) नहीं है। सीप में चांदी दिखने के स्थल पर सामने पड़ी वस्तु से इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष होने पर पहले 'यह' इस आकार का सामान्य ज्ञान होता है, इन्द्रियदोष तथा दूरत्व आदि कारणों से उस वस्तु के विशेष अंश शुक्तिक का ग्रहण नहीं होता, केवल उसके चमकीलेपन का ग्रहण होता है; यह चमकीलापन चांदी के समान होने से तथा चांदी के प्रति इष्टसाधनता (उपयोगता) ज्ञान रहने से, सामान्य ज्ञान 'यह है' के पश्चात् उठी हुई विशेष अंश की जिज्ञासा 'यह क्या है' के फलस्वरूप ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्ष से दुकान पर स्थित चांदी का आलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष होता है। इस प्रकार 'यह' अंश से सामने पड़ी वस्तु का सामान्य ज्ञान तथा 'रजत' अंश में सचमुच के रजत (जो दुकान आदि में स्थित) का ज्ञान होता है, इसीलिये दोनों अंश मिलकर यह रजतत्व-प्रकारक विशिष्ट ज्ञान हो जाता है, जब कि वास्तव

में वहां शुक्तित्व वस्तु है। जो वस्तु जैसी (जिस विशेषण से युक्त) है, उसका उसी रूप से ज्ञान न होकर अन्य दूसरी किसी वस्तु के विशेषण से युक्त रूप का ज्ञान होना ही भ्रम है।

आनन्दबोध ने न्यायमकरन्द में अन्यथाख्याति पक्ष को रखते हुए कहा है कि सामने स्थित वस्तु विषयिणी प्रवृत्ति के समय वहां रजत के आरोप की कल्पना अवश्य करनी पडती है। वह रजत अत्यन्त असत् नहीं माना जा सकता है क्योंकि वैसे पदार्थ का तो प्रतिभास होता नहीं और जो है ही नहीं उसका बाध भी क्या होगा, यदि है (सत्) है। तो उसका बाध नहीं हो सकता। इन सब अनुपपत्तियों के कारण यही मानना चाहिए कि सीप का टुकड़ा ही दूषित नेत्र गृहीत होने पर किसी अन्य ही वस्तु (रजत) के रूप में अवभासित होता है।<sup>38</sup>

**अन्यथाख्याति का अद्वैतमुखेन खण्डन-** अन्यत्र स्थित वस्तु के आकार में सामने स्थित वस्तु प्रतिभासित होती है यह कहना ठीक नहीं है, क्योंकि इन्द्रिय की पहुंच के बाहर स्थित वस्तु का सामने स्थित वस्तु में ज्ञान होगा कैसे? ज्ञानलक्षणासन्निकर्ष अद्वैत वेदान्त में स्वीकृत नहीं है।

आनन्दबोध में न्यायमकरन्द में अन्यथाख्याति के खण्डन के लिए कहा है कि बाद में पुरस्कर्त्ता के मत में रज्जु व सर्प अन्योन्यात्मता (एक दूसरे से अभिन्न हो जाना, जो एक वस्तु का दूसरी वस्तु के आकार से ज्ञान होने के लिए अवश्य कल्पनीय है) क्या सत् रूप से अनुभवगोचर है, या असत् रूप से? प्रथम ठीक नहीं क्योंकि ये सामने स्थित तथा अन्यत्र स्थित वस्तुएं परस्पर एक दूसरे की अभावरूप हैं (रज्जु सर्प नहीं है, सर्प रज्जु नहीं है) तो कैसे इनकी अन्योन्यात्मता 'सत्' रूप से अनुभूत होगी। अथवा अन्योन्यात्मता होते हुए इनमें अभेद कैसे होगा। और यदि किसी प्रकार इनकी अन्योन्यात्मता सच्ची नहीं है तो फिर बाध (यह रज्जु है सर्प नहीं) का अनुभव अनुपन्न होता है। असत् रूप होना भी ठीक नहीं क्योंकि एक वस्तु में दूसरी वस्तु का होना असत्य ठहरा करता है, यह अन्योन्यात्मता आरोपित स्वरूप वाली होने से कोई दूसरी वस्तु नहीं है, वह इदंकारास्पद ('यह' ज्ञान में आश्रित) जो चाहे रजत ही हो, चाहे दोनों से अतिरिक्त घड़ा आदि हो। अतः इन तीनों प्रकारों से अन्य कुछ कहना हो तो अनिर्वचनीयता

ही कहनी होगी।<sup>39</sup> इस प्रकार भ्रम की व्याख्या में अन्यथात्व जैसा कि नैयायिक मानते हैं, उसके लिए अवकाश ही नहीं है।

**अख्याति सिद्धांत—** अख्यातिवाद के समर्थक प्राभाकर मीमांसक माने जाते हैं। उनक अनुसार सभी ज्ञान यथार्थ हैं। जहां शुक्ति के स्थान पर रजत दिखाई देता है, वहां भी वे भ्रम नहीं कहते। उनके अनुसार वहां ग्रहण तथा स्मरण रूप दो यथार्थ ज्ञान हैं। 'यह रजत' है प्रतीति में पहला अंश 'यह' तो सामने स्थित वस्तु का ग्रहण है, तथा द्वितीय अंश 'रजत' पहले देखे हुए रजत का स्मरण है, प्रथम का कारण है इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष और दूसरे का— सादृश्य से उद्बुद्ध हुये संस्कार। पहला अंश सामान्य ज्ञान है, दूसरा विशेषज्ञान। दोनों में जो अन्तर है वह दोष के कारण नहीं जाना जाता। बस यही इस ज्ञान को शुक्ति में शुक्तिज्ञान तथा घट में घटज्ञान इत्यादि अन्य ज्ञानों से पृथक् कर देता है, उस अन्तर के कारण ही इसे भ्रम कह दिया जाता है, वस्तुतः भ्रम का वाच्य कोई एकीकृत ज्ञान नहीं होता।

विमुक्तात्मा ने इष्टसिद्धि में अख्याति का स्वरूप बड़े ही संक्षिप्त शब्दों में निरूपित किया है। भ्रमस्थल पर जो शुक्ति के स्थान पर रजत दिखाई देता है, वहाँ न तो असत् रजत की प्रतीति होती है न ही अन्यत्र सत् रजत की ही प्रतीति होती है, प्रत्युत स्थिति यह है कि यहाँ दो ज्ञान हैं। इन्द्रिय सन्निकर्ष से तो उस वस्तु का 'यह' ऐसे आकार वाला सामान्य ज्ञान होता है। साथ ही चमक के सादृश्य से रजत का संस्कार जग जाने के कारण रजत की स्मृति होती है। उस स्मृति का वास्तविक रूप तो होता है— वह (पहले देखा हुआ) रजत—किन्तु यहां ज्ञान—प्रक्रिया में दोष रहने के कारण 'वह' अंश लुप्त हो जाता है, केवल 'रजत' अंश रह जाता है। ये दो पृथक्—पृथक् (क्रमशः प्रत्यक्ष व स्मरण रूप) ज्ञान हैं; ऐसा विवेक नहीं रहता, इसी से उस 'यह' ज्ञान के विषय को ही रजत समझ लेना रूप भ्रान्ति उदित होती है। ये दोनों 'यह' ज्ञान तथा रजतज्ञान—यथार्थ होते हुए भी परस्पर मिलित होकर उक्त अयथार्थ व्यवहार का प्रवर्तन करते हैं। ज्ञान अयथार्थ नहीं होता। बाद में जो 'यह रजत नहीं है'— ऐसा ज्ञान होता है, वह उक्त विवेक की अख्याति (अन्तर के प्रकाशित न होने) को ही दूर

करता हुआ, सीप व रजत के मिलित रूप से प्रवृत्त अयथार्थ व्यवहार को ही निवृत्त करता है, किसी पहले प्राप्त अयथार्थ ज्ञान का बाध नहीं करता।<sup>40</sup>

**अख्याति सिद्धांत का अद्वैतमुखेन खण्डन-** चित्सुखाचार्य ने तत्त्वप्रदीपिका में अख्याति सिद्धांत का खण्डन करते हुये कहा है कि (दो) ज्ञानों तथा उनके (दो) ज्ञेयों के अन्तर का ग्रहण न होना ही विभ्रम शब्द कहा जाता है— यह कहना उचित नहीं क्योंकि सभी भावों (पदार्थों) को विभेदस्वभाव वाला मान लेने पर स्वयंप्रकाश होने के नाते स्फुटतर आभास (प्रतीति) वाले ज्ञानों तथा उनके अधीन प्रकाश वाले अर्थों (ज्ञेयों) में अन्तर का ग्रहण न हो, ऐसा हो नहीं सकता। यह नहीं कहा जा सकता है कि अवभासित होती हुई वस्तु ही भेद का अवभास है— क्योंकि अवभास और अनवभास रूप विरुद्ध धर्मों की एक में स्थिति सम्भव नहीं है।<sup>41</sup>

### अनिर्वचनीयख्याति का मंडन

इस प्रकार विविध युक्तियों के व्याख्यापक ये छहों पक्ष (ख्यातिवाद) खण्डित हो जाते हैं, इन सब में दिखने वाले दोषों से बचते हुए अद्वैतवेदान्ती आचार्य भ्रम को अनिर्वचनीयख्याति कहकर स्थिति की सबसे अधिक समंजस व्याख्या करते हैं। आनन्दबोध ने 'न्यायमकरन्द' में "अनिर्वचनीय" अर्थ का अवभास विभ्रम है", यह कहते हुए अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति का युक्तिपूर्ण उल्लेख किया है। तदनुसार भ्रम में दिखाई देने वाली वस्तु न सत् होती है, न असत् और न ही दोनों, बल्कि अनिर्वचनीय होती है।<sup>42</sup> वह सत् इसलिए नहीं क्योंकि उसका बाध हो जाता है और जिसका बाध हो जाता है उसे अद्वैतवेदान्त की दृष्टि से सत् नहीं कहा जा सकता और असत् इसलिए नहीं क्योंकि उसकी वर्तमान में प्रतीति होती है।

वस्तुतः अनिर्वचनीय होने का अर्थ निर्वचन का अभाव मात्र (किसी प्रकार कहा न जा सकना) नहीं है। सत् और असत् कोटियों से पृथक्-पृथक् या दोनों से एक साथ विलक्षण (पृथक् भिन्न) होना ही अनिर्वचनीयता नहीं है। क्योंकि ऐसा होता तो, असत् से विलक्षण होना सत् में और सत् से विलक्षण होना असत् में तथा सत् व असत् दोनों से विलक्षण होना (उभयाभाव) पृथक्-पृथक् सत् तथा असत् दोनों में ही प्राप्त

होता है। इसलिए पृथक्-पृथक् एक (सत् व असत्) प्रकार से विलक्षण होते हुए दोनों से विलक्षण होना ही सही अर्थों में अनिर्वचनीयता है।<sup>43</sup>

ऐसे अनिर्वचनीय पदार्थ की सिद्धि अर्थापत्ति प्रमाण के द्वारा होती है। जैसे कि अत्यन्त सत् शशशृंग आदि वस्तुओं की तो कभी प्रतीति होती नहीं और वास्तव में सत् का कभी बाध नहीं होता। यहां भ्रमस्थल पर दिखाई देने वाली वस्तु प्रतीति का विषय होती है और बाध का भी। इन दोनों का अर्थात् प्रतीति और बाध का एक साथ होना अनुपपन्न है, जब तक कि वास्तविक सत् तथा असत् दोनों से ही विलक्षण प्रकृति की कोई वस्तु न हो। अतः अर्थापत्ति द्वारा उभयविलक्षण रूप में अनिर्वचनीय वस्तु की कल्पना करना आवश्यक हो जाता है।<sup>44</sup>

यहाँ पर आपत्ति उठती है कि भ्रम स्थल के रजत को सत् तथा असत् दोनों से पृथक् माना जाएगा तो अनुभव में विरोध उत्पन्न होगा, क्योंकि भ्रम के समय अनुभव होता है कि यह सत्य रजत है, और बाध के समय “यह रजत नहीं है” जिसका अर्थ है कि रजत् असत् है। रजत को यदि दोनों प्रकारों से अलग माना जाएगा तो इन अनुभवों का विरोध होगा। इसके प्रति-उत्तर में आनन्दबोध ने कहा है कि भ्रम में जो रजत प्रतीत होता है, वह अनिर्वचनीय है। उसमें प्रतीति होने वाली सत्ता भी अनिर्वचनीय है, क्योंकि बाध समय रजत का उस स्थान से संसर्ग न होना ही जाना जाता है।<sup>45</sup>

वस्तुतः अद्वैतवेदान्त सम्मत अनिर्वचनीयता के प्रतिपादन में भ्रमज्ञान तथा बाधज्ञान दोनों की व्यवस्था एवं युक्तता तभी बनी रहती है जब भ्रम में प्रतीति होने वाली वस्तु तथा उसके (भ्रमरूप) ज्ञान को सत्त्व, असत्त्व और सदसत्त्व, इन सबसे रहित पृथक् अनिर्वचनीय, अविद्यात्मक माना जाए।<sup>46</sup> भ्रान्ति में जो कुछ भासित होता है वह वस्तुतः है या नहीं, इसका निर्णायक कोई प्रमाण न होने से भी वह अनिर्वचनीय है।<sup>47</sup> आनन्दबोध द्वारा कहे गये अनिर्वचनीयता के अर्थ को और स्पष्ट करते हुए चित्सुखाचार्य ने कहा है कि सत्, असत् और सदसत् उभयात्मक दृष्टि से जो किसी विचार कोटि में न आ सके उसे ही वेदान्तज्ञ मनीषी अनिर्वचनीय कहते हैं।<sup>48</sup>

पुनः भ्रमजात रजत को परस्पर विरुद्ध सत्त्व व असत्त्व के निषेधों का समुच्चय (एक साथ एक वस्तु में होना) भी नहीं माना जा सकता। एक ओर दोनों में से किसी एक (अन्यतर) का निषेध करने पर दूसरे का विधान अनिवार्य हो जाता है तो दूसरी ओर अद्वैतवेदान्ती उन दो निषेधों के समुच्चय को भी तात्त्विक नहीं मानते। जो रजत आदि प्रपंच स्वरूपतः अनिरूप्य है, उसमें कोई तात्त्विक धर्म कैसे रह सकता है? पुनः जहाँ विरोधी वर्गों में से एक का निषेध हो वहाँ अवश्य दूसरे का विधान होगा, ऐसा कोई भी नियम नहीं है।<sup>49</sup> यद्यपि यह तर्कशास्त्र का एक सर्वमान्य नियम है लेकिन अद्वैतवादियों की सफलता इस बात में निहित है कि अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति के माध्यम से वे इस नियम का अपवाद करते हैं।

अब यदि यह प्रश्न उठाया जाये कि भ्रम में प्रतीति होने वाले रजत का किसी भी प्रकार से निश्चयपूर्वक निर्वचन क्यों नहीं हो सकता? इस प्रश्न को स्पष्ट रूप से समझाते हुए प्रकटार्थ विवरण में कहा गया है कि भ्रमस्थल में दिखाई देने वाला रजत सत् ही है क्योंकि प्रतीति हो रहा है; ऐसा नहीं माना जा सकता क्योंकि तब उस (रजत) का यहां रहना ही प्राप्त होगा जबकि ऐसा नहीं है। यदि कहें कि वह रजत अन्यत्र सत् है तो बहुत दूर होने के कारण चक्षुः सन्निकर्ष की सीमा के बाहर होने के कारण उसे परोक्ष होना होगा। जबकि भ्रमात्मक रजत की प्रतीति को परोक्ष नहीं कहा जा सकता। यदि चक्षुः सन्निकर्ष की सीमा से बाहर होने के दोष के कारण उसे अपरोक्ष माना जाए तो इस तरह बहुत कुछ का प्रत्यक्ष होना गले पतित होगा।<sup>50</sup> अतः उस रजत का सत् रूप से निरूपण नहीं हो सकता। यदि उसे सत् रूप माना जाए तो उस दशा में किसी को उसका ज्ञान होना, किसी को न होना यह सम्भव नहीं हो पाएगा। पुनः असत् रूप माना जाए तो उसे गगनकुसुम की तरह त्रिकाल में भी ज्ञान का विषय नहीं होना चाहिए। परन्तु रजत्, सर्प आदि का प्रतीति भी होती है और उसमें प्रवृत्ति भी होती है। इसलिए प्रतीयमान रजत को अत्यंत असत् भी नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि यह सत्त्व का आश्रय लेकर ही प्रतीति का विषय बनता है। पुनः इसे सदसदात्मक भी कहा जाना उचित नहीं है क्योंकि ऐसा मानने पर विरुद्ध धर्मों का एकाश्रय मानना पड़ेगा। यदि ऐसा मान लिया जाए तो रजत आंशिक रूप से सत् और आंशिक रूप से असत् भी होगा।

तब प्रतीयमान रजत को किस अंश को भ्रान्त कहेगें और किस अंश का बाध होगा? इसे तत्त्वतः दोनों से विलक्षण भी नहीं कहा जा सकता, विरोध और प्रतीति से पराहत होने के कारण। अतएव प्रतीयमान रजत को अनिर्वाच्य ही मानना चाहिए।<sup>51</sup>

वस्तुतः अनिर्वचनीयता के निहितार्थ को समझने के लिए अद्वैत सम्मत भ्रम प्रक्रिया को समझना यहाँ आवश्यक है। प्रकटार्थ विवरण के अनुसार अज्ञान शुक्ति को आवृत करता हुआ रजत के आकार में तथा इस रजत के ज्ञानाभास के आकार में परिणत होता है। चूँकि ज्ञान वास्तव में अंतःकरणवृत्ति में प्रतिबिम्बित चैतन्य ही होता है जो अययार्थ नहीं हो सकता। अतः ज्ञानाभास रूप से जो प्रतीत होता है वही अनिर्वचनीय है। अद्वैतवेदान्त के ख्याति विचार को इस तरह देखने पर यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि जैसे एक व्यक्ति को ज्ञात होती हुई शुक्ति उसके साथ खड़े दूसरे व्यक्ति को नहीं दिखती, वैसे ही अज्ञान से आवृत हुई शुक्ति दूसरे के प्रति अनावृत रह सकती है इसीलिए एक को वहाँ रजत का भ्रम होने पर भी दूसरे को नहीं होता। अतः व्यक्ति के अज्ञान के द्वारा उत्पादित अनिर्वाच्य रजत को मानने से उक्त व्यवस्था बनी रहती है, अन्य मतों में वह दुष्कर या असम्भव प्राय है।<sup>52</sup>

इसी प्रकार विद्यारण्य ने अद्वैत वेदान्त सम्मत भ्रम प्रक्रिया को समझाते हुए कहा है कि भ्रमज्ञान का स्वरूप हमारे अनुभव में यह रजत के प्रकार का होता है इसमें 1. पहले दोषयुक्त इन्द्रिय से 'यह' अंश को ही विषय करने वाली अन्तःकरणवृत्ति उदित होती है 2. उसके बाद 'यह' अंश व उसकी ग्राहकवृत्ति में चैतन्य अभिव्यक्त होता है। 3. इस दशा के चैतन्य में विद्यमान अविद्या दोष (पूरी कारण सामग्री में कहीं भी स्थित दोष) से संक्षुब्ध होती है। 4. 'यह' अंश से अवच्छिन्न चैतन्य में रहने वाली अविद्या क्षुब्ध होकर सादृश्य से उद्बुद्ध हुए रजतसंस्कार की सहायता से रजत के आकार में विवर्तरूप परिणाम को प्राप्त हो जाती है। और 5. वृत्ति से अवच्छिन्न चैतन्य में स्थित अविद्या संस्कार से सहकृत होकर उस रजत को विषय करने वाली वृत्ति बन जाती है। 6. ये दोनों रजतविवर्त तथा वृत्तिविवर्त अपने-अपने अधिष्ठान रूप में स्थित एक ही साक्षिचैतन्य द्वारा प्रकाशित होते हैं इसी से रजत का अवभास होता है।<sup>53</sup>

यद्यपि इस प्रक्रिया में अंतःकरणवृत्ति तथा अविद्यावृत्ति ये पृथक्-पृथक् दो ज्ञान हैं, तथापि उन दोनों के विषय (सच्चा 'यह' अंश तथा मिथ्या 'रजत' अंश) परस्पर तादात्म्ययुक्त होने से एक ही हो जाते हैं। इसलिए विषयावच्छिन्न फल (प्रकट होना या दिखना) भी एक ही हो जाने से 'यह रजत है' ऐसे आकार वाले ज्ञान का भी एक होना गौण रूप से कह दिया जाता है।<sup>54</sup>

इसी क्रम में नृसिंहाश्रम ने वेदान्तत्वविवेक की स्वोपज्ञ 'दीपन' टीका में कुछ भिन्न प्रकार से भ्रम प्रक्रिया का निरूपण किया है। तदनुसार

1. दोष से दूषित नयन आदि के द्वारा शुक्ति से सम्बन्ध होने पर
2. अन्तःकरण की विषयदेश को व्याप्त कर लेने वाली 'यह' आकार वाली ही वृत्ति उत्पन्न होती है, वृत्ति द्वारा व्याप्त होने पर भी विषय का शुक्तित्व अंश उक्त दोष के कारण प्रतिबद्ध रहता है उसका आकार वृत्ति नहीं लेती। अतः 'यह है' इतना ही 'इन्द्रियसंयोग' आदि से उत्पन्न अन्तःकरणवृत्ति का आकार होती है, "यह शुक्ति है" ऐसा नहीं। इसके बाद 3. 'यह' अंश से अवच्छिन्न चैतन्य अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न चैतन्य के साथ एक ही उपाधि के सम्बन्ध के कारण अभिन्न सा प्रकाशित होता है।<sup>55</sup>
4. यहाँ (अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न चैतन्य में) शुक्तित्वरूप विशेष अंश से अवच्छिन्न चैतन्य का आवरण अज्ञान रहता ही है, क्योंकि उसकी निवृत्ति के प्रतिबन्धक आवरण को हटाने वाली शुक्तित्व आकार वाली वृत्ति उदित नहीं हुई है। यह अज्ञान ही अर्थात् 'यह' अंश से अवच्छिन्न चैतन्य में स्थित अज्ञान, सादृश्यदर्शन से जगे संस्कार, अधिष्ठान के सामान्यज्ञान तथा करणदोष से सहकृत होकर रजत के आकार में विवर्तित हो जाता है।
5. यह रजत अपने उत्पन्न होने के समय की सुख आदि के समान अपने आकार में ढली वृत्ति के बिना ही (सुखज्ञान के लिए सुखाकारा वृत्ति की आवश्यकता नहीं होती) साक्षी से सम्बद्ध होता हुआ प्रकाशित होता है। अतः 'इदंरजतम्' में रजत की प्रातिभासिक सत्ता है। पहले से उस रजत के यहाँ होने में कोई प्रमाण नहीं है। वह अपनी प्रतीति के साथ ही उत्पन्न और विनष्ट होता है।<sup>56</sup>

अतः अध्यस्त रजत अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न चैतन्य में स्थित शुक्तित्व अंश विषयक अज्ञान का ही विवर्त है तथा उसके ग्रहण के लिए अद्वैतवेदांतियों को पृथक् अवधि वृत्ति मानने की आवश्यकता नहीं पड़ती है। दुःख-सुख

आदि के सदृश इस रजत को भी साक्षिचैतन्य ही प्रकाशित करता है, अतः एक ही वृत्ति (अन्तःकरण) तथा एक ही विवर्त से कार्य निर्वाह हो जाता है।

अनिर्वचनीयख्याति की स्थापना करते हुए वाचस्पति मिश्र ने ब्रह्मसूत्र के अध्यास भाष्य की भामती में निम्नलिखित तर्क प्रस्तुत किये हैं—

- अनिर्वचनीय अध्यास सर्वत्र स्मृतिरूप होता है। स्वप्न में पिता आदि का देखना स्मृतिरूप ही है। निद्रा के व्यामोहवश निद्रित पुरुष नहीं जान पाता है कि पिता समीपस्थ नहीं है, अतः असन्निहित देशकाल में सन्निहित देशकालता का आरोप हो जाता है।
- कभी-कभी श्वेत शंख पीला दिखता है। इसमें भी सुवर्ण, बिल्व आदि पीत पदार्थों की स्मृति के साथ नेत्रगत पित्त की पीतिमा का योग रहता है। नेत्र की रश्मियाँ पित्तसम्प्रसक्त होकर शंख पर पड़ती हैं और पुरुष अपने नेत्रों के कामलारोग की पीतता न समझ कर शंख पर पीतता का आरोप करता है। इसी प्रकार गुड़ में रसनागत पित्त की कटुता का आरोप कर गुड़ को कटु कहा जाता है जिससे निम्बादि की स्मृत कटुता का योग रहता है।
- प्रतिबिम्ब-भ्रम (छाया पुरुष दर्शन) में भी स्मृति से आरोप की अनिर्वचनीयख्याति होती है। तीव्र सूर्य रश्मियाँ दर्पण या जल में पड़ती हैं और प्रवाह या दर्पण से विपरीत दिशा में किये हुए मुख को प्रकाश में दिखाती हैं जिससे पूर्वदृष्ट दर्पणादिगत प्रतिबिम्ब की स्मृति से किरणों पर प्रतिबिम्बारोप हो जाता है। भामती के इस उपस्थापन को स्पष्ट करते हुए कल्पतरुपरिमल टीका में स्पष्ट किया गया है—

**क.** जहाँ पहले जल या दर्पण में प्रतिबिम्ब देख कर सूर्य रश्मिगत प्रतिबिम्बाभास होता है वहाँ स्मृत प्रतिबिम्ब का आरोप स्पष्ट है परन्तु जहाँ उसी समय का देखा हुआ जलादिगत प्रतिबिम्ब नहीं होता और किरणों में दिखाई पड़ता है वहाँ कालान्तर में देखे हुए मुख-प्रतिबिम्ब की स्मृति से आरोप होता है।

**ख.** यहाँ शंका यह है कि यदि अनुभवगत जल या दर्पण की आधारता का मुख में आरोप माना जाय तो अन्यथाख्याति कहना चाहिये।

शुक्ति में रजत के अध्यास के समान यहां अनिर्वचनीयख्याति की व्याख्या नहीं हो सकती क्योंकि शुक्ति में अनिर्वचनीय रजत की प्रतिभासिक विवर्तात्मक उत्पत्ति मानकर व्याख्या हो सकती है किन्तु प्रतिबिम्ब भ्रम में अनिर्वचनीय मुख की उत्पत्ति नहीं मानी जा सकती। इसके उत्तर में कहा गया है कि दर्पणादि की अपेक्षा किरणों के आधार और प्रतिबिम्ब-दर्शन में आधाराधेयभाव की अनिर्वचनीय उत्पत्ति मानकर व्याख्या है।

- विभक्त नेत्रकिरणों से स्थानान्तर में स्थानान्तर के स्मृत चन्द्र का आरोप होने पर द्विचन्द्रदर्शन घटित होता है। एक स्मृत दिशा का अन्य दिशा में आरोप होने से दिग्भ्रम की अनुभूति होती है। अलातचक्र में चक्रस्मृति और शीघ्रभ्रमण से आरोप द्वारा चक्राकारता की अनिर्वचनीयख्याति बनती है। पूर्वदृष्टनगर की स्मृति का मेघादि आरोप होने से गन्धर्वनगर अनिर्वचनीय रूप में दृष्टिगोचर होता है।
- प्रतीयमान होना ही सत्ता नहीं है कि उक्त स्थितियों में सत्ख्याति कहा जाय और तब देह तथा इन्द्रियादि की प्रतीति को भी सत्ख्याति नहीं माना जा सकता। रज्जु में सर्प और स्फटिक में प्रतिबिम्बित लाली का प्रतिभास होने से ही उन्हें सत् मान लेने पर मृगमरीचिका से पिपासा का शमन भी होना चाहिए। मरुस्थल में प्रतिफलित तीव्र सूर्यकिरणों पर मन्दाकिनी का अध्यारोप होने से ही सत् जल की उपलब्धि नहीं मानी जा सकती है। अतः प्रतिभासित स्थलों पर न चाहते हुए भी वस्तुसत् की प्रतीति अमान्य ही करनी पड़ती है।
- किरणरूप से जल की मृगमरीचिका में वस्तुसत्ता न होने पर भी जल की स्वरूपतः वह परमार्थ सत्ता है जिसका प्रतिभास होता है। देह तथा इन्द्रियादि को असत् कैसे माना जा सकता है जबकि वे स्पष्ट अनुभूत होते हैं। इस स्थापना का खण्डन करते हुए भामतीकार कहते हैं कि स्वरूपतः होते हुए भी वस्तु की पारमार्थिकता नहीं सिद्ध होती। मृगमरीचिका को जलस्वरूप से सत् नहीं कहा जा सकता।
- असत्ख्यातिवादी की स्थापना है कि भाव से भिन्न अभाव नहीं होता। क्षणिक भाव ही भावान्तररूप से अभाव कहा जाता है जो स्वरूपतः

भाव है। कोई भाव अनुभव का विषय नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि उसमें अर्थक्रिया का सामर्थ्य नहीं रहता। उस दशा में चिदात्मगत आरोप या अध्यास का प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। यह भी समाधान नहीं हो सकता कि समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनक विषय के अभाव में भी ज्ञान स्वयं ही अपनी शक्ति से असत् का प्रकाशन करता है और असत् की प्रकाशन शक्ति को अविद्या कहते हैं क्योंकि विज्ञान की असत्प्रकाशनशक्ति का शक्य क्या है— कार्य अथवा ज्ञाप्य? कार्य नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि असत् को तत्त्वरूप से मान्य करना असम्भव है। ज्ञाप्यरूप भी नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि ज्ञापन हेतु ज्ञानान्तर की अपेक्षा होने से अनवस्थादोष है।<sup>57</sup>

इसका उत्तर देते हुये वाचस्पति मिश्र ने कहा है कि यदि निस्तत्त्व पदार्थ अनुभवगोचर नहीं होता तो क्या सूर्यकिरणों भी जलरूप में सतत्त्व हैं और उनका अनुभव होता है? उन्हें सतत्त्व तो कहा नहीं जा सकता है क्योंकि जलरूप से किरणों असत् हैं। वस्तुओं का तत्त्व दो प्रकार का होता है— सत्त्व और असत्त्व। सत्त्व स्वतः और असत्त्व परतः है।<sup>58</sup> वस्तु सदा स्वरूपतः सत् तथा पररूपतः असत् होती है। कोई कभी किसी रूप को जान पाता है। ऐसी स्थिति में असत्ख्यातिपक्ष असंगत है क्योंकि वह कुछ भी सत् नहीं मानता।<sup>59</sup>

सत्ख्याति पक्ष का सिंहावलोकन करते हुए भामतीकार कहते हैं कि सत्ख्यातिवादी के तर्कानुसार किरणों में जलनिर्भास को तत्त्वगोचर माना जाय तो उसे सग्यग् ज्ञान कहना चाहिए और तब अजलरूप किरणों का अजलरूप से ग्रहण किया जाय यह कैसे कहा जा सकता है? <sup>60</sup> जलाभावरूप किरणों को अभेदरूप से जल मानकर ग्रहण करने में सत्प्रत्यय कैसे हो सकता है?<sup>61</sup>

उक्त सिद्धांत को अमान्य करते हुए असत्ख्याति के प्रति अनुपपत्ति प्रस्तुत करते हुये कहा गया है कि मृगमरीचिका को असत् नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि एक वस्तु का असत्त्व अन्य वस्तु का सत्त्व माना जाता है। यदि कहा जाय कि आरोपित वस्तु ही अन्य वस्तु है तो भी असंगति आती है। आरोपित वस्तु किरण है तो किरण प्रत्यय होना चाहिए और जल होने

पर जल प्रत्यय। जलप्रत्यय गंगा में होना चाहिये, मरुस्थल में नहीं। नितान्त अवस्तुरूप असत् कैसे कहा जाय जब प्रत्यय होता है।<sup>62</sup>

- मृगमरीचिका में जल न सत् है, न असत् और उभयात्मक भी नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि परस्परविरोध है। अतः वह आरोपित जल अनिर्वचनीय है। इस प्रकार अध्यस्त जल यथार्थ एवं पूर्वदृष्ट जैसा भासित होता है जो तत्त्वतः न जल है और न पूर्वदृष्ट पदार्थ, किन्तु मिथ्या एवं अनिर्वाच्य है।<sup>63</sup>
- प्रातिभासिक के समान ही व्यावहारिक जगत् भी अनिर्वचनीयख्याति का विषय है। देहेन्द्रियादिप्रत्यय भी चिदात्मा में अध्यस्त होने से प्रतिभासिक प्रत्यय के समान ही अनिर्वचनीयख्याति है।<sup>64</sup>

### अनिर्वचनीयख्याति के प्रति अद्वैतवेदांतेतर दर्शनों के आक्षेप और

#### उनका प्रत्युत्तर

अद्वैतवेदांत के अनिर्वचनीय ख्यातिवाद पर अनेक आपत्तियाँ उठाई गई हैं। जिनमें रामानुज की आपत्तियाँ और उसके प्रति अद्वैतवेदांत का प्रत्युत्तर इस प्रकार है—

- रामानुज के अनुसार अनिर्वचनीयख्याति भी अन्यथाख्याति से पृथक् नहीं है। इस बात को मानना कि भ्रम की वस्तु अनिर्वचनीय है, इस तथ्य को भी स्वीकार करता है कि एक वस्तु अन्यथा वस्तु के समान भासित होती है और वही अनिर्वचनीय अन्यथा वस्तु भ्रम के समय सत् प्रतीत होती है।

रामानुज की इस आपत्ति को अद्वैत वेदांत स्वीकार नहीं करता। अनिर्वचनीयख्याति और अन्यथाख्याति में तालमेल नहीं है। अन्यथाख्याति के अनुसार सीप में चांदी की प्रतीति है और चांदी बाजार आदि में अन्यत्र होती है। अनिर्वचनीयख्याति में यह माना जाता है कि रजत अन्यत्र नहीं होता है वरन् अविद्या के कारण उसकी विक्षेप शक्ति से उत्पन्न होता है। अविद्या के रहने तक वह सत् प्रतीत होता है, किन्तु अविद्या के नष्ट होने पर रजत का बाध हो जाता है।

- दूसरी आपत्ति है कि यदि भ्रम काल में वस्तु अनिर्वचनीय ज्ञात होती है, तो वह नहीं होगा और यदि कहें भ्रम काल में वह अनिर्वचनीय नहीं होती है किन्तु ज्ञान होने पर ही वैसी ज्ञात होती है, तब यह अन्यथाख्याति ही है क्योंकि भ्रमवस्तु उस समय सत् ही ज्ञात होती है।

उक्त आपत्ति का पूर्वाग्रह यह है कि अनिर्वचनीय वस्तु में अनिर्वचनीयत्व नामक कोई स्थायी गुण मान लिया गया है, जबकि ऐसा नहीं है। एक ही वस्तु एक काल में सत् और दूसरे में असत् दिखाई देती है। वह न सत् दिखाई देते समय अनिर्वचनीय है और न असत् दिखाई देते समय। एक ही वस्तु सत् और दूसरे में असत् नहीं हो सकती इसलिए उसे अनिर्वचनीय कहते हैं।

- तीसरी आपत्ति यह है कि कोई वस्तु सत् या असत् ही होगी, अनिर्वचनीय जैसी कोई वस्तु नहीं होती है, क्योंकि तर्क का मध्यम परिहार नियम उसे स्वीकार नहीं करता है।<sup>65</sup>

इसके उत्तर में शंकराचार्य का कथन है कि तर्क सिद्ध न होकर भी अनुभव में आने के कारण ही अनिर्वचनीय है। यह “सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्ष” है।<sup>66</sup>

चौथी आपत्ति के अनुसार हम जो कुछ देखते हैं वह सत् ही होता है, असत् ज्ञान या भ्रम ज्ञान जैसी कोई वस्तु नहीं है।

इसके उत्तर में शंकराचार्य कहते हैं कि— **“मिथ्याप्रत्यरूप... सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः”**<sup>67</sup> अर्थात् मिथ्या प्रत्ययरूप भ्रम सर्वसामान्य के अनुभव में आता है अतः यह नहीं कह सकते हैं कि भ्रमज्ञान जैसा कुछ नहीं है। इसके अतिरिक्त यदि भ्रमनिवृत्ति भी नहीं है, किन्तु व्यवहार में यथार्थ ज्ञान होने पर सभी जन स्वीकार करते हैं कि उसके पूर्व उन्हें भ्रम था।

पांचवी आपत्ति है कि भ्रम की वस्तु उत्पन्न नहीं हो सकती इसलिये भ्रम की वस्तु का ज्ञान भी सम्भव नहीं है यदि कहें कि भ्रम ज्ञान होने के बाद भ्रान्त रजत की उत्पत्ति हो जाती है, तो ऐसा नहीं हो सकता, क्योंकि बिना रजत देखे उसका ज्ञान नहीं हो सकता है।

इसके उत्तर में अनिर्वचनीयख्याति कहते हैं कि भ्रम की वस्तु देखकर भ्रम नहीं होता। भ्रम का अधिष्ठान कुछ दूसरा ही होता है उसे हम देखते हैं, जैसे भ्रान्त रजत के दृष्टान्त में हम सीप देखते हैं, किन्तु सीप के उन

सभी धर्मों का ग्रहण नहीं कर पाते जिनके कारण हमें वह सीप रूप में रूप में ज्ञात हो। हम सीप के केवल उन्ही धर्मों का ग्रहण कर पाते हैं जो रजत में भी विद्यमान होते हैं। उन धर्मों के साथ हम अपनी कल्पना से रजत के शेष धर्म उन प्राप्त धर्मों के साथ जोड़कर उसी को रजत मान लेते हैं। अतः भ्रान्ति केवल मानसिक सृजन होता है इसलिये शंकराचार्य ने अध्यास के लक्षण में उसे 'स्मृतिरूप' माना है।

➤ रामानुज के द्वारा छठवीं आपत्ति यह दी गई कि इन्द्रिय दोष के कारण भ्रम की वस्तु उत्पन्न नहीं हो सकती, क्योंकि इन्द्रियों से तो ज्ञान ग्रहण किया जाता है, किसी वस्तु की उत्पत्ति नहीं होती है।

इसके उत्तर में अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवाद किसी वस्तु को दोषपूर्ण इन्द्रियों से उत्पन्न नहीं मानता। दोषपूर्ण इन्द्रियाँ गृहीत ज्ञान को दूषित या विकृत तो कर ही सकती हैं, जैसे, पाण्डुरोग में चन्द्रमा पीला दिखाई देता है। न वास्तविक चन्द्रमा पीला ही हो जाता है और न पीले रंग का चन्द्रमा ही निर्मित होता है, बस केवल नेत्र में पित्त दोष से सफेद रंग पीले में परिणत होकर अंतःकरण में भासित होता है।

विज्ञानवादियों की ओर से भी अनिर्वचनीयख्याति पर शंका करते कहा गया है कि वेदान्त-मत में यदि भ्रम स्थल पर रजत की स्मृति मानी जाये तो अख्यातिवाद प्रसक्त होगा, यदि रजत का ग्रहण (प्रत्यक्ष) माना जाये तो आत्मख्याति या अन्यथाख्याति ही प्रसक्त होगी। स्मरण व ग्रहण से अतिरिक्त तो ज्ञान का कोई तीसरा प्रकार होता ही नहीं।

इसका उत्तर देते हुये अद्वैतवेदान्ती कहते हैं कि— क्या उक्त दोनों से पृथक् (विलक्षण) सामग्री का निरूपण न हो सकने के कारण तीसरा प्रकार असम्भव है? या विलक्षण ज्ञान के स्वरूप का निरूपण नहीं किया जा सकता इसलिए वह असम्भव है? या विलक्षण विषय का निरूपण न हो सकने से यह असम्भव है। इनमें से प्रथम विकल्प ठीक नहीं क्योंकि इन्द्रिय सम्प्रयोग संस्कार तथा दोष रूप सामग्री वहां विद्यमान है।<sup>68</sup>

अख्यातिवाद की ओर से (चित्सुखी में उठाई गई) आपत्ति है कि दोष तो प्रतिबन्धक ही होते हैं, अतः वे प्राप्त कार्य के उदय को रोकते भर हैं, किसी अपूर्व (नये) कार्य को उत्पन्न करने में हेतु नहीं बनते।

इसके प्रति उत्तर में कहा गया है कि उदय का अभाव तो प्रागभावरूप है, नित्य है, किसी का कार्य नहीं, अतः दोष उसका कारण नहीं। किन्तु वात-पित्त आदि के दोष अपूर्व कार्य ज्वर आदि की उत्पत्ति करते ही हैं। तथा दोष संस्कारों का उद्बोधन करा देने भर से अन्यथा सिद्ध नहीं कहे जा सकते क्योंकि वह (संस्कारों को जगाना) तो उनका अवान्तर (गौण) व्यापार है। प्रधान व्यापार तो अनिर्वचनीय वस्तु को उत्पन्न करना ही है। जैसे उठना गिरना रूप व्यापार (क्रिया) से युक्त होती है कुल्हाड़ी छेदन (कार्य) के प्रति हेतु होती ही है।<sup>69</sup>

अख्यातिवाद की ओर से एक अन्य शंका की जाती है कि— इन्द्रियसम्प्रयोग तो केवल 'यह' अंश का ज्ञान करवा कर सामर्थ्यहीन हो गया (उसमें भ्रम रूप नया ज्ञान व उसके ज्ञेय को उत्पन्न करने का सामर्थ्य नहीं) फिर संस्कार ही शेष रहा जो रजतस्मृति को ही उत्पन्न कर सकता है, नयी वस्तु व ज्ञान को नहीं। अतः रजत की स्मृति ही माननी पड़ेगी, अन्यथा कैसे रजत उत्पन्न होगा और कैसे उसका प्रत्यक्ष जैसा ज्ञान होगा?<sup>70</sup>

इसके प्रत्युत्तर में विद्यारण्य ने वेदांतसम्मत भ्रम प्रक्रिया का विस्तार से निरूपण किया है। तदनुसार—

- क—** पहले दोषयुक्त इन्द्रिय से 'यह' अंश को ही विषय करने वाली अन्तःकरणवृत्ति उदित होती है।
- ख—** उसके बाद 'यह' अंश व उसकी ग्राहक वृत्ति में चैतन्य अभिव्यक्त होता है।
- ग—** इस दशा में चैतन्य में विद्यमान अविद्या दोष (पूरी कारण सामग्री कहीं भी स्थित दोष) से संक्षुब्ध होती है।
- घ—** 'यह' अंश से अवच्छिन्न चैतन्य में रहने वाली अविद्या क्षुब्ध होकर सादृश्य से उद्बुद्ध हुए रजत संस्कार की सहायता से रजत के आकार में विवर्तरूप परिणाम को प्राप्त हो जाती है। (विवर्तरूप रजत बन जाती है) और
- ङ—** वृत्ति से अवच्छिन्न चैतन्य में स्थित अविद्या संस्कार से सहकृत होकर उस रजत को विषय करने वाली वृत्ति बन जाती है।

च— ये दोनों — रजतविवर्त तथा वृत्तिविवर्त अपने-अपने अधिष्ठान रूप में स्थित एक ही साक्षिचैतन्य द्वारा प्रकाशित होते हैं; इसी से रजत का अवभास होता है।<sup>71</sup>

यद्यपि इस प्रक्रिया में अन्तःकरणवृत्ति या अविद्या वृत्ति ये पृथक्-पृथक् दो ज्ञान हैं। तथापि उन दोनों के विषय सच्चा 'यह' अंश परस्पर तादात्म्ययुक्त होने से एक ही हो जाते हैं, इसीलिये विषयावच्छिन्न फल (प्रकार होना या दिखना) भी एक ही हो जाने से 'यह रजत है' ऐसे आकार वाले ज्ञान का भी एक होना गौण रूप से कह दिया जाता है।<sup>72</sup>

इस प्रकार विद्यारण्य द्वारा किये गये विवेचन में भ्रम का वेदान्त-सम्मत स्वरूप परिष्कृत रूप में सामने आया है, इसमें भ्रम को वृत्तिद्वयात्मक (दो वृत्तियों से निष्पन्न) कहा गया, जिसमें अख्यातिवाद का प्रभाव होते हुये भी उसके दोषों का प्रवेश नहीं है।

**अलौकिकख्यातिवादियों** का प्रश्न है कि भ्रमस्थल से शुक्तिगत रजत को लेकर सिद्धि होती है, परन्तु तत्काल प्रातिभासिक रजत की विषमता में कोई प्रमाण नहीं है। अर्थात् यह अप्रमाणित है कि प्रत्यक्षकाल में ही शुक्तिगत रजत की उत्पत्ति होती है और फिर वह रजत प्रत्यक्ष का विषय बनता है। ऐसी स्थिति में यही मान्य है कि पूर्वसिद्ध एवं देशान्तरीय रजत ही स्मृतिगत होकर विषयता प्राप्त करता है।<sup>73</sup>

अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादी इस तर्क को अमान्य करते हुये कहते हैं कि इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष के अभाव से स्मृत रजतादि की प्रत्यक्षविषयता असम्भव है। ज्ञानलक्षण प्रत्यासत्ति से रजत ज्ञान का तर्क अयुक्त है क्योंकि यदि भ्रमस्थल में उसे मानकर ज्ञान की व्यवस्था दी जाय तो अनुमानस्थल में भी उसी से अग्नि आदि की ज्ञानविषयता बन जाने पर अनुमान का उच्छेद मानना होगा।<sup>74</sup>

इस पर प्रतिवादी की पुनः आपत्ति है कि व्यावहारिक रजत की उत्पत्ति में परमाणु आदि कारण होते हैं किन्तु रजत की उत्पत्ति में सामग्री का सर्वात्मना अभाव है।

इसका उत्तर देते हुए कहा गया है कि व्यावहारिक सामग्री प्रातिभासिक रजतादि की जननी नहीं है प्रत्युत विलक्षण या अनिर्वचनीय

सामग्री उत्पत्ति के प्रति उत्तरदायी है।<sup>75</sup> इसकी विलक्षण प्रक्रिया इस प्रकार है।<sup>76</sup>

- क-** कामला आदि से दूषित नेत्र वाले पुरुष में पुरोवर्ती शुक्त्यादि के संयोगादिसन्निकर्ष से इदमाकार या इदन्ताविशिष्ट विलक्षण अन्तःकरण वृत्ति उदय लेती है जो शुक्ति आदि के चाकचिक्यादि से स्वरूप ग्रहण करती है।
- ख-** उस वृत्ति में इदन्तारूप उपाधि से उपहित चैतन्य प्रतिबिम्बित होता है (जो अद्वैतवेदान्त की सामान्य प्रत्यक्ष प्रणाली है)।
- ग-** इन्द्रिय प्रणाली द्वारा चित्प्रतिबिम्बित अन्तःकरणवृत्ति विषयाकार लेते समय शुक्त्याकार न होकर इदमाकार या इदन्ताकार हो जाती है।
- घ-** तब इदमवच्छिन्न चैतन्यरूप प्रमेय, वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूप प्रमाण और अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूप प्रमाता का अभेद घटित होता है।
- ङ-** तदन्तर प्रमातृचैतन्य से अभिन्न विषय चैतन्य में शुक्तिआदि की प्रकारता वाली अविद्या सक्रिय होकर चाकचिक्यादि—जनित सादृश्य—दर्शन से उद्बोधित रजत संस्कार तथा कमलादिदोष के साथ रजतरूप अर्थाकार और रजतज्ञानरूप प्रतिभासाकार का परिणाम लेती है।

यहां प्रभाकरमतानुसार यह आपत्ति की जा सकती है कि यथार्थ ख्याति और अनिर्वचनीयख्याति में क्या अन्तर है, जब शुक्ति की इदमाकार वृत्ति और रजत की रजताकार वृत्ति उभयसम्मत है, शुक्ति को 'इदं' और परोक्ष रजत की अपरोक्ष मानने की प्रक्रिया प्रभाकर सम्मत ही है। दोनों को मिलाकर विशिष्ट ज्ञान की कल्पना दोनों मतों में नहीं की जाती है तब अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति का पार्थक्य किस बात में है?

इसके उत्तर में अद्वैतवेदांती कहते हैं कि साक्षिचैतन्य और वृत्तिचैतन्य स्वरूपतः एक हैं। इदमाकार और रजताकार दो वृत्तियों में प्रतिबिम्बित चैतन्य द्विधा प्रतिभासित होता है। इदमाकारवृत्ति सत्य और रजताकारवृत्ति मिथ्या वस्तु अवगाहन करती है जिसमें दोनों का अभेद घटित होता है जो मिथ्या है।<sup>77</sup> इनके अनुसार—

- क-** केवल साक्षी को लेकर प्रमा या अप्रमा का अवधारण नहीं होता प्रत्युत उपहित चैतन्य से वैसा निर्णय किया जाता है।

**ख-** इदमाकार और विषयाकार वृत्तियों की व्यवहारगत एकता होने पर प्रमा अन्यथा अप्रमा की व्यवस्था है।

**ग-** सत्य और मिथ्या का मिथुनीभाव ही भ्रम का कारण है। व्यावहारिक ख्याति की अनिर्वचनीयता इस तथ्य को लेकर है कि पारमार्थिक अद्वैत का द्वैतात्मक भास होता है जिसकी निवृत्ति परमार्थज्ञान से सम्भव होती है। प्रातिभासिक ख्याति भी अनिर्वचनीय है क्योंकि उसमें व्यावहारिक द्वित्व एकत्व लेती है। तत्त्वज्ञान से दोनों का बाध होता है। पारमार्थिक तत्त्वज्ञान से व्यावहारिक और व्यावहारिक तत्त्वज्ञान से प्रातिभासिक प्रत्यय का बाध मान्य है।

न्यायमत की आपत्ति है कि देशान्तर स्थित रजत और शुक्ति दोनों ही अविद्या की उपज होने के साथ चैतन्य अध्यस्त हैं; यही अद्वैतसिद्धांत है, तब शुक्ति तथा रजत में अन्तर क्या बचा कि एक को सत्य और दूसरे को मिथ्या कहा जाये?<sup>78</sup> इसके प्रत्युत्तर में अद्वैत वेदांती कहते हैं कि—

**क-** नैयायिक जिस प्रकार सत्य पदार्थों में शब्द और ज्ञान आदि को क्षणिक तथा घटादि को अक्षणिक मानता है उसी प्रकार वेदान्त की भी व्यवस्था है कि वह किसी को व्यावहारिकरूप से सत्य और किसी को मिथ्या मानता है।

**ख-** घटादि व्यावहारिक प्रत्ययों में अविद्यारूप दोष कारण है जिससे ब्रह्म में घटादि— कार्यरूपता का अध्यास होता है। शुक्तिरजतादि की प्रातिभासिक प्रतीतियों में इन्द्रियदोष और अविद्या की सहभूत कारणता रहती है। इसी कारण स्वप्नगत रथादि— प्रत्ययों में निद्रादि दोष से प्रातिभासिकता व्यवस्थित है।

**प्राभाकर मीमांसक** (अख्याति) की ओर से यह प्रश्न उठाया गया है कि स्वप्न के रथादि का व्यवहार स्मरण से उत्पन्न हो जाता है, अतः अविद्या द्वारा रथादि की सृष्टिकल्पना में व्यर्थ का गौरव है।

इसके उत्तर में कहा गया है कि अख्यातिवाद के अनुसार स्वप्नगत रथादि को स्मृति मानने पर अनुव्यवसाय की अनुपपत्ति आती है— जाग्रत का अनुव्यवसाय होता है कि रथ देख रहा हूँ किन्तु स्वप्न के रथदर्शन का अतीतकालिक अनुव्यवसाय ही देखा जाता है। इसके अतिरिक्त उभय सम्मत श्रुति का विरोध आता है।<sup>79</sup> बृहदारण्यक में रथादि की सृष्टि का

स्पष्ट उल्लेख है।<sup>80</sup> अतः यही मान्य है कि शुक्तिरजत के समान स्वप्नगत रथादि भी प्रतिभासपर्यन्त प्रतीत होने वाली प्रातिभासिक सृष्टियाँ हैं।

स्वप्न को अध्यस्त न मानने वाले उन सभी विपक्षियों की ओर से आपत्ति है कि—स्वप्न— रथादि का अधिष्ठानरूप देश विशेष भी स्वप्नदृश्य रहता है। ऐसी स्थिति में अनिर्वचनीय एवं प्रातिभासिक देश की भी कल्पना अनिर्वचनीय ख्यातिवाद में स्वीकार करनी पड़ती है और रथादि के अध्यास के अधिष्ठान की व्याख्या नहीं बन पाती। इसके प्रत्युत्तर में अद्वैतवेदांती कहते हैं कि स्वयंप्रकाश चैतन्य ही स्वप्नरथादि का अधिष्ठान है।<sup>81</sup> इस अधिष्ठान के सन्दर्भ में ख्याति का विवर्त रूप अनिर्वचनीयत्व इस प्रकार है—

**क—** रथादि की अस्तिरूप प्रतिपत्ति होने से परमार्थसत् चैतन्य ही अपनी प्रकाशरूपता में अधिष्ठान है।

**ख—** रथादि चैतन्याधिष्ठित चैतन्यविवर्त है, अतः चैतन्य में ही अध्यस्त हैं।

**ग—** स्वप्नरथ का देश विशेष भी चित्त में ही अध्यस्त तथा प्रातिभासिक है।

**घ—** स्वप्न में सभी इन्द्रियों के शान्त होने के कारण रथादि की इन्द्रियग्राह्यता भी चिदध्यस्त एवं प्रातिभासिक है।

**ङ—** जाग्रत की रथादि प्रतीतियाँ अविद्या परिणाम और चिद्विवर्त होने से अध्यास हैं किन्तु स्वप्न की प्रतीतियाँ इन्द्रियादि दोष सहकृत अविद्या परिणाम एवं चिद्विवर्त हैं।

इस पर प्रतिपक्षी का प्रश्न है कि स्वप्न में शुद्ध चैतन्यगत अध्यास मानने पर जागरित में भी स्वप्न रथादि की अनुवृत्ति क्यों नहीं होती? अधिष्ठान चैतन्य का उभयत्र साक्षात्कार नहीं है और अध्यस्त प्रतीति भी उभयत्र समान है।<sup>82</sup>

इसके उत्तर में वेदान्त परिभाषाकार कहते हैं कि स्वाप्न—वस्तुओं का जाग्रत दशा में नाश हो जाने से प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता। कार्य विनाश की प्रणाली को लेकर अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति की व्यवस्था में कोई दोष नहीं आता<sup>83</sup>—

- क-** व्यावहारिक कार्य का नाश उपादानकारण के साथ होता है। जैसे, मुसलप्रहारादि से घटनाश में कपालादि उपादानसामग्री के विनाश से घट का विनाश व्यवहृत किया जाता है।
- ख-** व्यावहारिक मायापरिणाम एवं ब्रह्मविवर्त रूप का बाध अधिष्ठानतत्त्व के साक्षात्कार से होता है जिसमें उपादानीभूत माया की निवृत्ति होती है।
- ग-** प्रातिभासिक स्वप्नादि कार्यो का नाश अविद्यारूप उपादान के रहते हुए ही हो जाता है इसमें द्वितीय ज्ञान वृत्ति के उदय से प्रातिभासिक वृत्ति की निवृत्ति कारण है।
- घ-** प्रतिभास- निवृत्ति में अविद्या का नहीं प्रत्युत निद्रादि दोष का नाश अपेक्षित है।

अद्वैत वेदान्त में शुक्तिरजत की व्याख्या तूलाविद्या और मूलाविद्या के आधार पर की जाती है। तूलाविद्या दोषसहकार से घटित होने वाली तात्कालिक अविद्या है और मूलाविद्या प्रमाण, प्रमाता आदि के व्यवहार का कारण है। तात्पर्य यह है कि प्रतिभास तूलाविद्या और मूलाविद्या की निष्पत्ति है।<sup>84</sup>

उक्त व्यवस्था पर प्रतिपक्षी फिर शंका करते हुये कहते हैं कि शुक्तिरजत स्थल में रजत का बाध न मानकर निवृत्ति मानने पर रजतज्ञान का प्रमात्व प्राप्त होगा जो असंगत है। अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवादी शुक्तिज्ञान में रजतप्रतिभास के समय रजत की प्रतिभासिक सत्ता स्वीकार करता है। उस दशा में शुक्ति रजत नहीं है। यह त्रिकालिक बाध नहीं हो सकता।

इसके प्रत्युत्तर में वेदान्त परिभाषाकार कहते है कि शुक्ति-रजत में 'नेदं रजतम्' के निषेधबोध के अभाव का प्रतियोगी रजत न होकर प्रातिभासिक-रजत है। तूलाविद्या का कार्यभूत रजत लौकिक दृष्टि से और मूलाविद्या का कार्य पारमार्थिक की अपेक्षा प्रातिभासिक है। यहां रजताभाव की प्रतियोगिता का धर्म समानधिकरण न होकर व्यधिकरण है क्योंकि व्यवहारतः सत्य रजताभाव की प्रतियोगिता रजतत्वावच्छिन्न तथा मिथ्या रजत के अभाव की प्रतियोगिता प्रातिभासिक रजतत्वावच्छिन्न है। यह प्रकार-भेद न्याय में भी मान्य है जो प्रकारता भेद के आधार पर विपर्यय और अन्यथाख्याति की स्थापना करता है।<sup>85</sup>

उक्त स्थापना पर पुनः प्रश्न उठता है कि प्रातिभासिक रजत की पारमार्थिकता ज्ञात है या अज्ञात है? यदि ज्ञात है तो रजत की अभाव प्रतियोगिता भी अज्ञात है। अतः अभाव का प्रत्यक्ष न होगा। यदि ज्ञात माना जाय तो तात्कालिक अपरोक्ष प्रतिभास की तात्कालिक विषयता भी माननी होगी और तब रजत में पारमार्थिकता को भी अनिर्वचनीय स्वीकार करना होगा। वैसी स्थिति में रजताभाव की प्रतीति के असम्भव होने से बाध या निवृत्ति असंगत होंगे।

उक्त आपत्ति का उत्तर है कि अन्योन्याध्यास के अनुसार रजत में अधिष्ठान की पारमार्थिकता का प्रतिभास होने से रजत की पारमार्थिकता की उत्पत्ति अस्वीकार्य है। जहां आरोपित वस्तु से सन्निकर्ष नहीं होता वहीं प्रातिभासिक वस्तु की उत्पत्ति अंगीकार की जाती है। तात्पर्य यह है कि वास्तविक रजत अधिष्ठान ब्रह्म में प्रतिभास लेता है और प्रातिभासिक रजत की अध्यास से उत्पत्ति मानी जाती है। यही कारण है कि स्फटिकगत जपाकुसुम के प्रतिबिम्ब स्थल में अनिर्वचनीय स्फटिकगत अरुणिमा की उत्पत्ति नहीं स्वीकार की जाती क्योंकि वहाँ जपाकुसुम का इन्द्रिय सन्निकर्ष सुलभ है। शुक्ति-रजतस्थल में शुक्ति से इन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष होता है अतः अनिर्वचनीय रजत की प्रातिभासिक उत्पत्ति मानी जाती है।<sup>66</sup>

इस प्रकार अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति की उपर्युक्त विवेचना के आधार पर हम कह सकते हैं कि अद्वैतवेदान्तियों की ब्रह्मविवर्तवादी और मायावादी-अध्यासवादी तत्त्वदृष्टि ही उनके भ्रम सिद्धांत का और उसकी व्याख्या का आधार है। वस्तुतः शंकराचार्य ने अध्यास भाष्य के द्वारा भ्रम के स्वरूप की अनिर्वचनीयतावादी व्याख्या करके एक ऐसा विचारोत्तेजक पूर्वपक्ष प्रस्तुत किया है जिसके फलस्वरूप भारत की पूरी दार्शनिक परम्परा एक तरह से आन्दोलित हो उठी और सभी दर्शनों ने अपने-अपने तरीके से भ्रम को व्याख्यायित करने की रुचि दिखाई। इसे शंकराचार्य का एक महत्त्वपूर्ण दार्शनिक योगदान कहा जा सकता है कि उनके चलते ही भारतीय दर्शन में भ्रम निरूपण को दार्शनिक महत्त्व प्राप्त हुआ। अद्वैतवेदान्तियों के अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति की बहुत आलोचनाएँ हुईं, सभी दर्शनों के आचार्यों ने स्वयूथ्य ख्याति सिद्धांत को सन्दर्भ बनाकर अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति पर खूब प्रहार किये, परन्तु उन सभी आलोचनाओं को अन्ततः स्वयूथ्य विचार का

पूर्वाग्रह ही कहा जा सकता है। अनिर्वचनीय ख्याति पर जो सर्वाधिक महत्वपूर्ण आपत्ति है, वह यह कि सत् और असत् के अतिरिक्त अनुभव में कोई विलक्षण कोटि नहीं आती। यह बात सामान्य अनुभव और साधारण भाषा का अनुकरण करने वाले तर्कशास्त्र की दृष्टि से उचित भी है, परन्तु यहां द्रष्टव्य है कि यदि शंकराचार्य भ्रमात्मक अनुभव को एक विलक्षण कोटि के रूप में पहचानने का प्रथमतया प्रयास करते हैं तो उनके इस प्रयास को अस्वीकार करने के बजाय दार्शनिक दृष्टि से यही उचित प्रतीत होता है कि सत्य या असत्य कोटि पर अवलम्बित तर्कशास्त्र की परिधि को ही विस्तृत किया जाय जिसमें सत्यासत्य के अतिरिक्त एक सत्यासत्य विलक्षण कोटि के लिए भी अवकाश हो।

दर्शनशास्त्र विभाग,  
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### सन्दर्भ एवं टिप्पणी

1. अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तदभेद उच्यते (माण्डूक्य कारिका, 3 / 18)  
नेह नानेति चाम्नायादिन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यपि।  
अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः॥ (वही, 3 / 24)
  2. बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् शां० भा०, 2 / 4 / 14
  3. विवेक चूड़ामणि, 406
  4. सापेक्षत्वात् सावधेश्च तत्त्वेऽद्वैतप्रसंगतः।  
एकाभावादसन्देहान्न रूपं वस्तुनो भिदा। (तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, 2 / 1—पृ.285)
  5. वही
  6. वही, पृ. 285
  7. वही, पृ. 287—88
  8. वही, 288
  9. बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, 4 / 5 / 6
  10. अनिवृत्तेपीशसृष्टे द्वैते तस्य मृषात्मनः।  
बुद्ध्या ब्रह्माद्वयं बोद्धुं शक्यं वस्तुत्वैक्यवादिनः॥ (पंचदशी 4 / 40)
  11. वही, 4 / 41
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12. वही, 4 / 42
  13. वही, 4 / 43-44
  14. वही, 11 / 25-26
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  16. भूमाऽपरिमितः । (ऐतरेयब्राह्मण, 1 / 5)
  17. यो वै भूमा तत् सुखम् । नाल्पे सुखमस्ति । (छान्दोग्योपनिषद्, 7 / 23 / 1)
  18. यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति.....तदितर इतरं विजानाति ।  
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विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् । (बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद्, 2 / 4 / 14)
  19. ब्रह्मसूत्र-शांकरभाष्य (चतुःसूत्री), रमाकांत त्रिपाठी, पृ.-1
  20. ब्रह्मसूत्र-शांकरभाष्य, अध्यास भाष्य, पृ. 4
  21. ब्रह्मसूत्र-शांकरभाष्य (चतुःसूत्री), रमाकांत त्रिपाठी, पृ. 2
  22. ब्रह्मसूत्र-शांकरभाष्य, सत्यानन्दी दीपिका, पृ. 6
  23. ब्रह्मसूत्र-शांकरभाष्य (चतुःसूत्री), रमाकांत त्रिपाठी, पृ. 3
  24. वही, पृ.-4
  25. वही, पृ.-4
  26. वही, पृ.-5
  27. द्रष्टव्य-ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य उपोदघात
  28. वही
  29. वही
  30. विषयस्य समस्तसमर्थस्य विरहेऽपि ज्ञानमेव तत्तादृशं  
स्वप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यासादितदृष्टान्तसिद्धिस्वभावभेदमुपजातमसतः प्रकाशनं  
तस्मादसत्प्रकाशनशक्तिरेवास्याविद्येति । (भागवत, पृ. 22)
  31. याऽसौ असत्प्रकाशनशक्तिर्विज्ञानवर्तिनी किमस्याः शक्तेः शक्यमिति ।  
यद्यसदेवेति मतं, किमेतत् कार्यमाहोस्वित् ज्ञाप्यं, न तावत् कार्यमसत्तस्य  
तत्त्वानुपपत्तेः प्रकाशनशक्तिताव्याघाताच्च । नापि प्रकाश्यं  
प्रकाशान्तरानुपलम्भादनवस्थापाताच्च । (न्यायमकरन्द, पृ. 104)
  32. भामती, 1 / 1 / 1, पृ. 23
  33. वही, पृ. 302

34. असतो नृशृंगादेः प्रतिभाससम्भवात् प्रतिभासमानत्वाच्च इदं रजतं सद इत्याद्ये पक्षे युक्तिः (इष्टसिद्धि, पृ. 39)
35. नापि सत् नेदं रजतमित्यादिबाधविरोधात् । तत्र बाध्यते ततोऽन्यत्रास्तीति चेत् नः तत्र प्रमाणानिरूपणात् । (तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ. 123)
36. वही, पृ. 126
37. वही, पृ. 128
38. न्यायमकरन्द, पृ. 81–82
39. न्यायरत्नाकर, पृ. 87–88
40. इदंधीरक्षणारूप्यधीस्समृतिस्तत्प्रमोषतः ।  
दोषादिदं रूप्यमिति भ्रान्तिस्तदविवेकतः ॥ (इष्टसिद्धि, 1/7)
41. न्यायमकरन्द, पृ. 64
42. आचार्याः पुनरनिर्वचनीयार्थावभासं विभ्रममाचक्षते । (वही, पृ. 111)
43. यत्तावत् निर्वचनानर्हतैवानिर्वाच्यतेत्यभ्यधायि तत्रानभ्युपगम एव । यत्तु नापि सदसत्प्रकारविलक्षणता इत्यादि, तत्र यद्यपि एकैकप्रकारवैलक्षण्योभयप्रकारवैलक्षण्ययोः अस्ति व्यभिचारः तथापि एकैकप्रकारवैलक्षण्यावच्छिन्नोभयप्रकारवैलक्षण्यस्य लक्षणभावे न कंचन दोषं पश्यामः । (वही, पृ. 14) सत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सति सदसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वम् अनिर्वाच्यत्वं, सदसत्त्वानधिकरणतामात्रस्य सदसतोरेव व्यभिचारादित्यर्थः (वही, पृ. 114)
44. अस्त्येव खल्वर्थापत्तिः तथाहि— नात्यन्तासतो नरविषाणस्य प्रातिभासगोचरता, नाप्यत्यन्तासतश्चिदात्मनो वात्र सम्भवः, तदिहोभयान्यथानुपपत्त्या उभयविलक्षणता रजतादेराश्रीयत इति । (न्यायमकरन्द, पृ. 116)
45. यश्चायमनुभवविरोधः 'सदिदं' रजतमिति पूर्वानुभवो नेदं रजतमित्युत्तरश्चा— सत्तावलम्बी, सदसद्विलक्षणतायां विरुध्येत इत्यभिहितः नायमप्यस्ति । तथा हि शुक्तीदन्तासंसर्गवत् तत्तासंसर्गस्याप्यनिर्वाच्यस्यैवावभासनाद् अन्यस्याश्च रजतसत्ताया अनुपलम्भान्न विरुद्धः प्राचीनोऽनुभवः । (न्यायमकरन्द, पृ. 117–18)
46. सत्त्वे न भ्रान्तिबाधौ नासत्त्वे ख्यातिबाधकौ । सदसदभ्यामनिर्वाच्याविद्या वेधैस्सह भ्रमाः ॥ (इष्टसिद्धि, 1/9)
47. भ्रान्तो या वित्किंचिद्भाति तस्य सर्वस्य भावेऽभावे च प्रमाणाभावाद निर्वचनीयमेवेति सिद्धम् । (वही, पृ. 21)

48. प्रत्येकं सदसत्त्वाभ्यां विचारपदवीं न यत् ।  
गाहते तदनिर्वाच्यमाहुर्वेदान्तवेदिनः ॥ (तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, 1/13)
49. न च परस्परविरुद्धयोः सदसत्त्वयोर्निषेधसमुच्चयोऽनुपपन्नोऽन्यतरनिषेध-  
स्यान्यतरविधिनान्तरीयकत्वादिति युक्तम्: निषेधसमुच्चयस्य  
तात्त्विकत्वानङ्गीकारात् । तत्तत्प्रतियोगिदुर्निरूपतामात्रप्रकटनाय  
तद्विलक्षणत्वाभिलापः । न हि स्वरूपतो दुर्निरूपस्य किञ्चिदपि रूपं वास्तवं  
सम्भवति तथा सति तस्यापि तात्त्विकत्वप्रसंगात् । न  
चैकतरनिषेधोऽन्यतरविधिनान्तरीयकः । (तत्त्वप्रदीपिका, पृ. 137)
50. सर्वथा वास्तवाकारेण निरूपणासहिष्णुता चानिर्वाच्यता । तथा हि न  
तावद्यथावभासं सदेव रूप्यम्, अत्र सत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् । नापि तदन्यत्र सद-  
अतिविप्रकर्षेणाक्षसन्निकर्षापकर्षेण परोक्षतापातात् चक्षुरुन्मीलनान्वय  
व्यतिरकयोश्चाधिष्ठानदर्शनोपक्षयात् । न च दोषोऽक्षसन्निकर्षनिरपेक्ष  
एवापरोक्ष्यहेतुर्दृष्टः सर्वापरोक्ष्यापातात् । (प्रभाकर विजय, 1/1/1, पृ 9)
51. नाप्यत्यन्तासदादरणीयम्, प्रतिभाससदेव- प्रवृत्तेरनुपपत्तेः । .....  
नात्यन्तमसत्त्वम् तस्य सत्त्वाश्रयणात् ॥ नापि सदसदात्मकम् विरोधात्  
कात्स्न्येन, अंशाभ्यां तदात्मकत्वे, न भ्रान्तिबाधव्यवस्थापदं प्राञ्चति,  
पूर्वोत्तरयोरेकैकांशे यथार्थत्वात् । नाप्युभयवैलक्षण्यात्मता तत्त्वतो जाघटीति,  
विरोधगन्धधूपित्वात् प्रतीतिपराहतेश्च । क्वचिद्वैलक्षण्यवाचोयुक्तिरपि तत्तद्रूप  
निरूपणासहिष्णुत्वप्रकटनार्था । तस्मादनिर्वाच्यमेव तदाश्रयणीयम् । (वही)
52. अज्ञानं न दोषाधिष्ठानावभासादिशक्तं शुक्तित्वावरणेन रजताकारेण  
तदज्ञानाभासाकारेण च विपरिणमते । यथा च मम ज्ञानप्रकाशितापि शुक्तिः  
पार्श्वस्थस्य न प्रकाशीभवति तथा ममाज्ञानावृतापि तस्यानावृतेति  
किमनुपपन्नमनिर्वाच्याज्ञानजरूप्याभ्युपगमे । (वही, पृ. 11)
53. प्रथमं दोषसहितेनेन्द्रियेणेदन्तामात्रविषयाऽन्तःकरणवृत्तिर्जन्यते, तत इदन्तायां  
तद्ग्राहकवृत्तौ च चैतन्यमभिव्यज्यते । तच्चैतन्यनिष्ठा चाविद्या दोषवशात्  
संक्षुभ्नाति, तत्रेदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्थाऽविद्या संक्षुभिता सती  
सादृश्याद्युद्बोधितरूप्यसंस्कारसहायवशाद् रूप्याकारेण विवर्तते ।  
वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्थाऽविद्या तु रूप्यग्राहिवृत्तिसंस्कारसहकृता वृत्तिरूपेण  
विवर्तते, तौ च रूप्यविवर्तवृत्तिविवर्तौ स्वस्वाधिष्ठानेन साक्षिचैतन्येना-  
वभास्येते इत्येवं रजतावभासः । (वही, पृ0 127-28)

54. यद्यप्यत्रान्तःकरणवृत्तिरविद्यावृत्तिश्चेति ज्ञानद्वयम् तथापि तद्विषयः सत्यानृतयोरिदंरजतयोरन्योन्यात्मतयैकत्वमापन्नस्ततो विषयावच्छिन्नफलस्याप्येकत्वेन ज्ञानैक्यमप्युपचर्यते । (वही, पृ.128)
55. दोषदूषितनयनादिना शुक्तीदमंशादेः सम्बन्धे सति अन्तःकरणस्य विषयदेशव्यापिनीदमाकारा वृत्तिर्जापते, न तु शुक्तित्वाकारा, दोषेण प्रतिबन्धात् । ततश्चेदमंशावच्छिन्नविषयचैतन्यमन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नचैतन्येन एकोपाधिसम्बन्धाभिन्नं प्रकाशते । (त.वि.दी.पृ. 476-77)
56. तत्र शुक्तित्वादिविशेषावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावारकमज्ञानं तिष्ठत्येव, तन्नवृत्तिप्रतिबंधकावरणविरोधितदाकारवृत्तेरभावात् । तच्च सादृश्यदर्शनादिसमुद्बुद्धसंस्काराधिष्ठानसामान्यज्ञानकरणदोषसहकृतमिदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य रजताद्याकारेण विवर्तते । तच्च रजतं स्वोत्पत्तिकाल एवं सुखादिवत्स्वाकारवृत्तिमन्तरेणैव साक्षिसम्बद्धं सत् प्रकाशत इति प्रातिभासिकम्, पूर्वं तत्सत्त्वे प्रमाणाभावात् । (त.वि.दी., पृ0 477)
57. भामती, पृ0 22
58. वही, पृ. 23
59. स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां नित्यं सदसदात्मनि ।  
वस्तुनि ज्ञायते किंचिद् रूपं कैश्चित् ।। (वही, उद्धरण)
60. वही
61. वही
62. नाप्यसत् । वस्त्वन्तरमेव हि वस्त्वन्तरस्य असत्त्वमास्थीयते । (वही)
63. वही, पृ. 23-24
64. देहेन्द्रियादिप्रपंचोप्यनिर्वाच्यः । अपूर्वोपि पूर्वमिथ्याप्रत्ययोपदर्शित इव परत्र चिदात्मनि अध्यस्यते । (वही, पृ. 24-25)
65. रमाकान्त त्रिपाठी, चतुसूत्री, पृ. 9
66. ब्रह्मसूत्र शांकरभाष्य, अध्यासभाष्य, पृ. 18
67. वही, पृ. 18
68. ननु तवापि रजतज्ञानस्य स्मृतित्वे स्यादख्यातिर्ग्रहणत्वे चान्यथाख्यातिः आत्मख्यातिर्वा स्यात्, नहि ज्ञानस्य स्मृतिग्रहणाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः संभवतीति चेद् मैवम् किं विलक्षणसामग्र्यनिरूपणात्तदसंभवः? किं वा

- विलक्षणज्ञानस्वरूपानिरूपणाद् उत विलक्षणविषयानिरूपणात्? नाद्यः सम्प्रयोगसंस्कारदोषाणां सामग्रीत्वात्। (वि.प्र.सं. पृ. 126)
69. न च वाच्यं दोषः प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन पूर्वप्राप्तकार्यानुदयस्यैव हेतुर्न त्व पूर्वकार्योदयस्येति; अनुदयस्य प्रागभावरूपस्यानादित्वेन दोषाजन्यत्वात्। वातपित्तादिदोषाणां चापूर्वकार्योत्पादकत्वदर्शनात्। न च दोषस्य संस्कारोद्बोधकत्वेनान्यथासिद्धिः तदुद्बोधस्यावान्तरव्यापारत्वात्। न ह्युद्यमननिपतने कुर्वन् कुठारः छिदिक्रियां प्रत्यहेतुर्भवति। (वही पृ. 126–127)
70. ननु सम्प्रयोगस्येदन्तामात्रज्ञानोपक्षीणत्वात् संस्कारस्य स्मृतिजनकत्वेऽपि त्वयाऽत्र स्मृतेरनङ्गीकृतत्वाद् दोषस्य च स्वातन्त्र्येण ज्ञानहेतुत्वादर्शनाद् रजतावभासः कथम्? (वही, पृ. 127)
71. प्रथमं दोषसहितेनेन्द्रियेणेदन्तामात्रविषयाऽन्तःकरणवृत्तिर्जन्यते, तत इदन्तायां तद्ग्राहकवृत्तौ च चैतन्यमभिव्यज्यते। तच्चैतन्यनिष्ठा चाविद्या दोषवशात् संक्षुभ्नाति, तत्रेदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्थाऽविद्या संक्षुभिता सती सादृश्याद्युद्बोधितरूप्यसंस्कारसहायवशाद् रूप्याकारेण विवर्तते। वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्थाऽविद्या तु रूप्यग्राहिवृत्तिसंस्कारसहकृता वृत्तिरूपेण विवर्तते तौ च रूप्यविवर्तवृत्तिविवर्तौ स्वस्वाधिष्ठानेन साक्षिचैतन्येनावभास्येते इत्येवं रजतावभासः (वही, पृ.127–128)
72. यद्यप्यत्रान्तःकरणवृत्तिरविद्यावृत्तिश्चेति ज्ञानद्वयम्, तथापि तद्विषयः सत्यानृतयोरिदंरजतयोरन्योन्यात्मतयैकत्वमापन्नस्ततो विषयावच्छिन्नफलस्याप्येकेत्वेन ज्ञानैक्यमप्युपचर्यते। (वही, पृ.–128)
73. धर्मराज अध्वरीन्द्र, वेदांत परिभाषा, पृ. 93
74. वही, पृ. 94
75. वही, पृ. 96
76. वही, पृ. 97–98
77. वृत्तिद्वय–प्रतिबिम्बित– चैतन्यस्यैकस्य सत्य–मिथ्या–वस्तु तादात्म्यावगाहित्वेन भ्रमत्वस्य स्वीकारात्। (वही, पृ. 109)
78. वही, पृ. 111–112
79. रथादेः स्मरणमात्राभ्युपगमे रथं पश्यामि, स्वप्ने रथमद्राक्षमित्या–द्यनुभवविरोधापत्तेः..... श्रुतिविरोधापत्तेश्च। तस्माच्छ्रुतिरूप्यवत्

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- स्वप्नोपलब्धरथादयोपि प्रातिभासिका यावत्प्रातिभासमवतिष्ठन्ते। (वही, पृ. 113)
80. बृहदारण्यक (4/3/10)
81. चैतन्यस्य स्वयंप्रकाशस्य रथादधिष्ठानत्वात् प्रतीयमानं रथादि अस्तीत्येव प्रतीयत इति सदरूपेण प्रकाशमानं चैतन्यमेवाधिष्ठानम्। देशविशेषोपि चिदध्यस्तः प्रातिभासिकः। रथादाविन्द्रयग्राह्यत्वमपि प्रातिभासिकं तदा सर्वेन्द्रियाणामुपरमात्। (धर्मराज अध्वरीन्द्र, वेदांत परिभाषा, पृ. 115)
82. वही, पृ. 120
83. वही, पृ. 121
84. वही, पृ. 123
85. न हि तत्र रजतत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावो निषेध-धी-विषयः, किन्तु लौकिकपारमार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्न- प्रातिभासिकरजतप्रतियोगिताकः व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्न प्रतियोगिताकाभावाभ्युपगमात् (वही, पृ. 125)
86. पारमार्थिकत्वस्याधिष्ठाननिष्ठस्य रजतप्रतिभाससंभवेन रजतनिष्ठ- पारमार्थिकत्वोत्पत्त्यनभ्युपगमात्। यत्रारोप्यमसन्निकृष्टं तत्रैव प्रतिभासिकवस्तुत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारात्। अत एवेन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टतया जपाकुसुमलौहित्यस्य स्फटिके भानसंभवान्न स्फटिके अनिर्वचनीय लौहित्योत्पत्तिः (वही, पृ. 128)

## वैदिक परम्परा की पर्यावरणीय दृष्टि

श्रीप्रकाश पाण्डेय

जीवन के लिए जिन संघटनात्मक तत्त्वों को अनिवार्य माना जाता है, कभी-कभी उनका अत्यधिक दोहन जीवनसंकट का एक अनपेक्षित घटक बन जाता है। कारण कि मनुष्य यह भूल जाता है कि जीवन निरपेक्ष नहीं सापेक्ष है, निरा वैयक्तिक नहीं समष्टिभूत है, किंवा विश्वीय है। विश्वीय होने के कारण ही विश्वात्मा है और विश्वात्मा ही नहीं सर्वात्मा है। तभी तो वैदिक ऋषि के अन्तस् से प्रस्फुटित होता है— 'सर्वभवन्तु सुखिनः सर्वसन्तु निरामयाः, सर्वभद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चित् दुःखभाग्भवेत्'<sup>1</sup>, 'आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत्'<sup>2</sup>, 'सर्वभूतस्थमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि'<sup>3</sup> तथा सभी प्राणियों के हित में सदैव रत रहने का हृदयस्पर्शी भाव। वस्तुतः उसका यह सर्वलोकोपकारी भाव केवल चेतन के प्रति ही नहीं अपितु अचेतन प्रकृति के प्रति भी भावप्रवणता का परोक्ष संदेश है क्योंकि प्रथम दृष्टया उसका साक्षात्कार वाह्य प्रकृति से ही होता है जिसकी आराधना की पृष्ठभूमि पर वह 'असत् से सत् की ओर', 'अंधकार से प्रकाश की ओर', 'मृतत्व से अमृतत्व की ओर'<sup>4</sup>, 'अज्ञान से ज्ञान की ओर', 'निश्चेतना से चेतना', 'आत्मचेतना' और अन्ततः 'पूर्ण चेतना' की ओर जाने की अभीप्सा करता है। उसकी यह अभीप्सा पूर्णत्व की प्राप्ति हेतु 'जीवेम् शरदः शतम्'<sup>5</sup> की जिजीविषा के रूप में अभिव्यक्त होती है। कारण कि वह पृथ्वी का पुत्र तो है ही किन्तु है दिव्य लोक का अधिकारी। विडम्बना यह है कि पृथ्वी के गर्भ से प्रसूत, वायु के झूले में झूलता, आकाश से लोरी सुनता, जल की बूँद से तृप्त तथा अग्नि के तेज से दीप्तिमान यह पंचमहाभूतपुत्र अपने मूल से कटकर, शैशव से विस्मृत, युवावस्था के मद में मस्त, किन्तु वार्धक्य के अन्त के प्रति बेहद भयभीत है। सुतरां अपने भूत से विस्मृत, वर्तमान से असन्तुष्ट एवं भविष्य के प्रति इस भय से मुक्ति के प्रयास में वह अनजाने नित्य नयी-नयी समस्याएँ पैदा करता जा रहा है। उसे अपने वैज्ञानिक

वर्चस्व पर सर्वजेता होने का एकान्तिक गर्व तो है किन्तु सार्वभौमिक परिणाम की सिद्धि पर दुःख, हताशा एवं अनन्तः प्रायश्चित्तरहित पश्चात्ताप है। वर्चस्व की होड़ में आज वह ऐसे पथ पर है जहाँ से प्रत्यावर्तन एवं अग्रगमन दोनों का अन्त, सर्वनाश एवं अकारण प्रलय है।

वस्तुतः मानव ने अपनी अप्रतिहत इच्छाशक्ति के लिए उसके उपभोग की कोई सीमा नहीं निर्धारित की है। करना भी नहीं चाहता और यदि करता है तो सर्वभोक्ता की अहंवृत्ति से। परिणामतः उसका यह प्रयास अग्निशान्त्यर्थ घृतप्रयोगवत् ही सिद्ध होता है। यही कारण है कि वह प्राकृतिक संसाधनों के साग्रह सदुपयोग की अपेक्षा अन्यथा एवं अतिशय उपयोग पर निर्ममता पूर्वक आग्रही है और उसी विभीषिका का दंश झेल रहा है जिसके लिए वह स्वयमेव सर्वथा उत्तरदायी है। क्योंकि उसकी अहंवृत्ति ने उसे पृथ्वीपुत्र होने का नहीं प्रत्युत् उसके नियंता होने का सहेतुक विश्वास दिलाया है और इस अहमाग्नि में घी का काम किया है उसकी कतिपय वैज्ञानिक सफलताओं ने जिनके कारण वह सुख की स्वप्निल निद्रा में सो रहा है। किन्तु इस निद्रा के स्वप्न जब उसे चिरनिद्रा की दस्तक देते हैं तब वह जीवन के संदर्भ में 'ततः किं' के उत्तर की तलाश में अपने मूल की ओर वापस आने का आह्वान करता है। वस्तुतः उसकी यह चिन्ता अवान्तरेण प्राकृतिक अवयवों के क्षरण से उत्पन्न उस आत्यन्तिक अभाव की चिन्ता है जहाँ निस्तब्धता एवं नीरवता सान्त जीवन का पर्याय बन जाती है। वह डूब जाता है ऐसे अन्धकार में जहाँ दूर-दूर तक प्रकाश की कोई किरण नहीं दिखायी देती। यदि दिखायी देता है तो कुहासे से आछन्न वह अजेय, असीमित आकाश जिसके नीचे वह कितना बौना और असहाय है। उसे इसका एहसास तो होता है किन्तु इससे मुक्ति का मार्ग नहीं मिलता।

प्रायेण यह सर्वस्वीकृत अवधारणा है कि किसी समस्या का समाधान उसकी जड़ में ही होता है। एतावतः जीवन सम्बन्धी समस्याओं का समाधान भी इसे निर्धारित करने वाले तत्त्वों में ही ढूँढना चाहिए, चाहे वे वाह्य हों या आन्तर। आन्तर जगत तो प्रथम दृष्ट्या अपने परितः विद्यमान वाह्य जगत से ही निर्धारित होता है। अस्तु वैदिक परम्परा में

जिस वाह्य तत्त्व को समस्या के समाधान हेतु प्राथमिक रूप से सर्वतोभावेन स्वीकार किया गया वह है— 'प्रकृति', जो अपनी विविधता में सामंजस्य एवं समरसता से परिपूरित है, जो स्वयं में अनभिव्यक्त किन्तु व्यक्तभावापन्न है। 'सांख्यीय' दार्शनिक दृष्टि भी इसका अनुमोदन करती है।

वस्तुतः सामान्य व्यवहार में रहने के लिए जिन परिस्थितियों की आवश्यकता होती है, उनमें अन्न, जलवायु, वस्त्र एवं आवास आदि अनिवार्य हैं और ये सभी प्रकृति से प्राप्त होते हैं। अतः प्रकारान्तर से यह प्रकृति जगत् ही पर्यावरण है।<sup>6</sup> अपने व्युत्पत्तिक अर्थ में भी पर्यावरण (परि उपसर्ग पूर्वक आवरण शब्द का योग) का तात्पर्य है चारों तरफ से घिरा हुआ। अर्थात् पर्यावरण वह स्थिति है जिसमें चारों तरफ से मनुष्य, पशु एवं वनस्पति घिरे हैं। इसीलिए पर्यावरण को पारिस्थिकी का एक अंश माना जाता है। इस सन्दर्भ में अवधेय है कि गहन पारिस्थिकी एक नयी दृष्टि है जो पर्यावरण के संरक्षण के अतिरिक्त भी कुछ है। वह पारिस्थिकी के अन्तर्गत होकर भी पूर्णपारिस्थिकी नहीं है; क्योंकि पर्यावरण का सम्बन्ध मात्र प्राकृतिक परिस्थितियों से है जबकि पूर्णपारिस्थिकी के अन्तर्गत इसके साथ-साथ, आर्थिक, सामाजिक, राजनैतिक एवं सांस्कृतिक परिस्थितियाँ भी निहित हैं। अतः पारिस्थिकी विस्तृत पर्यावरण है। स्पष्ट है 'पर्यावरण का अर्थ उन परिस्थितियों या परिवेशों से है जिनमें मनुष्य, पशु या पौधे आदि रहते हैं एवं क्रिया करते हैं।'<sup>7</sup> अतः उनसे पोषित एवं संरक्षित इन सबका अन्तर्सम्बन्ध एवं इनकी परस्पर निर्भरता पर्यावरण का एक रूप है। दूसरे शब्दों में "प्रभावशाली दशाओं का सम्पूर्ण योग, जिसमें जीव रहते हैं, पर्यावरण है"<sup>8</sup> एवं 'पर्यावरणवाद का सीधा सम्बन्ध मनुष्य को लाभ पहुँचाने के लिए प्राकृतिक पर्यावरण के नियंत्रण एवं प्रबन्धन से है।'<sup>9</sup> वैदिक परम्परा के अनुसार यह नियंत्रण एवं प्रबन्धन स्वयं प्रकृति के स्वरूप में ही है तथापि आज का तार्किक मानव इस आर्षमत के विपरीताचरण का आग्रही है जिसका परिणाम है— पर्यावरण की वैश्विक समस्या एवं इसका असमाधेय समाधान। किन्तु प्रश्न यह है कि क्या यह अन्ततः असमाधेय ही रहेगा? वैदिक परम्परा यह नहीं मानती। उसके अनुसार हम भावपूर्ण ढंग से सम्पूर्ण

प्रकृति को, सम्पूर्ण भूमि को विश्व के रूप में (बिना भौगोलिक परिसीमन के) स्वीकार करें। इस दृष्टि से वैदिक संस्कृति का वह 'वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्'<sup>10</sup> (सम्पूर्ण वसुधा ही परिवार है) सिद्धान्त जीवन के 'सत्यम्, शिवम् एवं सुन्दरम्' का एकमेव आदर्श हो सकता है जो वैदिक ऋचाओं में प्रस्फुटित है। यहाँ, जहाँ प्राकृतिक वातावरण के सन्तुलनार्थ आत्मशोधनपूर्वक सत्य को समर्पित यज्ञादि के विधानपूर्वक अपने शिवम् की कामना है वहीं प्रकृति के प्रकोप से बचने एवं स्वस्थ जीवन के लिए उसके शान्ति का आह्वान भी है। ध्यातव्य है कि यहाँ शान्ति के भी शान्ति का आह्वान है ताकि 'सुन्दरम्' की प्राप्ति हो सके। यथा— 'कल्याणकारक, न ऊबने वाले, पराभूत न होने वाले, उच्चता को पहुँचाने वाले, शुभकर्म चारों ओर से हमारे पास आवें। प्रगति को न रोकने वाले, प्रतिदिन सुरक्षा करने वाले देव सदा हमारा संवर्धन करें। ...सोमरस निकालने वाले सुखकारी पत्थर हमें औषधि दें। स्थावर और जंगम के अधिपति, बुद्धि को प्रेरणा देने वाले उस ईश्वर का हम अपनी सुरक्षा के लिए आह्वान करते हैं। ....हे देवों! कानों से हम कल्याणकारी वाणी सुनें, आँखों से हम कल्याणकारी वस्तुएँ देखें। स्थिर, सुदृढ़ अवयवों से युक्त शरीरों से हम तुम्हारी स्तुति करते हुए जितनी हमारी आयु है वहाँ तक हम देवों का हित ही करें (यज्ञादि की हवि से पर्यावरण का संरक्षण करते हुए)। हे देवों! सौ वर्ष तक हमारे आयुष्य की मर्यादा हो।<sup>11</sup> ....'अदिति ही द्युलोक, अन्तरिक्ष, माता, पिता, पुत्र, सबदेव, पंचजन्य (ब्राह्मण, क्षत्रिय, वैश्य, शूद्र, निषाद) है, जो बन चुका है और जो बनने वाला है, वह सब अदिति ही है (यही शाश्वत सत्य है)<sup>12</sup> 'हम सत्य मार्ग पर चलें।' <sup>13</sup> द्युलोकरूपा, अन्तरिक्षरूपा, भूलोकरूपा, जलरूपा, औषधिरूपा, वनस्पतिरूपा, ब्रह्मत्रयीलक्षणपरंरूपा, सम्पूर्ण जगद्रूपा तथा शान्तिरूपा जो स्वरूपतः शान्ति है वह हमारे लिए कल्याणकारी हो।<sup>14</sup> ... हमारी प्रजा सुखी हो, सर्वत्र सुशान्ति हो।<sup>15</sup>

वस्तुतः पर्यावरण के लिए आवश्यक है कि वायुमण्डल प्रदूषित न हो और यह तभी सम्भव है जब हम सभी एक परिवार की तरह सहयोगपूर्वक परस्पर अपेक्षा का ध्यान रखें। वैज्ञानिक 'लवलॉक' ने 1969

में यूनानी देवता 'गाया' के नाम पर एक 'गाया सिद्धान्त' स्थापित किया, जिसके अनुसार पृथ्वीग्रह के सभी निर्जीव एवं सजीव अवयवों के मध्य एक गहरा अन्तर्सम्बन्ध है। अतः पृथ्वी पर वायुमण्डलीय सन्तुलन विभिन्न प्राणियों तथा भौतिक पदार्थों के सहअस्तित्व पर निर्भर करता है।<sup>16</sup> यह परस्परापेक्षा इस रूप में भी सहज स्वीकार्य है कि यदि आक्सीजन की आवश्यकता मनुष्य के लिए है तो कार्बनडायाक्साइड की आवश्यकता पेड़, पौधों को है। किन्तु आज जिस तरह पाश्चात्त्यीकरण, औद्योगीकरण एवं नगरीकरण के प्रभाव से पेड़, पौधे, पहाड़ तथा जल, जंगल, जमीन एवं जीवन का क्षरण हो रहा है, यह वायुमण्डलीय असन्तुलन का मुख्य कारण है तथा मनुष्य के 'ततः किं' की परिपृच्छा का उत्तर भी। इस सन्दर्भ में भारतीय परम्परा प्रकृति में विद्यमान तत्त्वों की परस्पर निर्भरता एवं कर्तव्यशीलता का जो उदाहरण प्रस्तुत करती है वह श्लाघ्य ही नहीं, अनुकरणीय भी है। यथा— 'सम्पूर्ण प्राणी अन्न से उत्पन्न होते हैं; अन्न की उत्पत्ति वृष्टि से होती है, वृष्टि यज्ञ से होती है और यज्ञ विहित कर्मों से उत्पन्न होने वाला है। कर्मसमुदाय को तू वेद से उत्पन्न और वेद को अविनाशी परमात्मा से उत्पन्न हुआ जान। इससे सिद्ध होता है कि सर्वव्यापी, परम, अक्षर, परमात्मा सदा यज्ञ में प्रतिष्ठित है।'<sup>17</sup> 'अथर्ववेद' तो सामाजिक, आर्थिक, राजनीतिक, सांस्कृतिक, एवं पर्यावरणीय समस्या के समाधान के साथ-साथ जीवन का प्रतिनिधि वेद है। यहाँ तो लाक्षणिक भाषा में हमारे ऋषियों ने पृथ्वी को माता एवं स्वयं को उसका पुत्र कहा है।<sup>18</sup> उसे तीनों लोकों में उत्तम<sup>19</sup> कहते हुए उसके गुणगान का आह्वाहन किया है<sup>20</sup> क्योंकि 'यह भाषाभेद और धर्मभेद के होते हुए भी सभी को एक परिवार के तुल्य पालती है।'<sup>21</sup> सामाजिक सन्तुलन के सम्बन्ध में वैदिक ऋषि कहता है कि 'हे पृथ्वी माता! आप सभी को रहने के लिए स्थान देती हैं, अतः आप हमें तेजस्वी बनायें। हममें परस्पर कोई द्वेषभाव न हो हम सबके प्रिय हों।'<sup>22</sup> यहाँ मातृतुल्य प्रकृति की भी अपेक्षा है कि 'सभी व्यक्ति मिलजुलकर सामाजिक कार्य करें, उनमें सामूहिक कर्म करने की सदबुद्धि हो।'<sup>23</sup> 'उनमें ऊँच-नीच का भेदभाव न हो परस्पर भाई-भाई तुल्य व्यवहार

करें।<sup>24</sup> इसीप्रकार प्राकृतिक सन्तुलन के सम्बन्ध में भी मनुष्य के लिए ऋषि प्रार्थित उपदेश का सम्पुट मंत्र यहाँ द्रष्टव्य है— 'जिसमें सभी प्रकार की वनस्पतियाँ, औषधियाँ पैदा होती हैं, वह पृथ्वीमाता विस्तृत और स्थिर हो। ऐसी विद्या, शूरता, सत्य, स्नेह आदि सद्गुणों से पालन—पोषण करने वाली कल्याणकारी और सुखकर साधनों को देने वाली मातृभूमि की हम सेवा करें'<sup>25</sup>(ताकि हमारी रक्षा हो)।

वस्तुतः वैदिकऋषियों की दृष्टि में 'भौगोलिक दृष्टि से जिस भूमि पर अनेक देश, उसके नागरिक अवस्थित हैं; जिसपर विभिन्न नदियाँ, पर्वत, जंगल और प्राकृतिक सत्ताएँ अवस्थित हैं; जिसपर विभिन्न पशु, पक्षी विचरण करते हैं एवं कीट—पतंग क्रियाशील हैं; ये सभी मिलकर एक परिवार हैं, यही विश्व परिवार है, जिसको एक भाव से देखना अपनी भावपूर्ण दृष्टि का वैश्वीकरण है। इसीलिए 'अथर्ववेद' के 'भूमिसूक्त' में 'पृथ्वी को माता कहा गया है और उसकी उर्वराशक्ति, सहनशीलता, पालनशीलता आदि का वर्णन करते हुए उससे अपने दीर्घायु होने की कामना की गयी है।<sup>26</sup> उससे प्रार्थना की गयी है कि 'जिस मातृभूमि में सागर, महासागर, नदी, नहर, झीलें, तालाब, कुएँ आदि जल के साधन हों, जहाँ सब भाँति के अन्न, फल, शाक आदि अधिक मात्रा में पैदा होते हों, जिससे सभी प्राणी सुखी हैं इस प्रकार की हमारी पृथ्वी हमें श्रेष्ठ भोज्यपदार्थ एवं ऐश्वर्य प्रदान करने वाली हो।'<sup>27</sup> 'यज्ञ कर्म करने वाले के लिए नदियाँ, वायु मधुर प्रवाह पैदा करें, सभी औषधियाँ मधुरता से सम्पन्न हों।'<sup>28</sup> सभी वनस्पतियाँ हमारे लिए मधुरता प्रदान करें एवं सूर्यदेव अपने माधुर्य से पुष्ट करें।<sup>29</sup> पिता की तरह पोषणकर्ता दिव्य लोक हमारे लिए माधुर्ययुक्त हो। मातृवत् रक्षक पृथ्वी की रज भी मधु के समान आनन्दप्रद हो।<sup>30</sup> इसीलिए वैदिक परम्परा में प्रकृति को वायुप्रदूषण, जलप्रदूषण, ध्वनिप्रदूषण, खाद्यप्रदूषण तथा पृथ्वी एवं वनस्पतियों से सम्बन्धित प्रदूषण से मुक्त रखने तथा जलरक्षण से सम्बन्धी अनेकशः उद्धारण प्राप्त होते हैं। यहाँ वायु की शुद्धि को जीवन के लिए सर्वाधिक महत्वपूर्ण घोषित करते हुए इसे शुद्ध एवं अशुद्ध (सागरपर्यन्त, समुद्र से दूर प्रदेशपर्यन्त) दो रूपों में

विभाजित कर<sup>31</sup> विविध गुणावगुण गैसों का मिश्रण कहा गया है। इनमें ही वह प्राणवायु (आक्सीजन) है जो अमरत्व की धरोहर एवं जीवन के लिए अति आवश्यक है।<sup>32</sup> यह शुद्ध एवं ताज़ी वायु अमूल्य औषधि है।<sup>33</sup> हमें उसे स्वच्छ रखना चाहिए। पुनः हम जानते हैं कि जल के बिना जीवन असम्भव है, फिर भी हम कल-कारखानों से उत्पन्न अपशिष्ट पदार्थ, कूड़ा-करकट, रासायनिक अपशिष्ट आदि नदियों में प्रवाहित करते रहते हैं। यहाँ तक कि सामुद्रिक परमाणु विस्फोट से भी हम जल को प्रदूषित करने से बाज नहीं आते जिसका वैश्विक परिणाम सामने है। अस्तु वैदिक परम्परा में जल की महत्ता पर प्रकाश डालते हुए कहा गया है कि हे जल! तुम अन्न की प्राप्ति के लिए आवश्यक हो। तुम पर जीवन तथा नाना प्रकार की औषधियाँ, वनस्पतियाँ एवं अन्नादि पदार्थ निर्भर हैं। तुम औषधि रूप हो।<sup>34</sup> यहाँ तक कि देखने, सुनने तथा बोलने की शक्ति भी पर्याप्त जल के बिना नहीं आती।<sup>35</sup> रोग रहित, रोगनाशक इस जल को मैं लाता हूँ जिससे मैं मृत्यु से बचा रहूँगा।<sup>36</sup> अतः शुद्ध जल मनुष्य को दीर्घायु प्रदान करने वाला, प्राणों का रक्षक एवं कल्याणकारी हो।<sup>37</sup>

इसी प्रकार ध्वनि प्रदूषण के सम्बन्ध में वैदिक परम्परा में कहा गया है कि 'हम स्वास्थ्य की दृष्टि से अधिक तीखी ध्वनि से बचें एवं आपस में वार्तालाप करते समय धीमें एवं मधुर बोलें।'<sup>38</sup> हमारी जिह्वा से मधुर शब्द निकलें, भजन, पूजन एवं कीर्तन करते समय मूल में मधुरता हो; मेरे कर्म में मधुरता हो तथा चित्त में मधुरता बनी रहे।<sup>39</sup> इसके साथ ही मिट्टी (पृथ्वी) एवं वनस्पतियों में प्रदूषण की रोकथाम के लिए उसके साथ भावनात्मक सम्बन्ध जोड़ते हुए कहा गया है कि 'नाना प्रकार के फल, औषधियाँ, फसल, पेड़, पौधे आदि इसी मिट्टी पर उत्पन्न होते हैं एवं उनपर हमारा जीवन निर्भर करता है। अतः पृथ्वी को हम माता के समान आदर दें। इसी प्रकार जल संकट से मुक्ति एवं इसके संरक्षण हेतु परोक्ष उपदेश है कि 'पृथ्वी सभी वनस्पतियों की माता और मेघ पिता है क्योंकि वर्षा के रूप में पानी बहाकर यह पृथ्वी में गर्भाधान करता है'।<sup>40</sup> इतना ही नहीं आज आध्यात्म एवं विज्ञान जिस नित्यतत्त्व को क्रमशः चेतना एवं ऊर्जा कहकर

दोनों के साम्य के आधार पर जगत् के सम्बन्ध में एक समन्वित विश्लेषणात्मक भाव की ओर अग्रसर हैं उसके मूल की ओर संकेत करते हुए वैदिक परम्परा कहती है कि 'पृथ्वी के मध्यभाग तथा औषधियों में अग्नि तत्त्व विद्यमान है। जल में, विद्युत में, पत्थरों में, मनुष्यों में, गौवों एवं घोड़ों आदि पशुओं में भी अग्नि तत्त्व विद्यमान है। इसलिए ये सभी एक सूत्र में बंधे होने से परस्पर समवायी रूप से आबद्ध हैं।<sup>41</sup> यही भाव वेदान्त दर्शन के 'पंचीकरण' सिद्धान्त में भी द्रष्टव्य है।

इतना ही नहीं पौराणिक आख्यान पर आधारित 'अभिज्ञान-शाकुन्तलम्' एवं 'मेघदूतम्' आदि में तो कालिदास मनुष्य एवं प्रकृति के पृथक्त्व की अपेक्षा मानवीकरण एवं परस्परापेक्षी सह अस्तित्व को स्वीकार करते हैं। शकुन्तला के सानिध्य में उन्हें सहकारवृक्ष लता के साथ ही सनाथ दिखायी देता है।<sup>42</sup> वह नवमालिका और सहकार में वरवधू का सम्बन्ध देखते हैं।<sup>43</sup> उन्हें महल के कृत्रिम वातावरण की अपेक्षा वन के प्राकृतिक वातावरण में अधिक सौन्दर्य दृष्टिगत होता है।<sup>44</sup> शकुन्तला की विदाई के समय तपोवन के वृक्ष अनेक प्रकार के वस्त्र और आभूषण देकर कण्व ऋषि की सहायता करते हैं<sup>45</sup> और कण्व ऋषि वनदेवता एवं सभी लतादि से शकुन्तला की विदाई की आज्ञा मांगते हैं।<sup>46</sup> यहाँ तक कि प्रकृति के आठ रूप कालिदास के भगवान शंकर की आठ मूर्तियाँ हैं जिनसे वे विश्वमंगल की कामना करते हैं।<sup>47</sup>

वस्तुतः मंत्रद्रष्टा वैदिक ऋषियों की दृष्टि में जीवन के संरक्षण के लिए पर्यावरणीय समस्या सर्वाधिक महत्वपूर्ण एवं प्राथमिक थी, कारण कि उन्होंने जीवन की प्रयोगशाला में स्वानुशासनपूर्वक अनुभव किया था कि एक स्वच्छ प्राकृतिक वातावरण जिसे प्राकृतिक संरक्षण से ही प्राप्त किया जा सकता है; में ही स्वस्थ जीवन एवं शाश्वत सुख की प्राप्ति हो सकती है। एतदर्थ उन्होंने सम्पूर्ण प्रकृति का न केवल मानवीकरण अपितु ईश्वरीकरण कर प्रकृति एवं मनुष्य के बीच प्रार्थना रूप एक भावपूर्ण संवाद एवं सहअस्तित्व का स्थापन करते हुए सर्वत्र सुशान्ति की मंगल कामना की तथा प्रकृति की गोद में शतायु होने का आशीर्वाद प्राप्त किया (जीवेम् शरदः शतम्)।

किन्तु मूल प्रश्न है कि क्या हम इस योग्य हैं कि प्रकृति हमारे लिए सर्वदा कल्याणकारी हो? प्राकृतिक सम्पदाओं का अप्रतिहत दोहन, जंगलों की अबाध कटाई, पहाड़ों के साथ-साथ जीव-जन्तुओं के साथ छेड़छाड़, नदियों के कल-कल प्रवाह को अवरुद्ध करना, वायुमण्डल को कृत्रिम साधनों से प्रदूषित करना, अपसंस्कृति का ही संस्कृतीकरण करना आदि ऐसे कटुसत्य हैं जिनके कारण प्राकृतिक असन्तुलन के साथ-साथ जीवन के प्रत्येक क्षेत्र में असन्तुलन हुआ है। जिसका परिणाम कहीं अतिवृष्टि, कहीं अनावृष्टि, कहीं भूकम्प, कहीं सुनामी, कहीं ग्लोबल वार्मिंग के कारण ग्लेशियर का पिघलना एवं इससे बहुत बड़ी आबादी के विनाश का खतरा तथा टूटते संवेदी रिश्ते एवं एकाकी भरे निरर्थक जीवन के रूप में सामने है। इसे ही हम सामान्य जनभाषा में प्राकृतिक प्रकोप एवं कलियुग का प्रभाव कहते हैं, जबकि इसके कारण हम स्वयं हैं। अस्तु यदि हम मातृतुल्य प्रकृति की गोद में स्नेहसिक्त होना चाहते हैं तो हमें पुत्रभाव से अपनी आर्षपरम्परा का अनुगामी होना पड़ेगा। इसीलिए भारतीय मनीषियों ने प्रकृति का मानवीकरण कर उससे पुत्रवत् प्रत्येक वस्तु की विनयीभाव से याचना की, अहंकार पूर्वक विजयी भाव से नहीं। यथा, 'जिस भूमि में वृक्ष, वनस्पति और लतादि स्थिर रहते हैं, जो वृक्ष, लतादि, औषधि रूप में सबकी सेवा सम्पन्न करती है ऐसी वनस्पतिधारिणी सर्वपालनकर्त्री धरती को हम शीश झुकाकर स्तुति करते हैं ताकि त्रिविध ताप की शान्ति हो।'<sup>48</sup>

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**ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE PARTICLE IN  
'OUGHT-SENTENCE'  
(A PŪRVA MĪMĀNSĀ PERSPECTIVE)**

S R BHATT

The objective of the present paper is to present the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā analysis of the use of the negative particle (*nañ*) as it is employed in Sanskrit language in a normative discourse. It is also intended to draw a clear distinction (a) between a positive injunction (*vidhi*) and a negative or prohibitory injunctions viz., absolute negation (*niṣedha* or *pratiṣedha*) and exclusion (*paryudāsa*), (c) between two varieties of exclusion (*paryudāsa*) viz., negative row-observance (*vrtopakrama*) and contingency of option (*vikalpa-prasakti*), and finally (d) between limitation (*upasaṃhāra*) and exclusion (*paryudāsa*). The entire exercise is in respect of different uses of the negative particle in different types of negative normative sentence.

An attempt has been made here to analyze the basic principles of the Mīmāṃsā mode of interpretation in this specific context and to provide illustrations of these principles not from the field of rituals as is customary in the traditional literature but from the ordinary day to day life so as to provide contemporaneity to the entire discussion and to liberate Mīmāṃsā from the bonds of sacrificial rituals and thereby rectify the classical error of overshadowing of the principles by their illustrative examples<sup>1</sup>. During old times people were familiar with those sacrificial rituals but in modern times those rituals have become outmoded and out of practice. So there is a need to substitute them with contemporary examples with which there is familiarity. This way of approaching the system of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, it is hoped, would make it both a living and a lively system and save it from being extinct. It is

further hoped that this will serve as an example to contemporary scholarship to undertake an analysis of other Mīmāṃsā principles along these lines.

## II

### Objective of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is primarily concerned with the norms of moral behaviour. Its entire philosophical enterprise in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, linguistic analysis etc. has been subservient to this prime consideration. These moral norms (dharma) are of the nature of injunctions to regulate human conduct for the realization of betterment in living.<sup>2</sup> By extension they also serve as the foundations of law in the Hindu tradition.<sup>3</sup>

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā draws a distinction between the norms which are man-made (*pauruṣeya*) and those which are impersonal or eternal (*apauruṣeya*) like the natural laws of gravitation, relativity etc. The former are called *puruṣatantra*<sup>4</sup> in the sense that they are formulated by human beings, are subject to human authority and control, and have a basis in human free will (*rāgataḥ prāpta*). They are hypothetical imperatives of conditional nature. They differ from time to time, place to place and society to society. The latter are in the form of categorical imperatives of unconditional nature (*nirapekṣa*). They are derived from a source which is objective, impersonal, unconditional and having universal sway. Such a source is technically called the *Veda*<sup>5</sup>. The Vedic injunctions are called 'Codanā'. Describing its nature Śābara writes<sup>6</sup> that it is trans-empirical in origin. It enables us to know norms as are valid at all points of time-past, present and future. These norms hold good irrespective of persons, circumstances or place. They are beyond falsification. They do not derive authoritativeness from any person, human or divine. Though they are trans-empirical in origin and trans-personal in nature, they are

not trans-worldly in their application.<sup>7</sup> This trans-empirical and trans-personal character provides them with universalisability and authoritativeness.

The *Codanā* is non-violable in the sense that it does not admit of exceptions. However, in view of some special circumstances the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā accepts some exceptions (*apavādas*) which are objective and rule-governed. There are some such exceptions technically known as *utsarga* (giving up), *atideśa* (extension), *bādhā* (obstacle), *vikalpa* (alternative) etc.

### III

#### Distinctions between *vidhi* and *niṣedha*

As stated earlier, the Vedic norms are in the form of categorical imperatives and they have an ‘ought-form’, which is generally expressed through ‘*liñ lakāra*’ (optative mood), which is an essential part of a normative sentence. According to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā the focal point of a sentence is verb (*kriyā*) which has a root element (*dhātu*) and a suffix element (*pratyaya*). The suffix, again, has verbality part (*ākhyāta*) and an optative part (*liñ*). It is the ‘*liñ*’ which is expressive of ‘ought’.

The Vedic norms are of two types, viz., positive injunctions (*vidhi*) and negative injunctions (*niṣedha etc*)<sup>8</sup>. The positive injunctions are normative sentences that enjoin and goad or urge (*pravartanā*). They generate a propensity in a person (*puruṣa*) and make him/her inclined towards a certain action. They stir a will (*icchā*) and a determination (*sañkalpa*) and make the person believe that the action is good (*iṣṭa*) or is instrumental to good (*iṣṭasādhana*) and thereby persuade him/her to perform the action.

A positive injunction has three aspects viz., prescriptive (*vidhātr*), assertive (*abhidhātr*) and performative (*viniyoktr*)<sup>9</sup>. One always ought to speak the truth’ (*Sadā satyam vadét*) is an example of positive injunction. It contains a prescription which is being

asserted through these words so as to urge a person to perform the act of speaking the truth.

A positive injunction, as stated above, enjoins and activates. A negative injunction (*niṣedha*), on the contrary, does not activate but deters a person and thus saves him/her from the harm which may accrue by its performance. A negative injunction (*niṣedha*) is prohibitory. It prohibits a person from doing some thing or turns him/her away from some action which would be harmful or have undesirable result (*aniṣṭa*). It is determent and is thus opposite of positive injunction. Positive injunction (*vidhi*) is performative where as negative injunction (*niṣedha*) is prohibitive. Negative injunction does not produce any positive result nonetheless it serves a useful purpose because it saves a person from harm or undesirable consequences. ‘*Madhumeha roqī śarkarām na bhakṣayet*’ i.e. ‘Diabetic patient should not take sugar’, this doctor’s prescription is a prohibitive injunction in non-moral context. ‘*Vivāhetarasambhogam na kuryāt*’ i.e. ‘Do not have extra-marital sex’, is an example in moral context.

Negative injunction is a part of *Veda* as much as positive injunction is its part. It also helps in the performance of *dharma* by making a person abstain from doing an act which is bad or harmful. If *dharma* is meant for good it follows that whatever wards off evil is also serviceable to it. So negative injunction also helps in getting *dharma* in so far as it gives rise to abstention *from* such action which entails harm or evil.

#### IV

*Analysis of niṣedha-vākya* (negative sentence)

A negative sentence contains negative particle like not (*na*). About ‘not’ two questions arise, viz.,

- (a) What is its exact sense?<sup>10</sup>
- (b) With which constituent of the sentence is it to be construed or connected?

Among the six possible senses of ‘na’ (not) in Sanskrit language it is generally understood either as absence (*abhāva*) or as opposition (*virodha*). For instance, *asti* means existence. When *asti* is connected with *na* it becomes *nāsti*. Depending upon the context, it may mean absence or opposition. When it is said that there is no pot on the ground (*Bhūtale ghato nāsti*), it means absence of pot on the ground. But when it is said that one ought not to have extra-marital sex (*Vivāhetarasambhogam na kuryāt*) the negative particle is not used in the sense of absence but in the sense of opposition. The point is that in a non-moral context ‘not’ can be understood as absence but in a moral context the intended meaning of prohibition can only be brought out if it is understood as opposition.

Further, in order to bring out the sense of opposition the negative particle cannot be associated with the verb which immediately follows it. In a non-moral context where the sense of absence is to be conveyed this can be done so in saying that there is no pot on the ground (*Bhūtale ghato nāsti*). The meaning of the negative particle not (*na*) can be construed with the meaning of the word ‘exists’ (*asti*) so as to bring out the sense of non-existence or absence of existence. But in a moral context where the sense of opposition is to be brought out this cannot be done. So in the sentence, ‘Do not have extra-marital sex’, if ‘not’ is construed with the verb and is understood as absence then in a potential form it would give the sense of *acting* in the form of abstention. This will imply that the act of abstention is to be done. (*Sambhogahbhavah karavtvah*). But then in this sense it becomes a positive injunction, an urge (*pravartana*) and no longer means withdrawal from action (*nivartana*). In this sense it means that we are directed to do something but how can a prohibitory sentence be taken to direct us *to do*. This, in fact, will confuse between positive injunction (*vidhi*) and negative injunction (*niṣedha*) and obliterate the distinction between the two.

So the Mīmāṃsā rule is that in negative injunction (*niṣedha*) we cannot construe the meaning of the negative particle (*na*) with the meaning of the root (*dhātvartha*) simply because of the proximity between the two. Instead, the meaning of the negative particle has to be construed with the meaning of the suffix (*pratyayārtha*). In the suffix, again out of the two parts viz., verbality (*ākhyāta*) and optative (*lin*) the meaning of the negative particle is to be construed with the meaning of optative element only and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā gives a convincing reason for this which we shall discuss later on.

The purport of optative element is to generate an urge to do (*pravartana*). When the meaning of optative element is construed with the meaning of negative particle which expresses opposition the sense thus obtained is opposite of urge to do (*pravartana virodha*) i.e. withdrawal from acting (*nivartana*). So a negative injunction (*niṣedha*) inculcates such withdrawal from acting which is opposite of an urge to do (*pravartana virodhī nivartana*). It does not inculcate mere abstention from acting (*kriyābhāva*) but the withdrawal referred to earlier (*nivartana*). It is thus anti-thesis of urging one to act (*preraṇā*). In this way the distinction between positive injunction (*vidhi*) and negative injunction (*niṣedha*) is clearly drawn.

The Mīmāṃsā system gives a justification for construing the meaning of the negative particle with the meaning of the optative element rather than with that of the root or the verbality part. It appeals to a rule of interpretation known as *upasarjana* (subordination) based on the distinction between the principal (*upasarjaka*) and the subsidiary (*upasarjya*), and the primacy and hold of the former over the latter. *Upasarjana* is a rule according to which a subordinate word loses its original independent character either by composition or by derivation while at the same time it determines the meaning of its principal. It serves as a

distinguishing or determining or defining attribute of the principal and functions as subservient to the latter. So if any word is subservient to another word it naturally has to be subservient to that word only and to none else. For example, a Research Associate of Y is an associate of Y only and cannot be an associate of Z. So if a word X is subservient to Y its meaning has to be construed with the meaning of Y and not with that of any other word in that sentence.<sup>12</sup>

In the present situation the root element is subordinate to the suffix and therefore the meaning of the negative particle cannot be construed with the meaning of the root element. It can only be construed with the meaning of suffix. Within suffix, again, verblity part is subordinate to optative part and therefore the meaning of the negative particle cannot be construed with the meaning of the verblity part, it has to be construed with the meaning of the optative part only. In the technical Pūrva Mīmāṃsā phraseology<sup>13</sup>, the *ākhyātāṃśa* expresses *ārthībhāvanā* and *lināṃśa* signifies *śābdībhāvanā*. Since *śābdī bhāvanā* is principal and *ārthī bhāvanā* is subordinate to it, the *ārthī bhāvanā* cannot be construed with *nayārtha*. Since *śābdī bhāvanā* is subordinate to none, *nayārtha* is to be construed with it only. So in a *nishedha vākya* like '*Nāṅṛtam vadet*' *na* does not go with the root 'vad' or with any other part of the sentence but with the *lināṃśa*, i.e. 't' only. The sense of *lina* is *pravartana*. When *nan* is enjoined with *lin* it conveys opposite of *pravartana* i.e. *nivartana*. When we hear a *vidhi vākya* the idea (*bodha*) we get is that we are being urged to do (*kartavya*). Similarly when we hear a *niṣedha vākya* we get the idea that we are being turned away from doing. This deterrent is the import of a *niṣedha vākya*. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā thinkers, therefore, define *nivartana* as a form of mental activity which is conducive to withdrawal from acting (*nivartyanukūla vyāpāra rūpa*). What is meant is that when we hear a prohibitory sentence

the necessary mental inclination to abstain from doing the prohibited things arises in us. This inclination is exactly what is intended by a prohibitory sentence.

## V

### ***Paryudāsa* (Exclusion)**

Though the general rule is that in a prohibitory sentence the meaning of the negative particle is to be construed with the meaning of suffix, or with the meaning of *lin*, to be more specific, but sometimes on account of some obstacles or unfavourable circumstances technically known as *bādhā*, it may not be possible to do so, otherwise the intended meaning cannot be conveyed. In such cases the meaning of negative particle has to be construed with either the meaning of the root (*dhātvartha*) or with the meaning of the noun (*saṁjnārtha*). This gives rise to exceptions (*apavādas*) which are technically known as *paryudāsa* (exclusion).

### **Distinction between *niṣedha* and *paryudāsa***

The difference between *niṣedha* and *paryudāsa* is that whereas the former is negative, the latter turns out to be positive in implication in spite of there being the negative particle. *Paryudāsa* is negative in form but positive in intent, as will be clear when its examples are discussed subsequently.

### **Types of *Paryudāsa***

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā thinkers have discussed two types of *paryudāsa*, namely (a) when the meaning of the negative particle is to be construed with the meaning of the root, and (b) when the meaning of the negative particle is to be construed with the meaning of the noun. The first variety consists of those cases which are in the form of negative vows. The second variety pertains to those cases where if the meaning of the negative particle is construed with the meaning of the suffix, it gives rise to options, a circumstance which Mīmāṃsakas try to avoid as far as possible. Let us now discuss these two in detail.

## VI

### *Tasya Vratamiti upakrama* (Negative vows)

When vows (*vratas*) are expressed negatively we have the first variety of exclusion. A vow means an observance which has to be performed. It is of a mandatory or binding character and its performance has to be undertaken. The expression ‘*tasya vratam*’ (his vow) occurring at the commencement of a sentence/passage/section/chapter shows that the sentence etc. contains vows or observances for some one to practice. The expression ‘his vow’ introduces (*upakrama*) the vow which is to be observed by that person. It is a prescription which lays down something which has to be observed or performed.

When we have negatively stated vows the meaning of the negative particle has to be construed with the meaning of the root and not with the meaning of the suffix as is to be done in the case of negative injunction (*niṣedha*). This is because if the meaning of the negative particle is construed with the meaning of suffix it will denote nothing more than abstention or withdrawal from practice (*nivartana*). But this is not what is intended in the present case. *Nivartana* or withdrawal from doing is not something to be done or practiced. It is rather the opposite of it. So the meaning of the negative particle has to be construed with the meaning of the root to bring out the intended meaning. In this way of interpreting it would imply a determination to do the opposite of what is conveyed by the root. A vow is something which ought to be practiced (*ācaraṇīya*). It is a duty (*kartavya*). So when a vow is stated we must interpret it in such a way as to bring out the sense of duty. In interpreting it by construal of the meaning of the negative particle with the meaning of the suffix ( as we do in case of *niṣedha*) the sense we get is mere withdrawal (*nivartana*) which is not a duty to be performed (*kartavya*). But how can something not to be practiced (*akartavya*) be stated under a vow (*vrata*) which

is to be practiced (*kartavya*). In order to get rid of this contradiction it is necessary that the meaning of the negative particle be construed with the meaning of the root. So whenever vows are stated negatively we must interpret them in such a way as to bring out the sense of duty (*kartavya*) and this can be done only by construing the meaning of the negative particle with the meaning of the root since we do not get the intended sense by constructing the meaning of the negative particle with the meaning of the suffix.

The Mīmāṃsā thinkers further point out that if we do construe the meaning of the negative particle with the meaning of the root, there will be no harmony between the previous and the subsequent clauses of the same sentence or the previous and the subsequent sentences of the same passage. (*anyathā pūrvottara vākyayorekavākyatvam na syāt*). This is so because the previous clause/sentence says ‘ought to do’ and the subsequent would say ‘not to do’ if the meaning of the negative particle is connected with the meaning of the suffix. This will result in disharmony (*ekavākyatābhaṅga*) between the previous clause/sentence (*upakrama vākya*) and the subsequent clause/sentence (*upakrānta vākya*). On the other hand, if the meaning of the negative particle is connected with the meaning of the root there would be such a harmony and the former would act as a means (*sādhana*) to the latter which would be its end (*sādhya*). The two thus would be mutually supplementary. An example can help us understand this mode of interpretation. For a believer in the Jaina faith it is a vow not to take food after the sunset. This can be expressed as, *Tasya vratam na bhakṣayet ādityasya astam gate. Etāvata vyādheh viyukto bhavati*. Here it is stated at the commencement of the sentence that it is a vow to be observed by a Jaina and it is a prescription that lays down something which has to be performed. If it were not to be understood as a prescription laying down a duty

to be performed (kartavyārtha) and if it were to be understood just a negative injunction (niṣedha), the syntactical unity between the previous and the latter parts would not be secured because the previous part enjoins a duty to be performed by stating that it is his vow (tasya vratam) and the latter part would enjoin him to withdraw from doing. So by connecting the negative particle not with 't' but with 'bhakṣa' we can get the sense of discharging of a duty or observance of a vow (kartavyārtha) and the purport of the latter part will be consistent with the import of the earlier part. The point is that the latter part, viz, *na bhakṣayet ādityasya astam gate* must convey a sense of duty. This can not be done if *na* is connected with *lin* element 't' which stands for *pravartana* i.e. urge to do because when *na* is connected with 't' it would mean *nivartana* i.e. withdrawal from doing or determent and determent is not something to be performed. Therefore we must construe the meaning of the negative particle with the root *bhakṣa*. The implication of this complete sentence will be a determination (samkalpa) to undertake withdrawal from taking food after sunset. Here '*tasya vratam*' introduces the vow, *na bhakṣayet*, explains the nature of that vow, and *etāvata* etc. mentions the result to be achieved by its observation. Thus there is syntactical unity among all the three parts.

## VII

### ***Vikalpa-prasakti* (contingency of option).**

The second variety of *paryudāsa* is known as *vikalpa-prasakti* which stands for avoiding of alternatives. It is another type of exception to the general rule which governs *niṣedha* (negative injunction). In both these varieties the meaning of the negative particle is not construed with the meaning of the suffix and that is why they are regarded as exceptions or exclusions. In the first variety the meaning of the negative particle is construed

with the meaning of the root (*dhātu*) and in the second variety it is construed with the meaning of the noun (*samjñā*) which stands for the things excepted from the application of the general rule.

Vikalpa-prasakti (contingency of option) stands for exception to general rule. When there is a negative statement to the effect that whatever is prescribed as applicable in general does not apply to certain exceptions, the negative prescription is known as *vikalpa-prasakti*. In *vikalpa-prasakti* the meaning of the negative particle can not be construed with the optative element in the suffix because it is not a case of withdrawal from action (*nivartana*). Likewise, the meaning of the negative particle cannot be construed with the meaning of the root because it is not a case of a vow (*vrata*) which entails a sense of duty (*kartavyārtha*) to be performed.

The first variety of *paryudasa* is expressed linguistically in the form of a simple categorical sentence. In case of the second variety the negative injunction is expressed in the form of an alternative sentence. The alternates are positive and negative respectively. Here there are alternatives to be avoided by getting a categorical sense of the sentence and this is done with the help of associating the meaning of the negative particle with the noun. Since getting this meaning precludes the association of the negative particle with the suffix, it is regarded as an obstacle (*bādhā*).

In case of alternative negative sentence if the negative particle is construed with the suffix it leads to admission of options which is not acceptable to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system as it implies infirmity or weakening of the injunction (*aniṣṭa prasanga*) as we shall see later on. For Mīmāṃsā introduction of option is a fault (*doṣa*) and it should be avoided as far as possible.

To get rid of option the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system invents a device of construing the negative particle with the noun standing

for things excepted by the general rule. For example, take the following sentences.

- i) Parivāranīyojanākāmkṣī garbhanirodhakam prayojayet na santānakāmī i.e. contraceptives ought to be used by those who are desirous of family planning but not by those who want a child.
- ii) The classical example is *yajatisu ye yajāmaham karoti nānuyajesu*. i.e. one should utter the words *ye yajāmahe* in all *yāgas* but not in *anuyāgas*.

In all these sentences to get the intended sense the meaning of the negative particle is construed with the noun. If the meaning of the negative particle were to be construed with the meaning of suffix, the sentence would mean “Do *a* in *X* but do not do *a* in *Xa*”. But this would result in inconsistency between the two clauses of the sentence. In other words, it would give rise to two conflicting injunctions one favouring the use of *a* and the other prohibiting it (of course in some cases). So the predicament would be to treat the two injunctions as optionally binding which is not a happy situation since owing to the existence of alternatives it does not become imperative on the part of the agent to follow either. Further whether we do *a* or do not do *a* would be immaterial in terms of result or consequences because the rules sanction both the alternatives. This clearly weakens the authority of both the rules in question which become alternatively unauthoritative (*pakṣe aprāmāṇyavān*). That is to say in case of alternation we have either A or B. If we follow A, B becomes unauthoritative. If we follow B, A becomes unauthoritative. This is what is known as *pākṣika aprāmāṇya* because we are disregarding any one. Moreover, since both are rule-permitted, both must be desirable and both must be yielding good results. To discard any one would mean to be deprived of its good consequences. This is not a satisfactory situation.

In view of the above defects (*doṣās*) the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system suggests that there should be attempt at resolution of alternatives. Therefore, they consider various possibilities and conditions of such a resolution. They point out that in case of a conflict between rules based on free will (*rāga*) and duty (*śāstra*) or between hypothetical and categorical injunctions, the latter prevails and there is no scope for choice, as the latter is stronger than the former. The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system provides a mechanism to test the strength which we need not discuss here.

There is a possibility of general rule coming in conflict with a special rule (like Article 370 of the Indian constitution providing special status to Kashmir). In such a situation the general rule is annulled by the special rule. There are three conditions of annulment (*bādhā*) discussed in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system. They are as follows.

- i) Both the rules should be mutually independent (*paraspara nirapekṣa*)
- ii) They must have the capacity of mutual annulment (*bādhya bādhaka bhāva*).
- iii) That which annuls must be positive (*bhāva-rūpa*). When there is a conflict between two equally forcible duties there can be no annulment (*bādhā*) of any one by the other and we are left only with the contingency of option. Likewise as stated earlier when they are not mutually exclusive and one depends upon the other for the things it prohibits, there can be no annulment.

Coming back to our examples, we find that here is a case of prohibition of such an act by one rule which has been enjoined by another rule. We can not say that the second rule annuls the first as both are of equal strength and the relation of mutual annulment can not be admitted to exist between them. Therefore in this case option has to be admitted. This is the *Vikalpa prasakti*

(contingency of option) which makes it impossible to connect the negative particle with the suffix and this forms the second exception to the general rule regarding the construction of the negative particle in a prohibitory sentence. The Mimamsa system gives an example to illustrate this variety and on account of its easy understanding we discuss it.

The example is, *Yajatisu ye yajāmahaṁ karoti nānuyājesu* i.e. the expression ‘ye yajāmahe’ should be used in all *yājyas* but not in *anuyājas*. Here ‘na’ is to be associated with *anuyāja* and not with *karoti*. Now the sentence, *Anuyājesu ye yajāmahaṁ na karoti* has all the appearance of an ordinary *niṣedha vākya*. Therefore, if following the general rule about the construction of negative particle in prohibitory sentence we were to connect the meaning of the suffix with the meaning of the negative particle the sense that we get would be withdrawal from action (*nivartana*), but this is not the intended meaning here. Therefore ‘na’ has to be associated with the noun ‘*anuyāga*’.

### VIII

The general Mīmāṃsā position is that we must not construe the meaning of the negative particle with the suffix if such a construal lands us in option. The Mimamsa system avoids option as far as possible for the reasons stated earlier. So it resorts to *paryudāsa* (exclusion) by connecting the negative particle with either verb (*dhātu*) or noun (*saṁjñā*). But sometimes even at the risk of having to admit an option (*vikalpa prasakto’pi*) it admits connecting of the negative particle with the suffix and thus resorting to *niṣedha* rather than to *paryudāsa*, only out of compulsion and only when there is no way out (*ananya gatyā*). In this situation the alternatives are in the form of disjuncts, i.e., A or not-A. Here avoidance of option is impossible. If two rules (of equal force) conflict, there is no possibility of conflict resolution in

the manner discussed in the earlier section and there has to be a choice of any one alternative. This can be done in terms of an appeal to some other rule or to circumstances, intention etc. For example, speaking or not speaking truth, or killing or not killing a terminal patient etc. are the examples of this type. In such cases *niṣedha* is to be resorted to by connecting the negative particle with the suffix. But there are two important considerations which have to be taken into account in resorting to *niṣedha*. Here *niṣedha* is to be resorted to only if (a) there is no accrual of harm or evil (*aniṣṭa prasanga*) and (b) the alternatives have only means-value (*kṛtvārtha*) and not end- value (*puruṣārtha*).

From the above analysis it follows that the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā admits two types of negation. One is the pure or absolute negation (*niṣedha*) discussed in section IV and the other is a negation arising out of option. There is a difference between the situations obtaining in the two types. Absolute negation inculcates withdrawal from activities which may generate evil or harm (*anarthahetu kriyānivṛtti janaka*).

So if we would do something which is prohibited we would incur harm or evil. The prohibited object (*pratiṣiddhyamān*) is cause of evil or harm (*anartha hetu*). But this is not the case in the second situation where option is exercised. Here there is no scope for evil or harm (*aniṣṭa prasanga*). For example, arsenic poison is absolutely prohibited but alcohol is not absolutely prohibited. Alcohol is prohibited on the basis of option. Taking it or not taking it is left to one's choice. Sometimes taking alcohol as a medicine is good and prescribed. Otherwise it is prohibited. So it is both prescribed (*vihita*) and prohibited (*niṣiddha*). The point to be noted here is that all prohibited things which are not harmful, may also be prescribed under special circumstances. So in opting for acceptance or rejection of such prohibited things we shall not be doing any thing wrong. But it must be remembered that this option

is available if and only if the following three conditions are fulfilled;

- i) The alternatives must not be based on free will (*raga*) but on rule (*śāstra*).
- ii) There should be scope for option, and
- iii) The prohibition must not have end-value but only means-value.

The prohibited will be harmful (*anartha hetu*) and can not be practiced if the following conditions prevail.

- i) The alternatives are based on free will (*rāgataḥ prāpta*).
- ii) There is no scope for option (*vikalpābhāva*) and
- iii) The prohibition has end-value.

All the three conditions are necessary according to the hardliners but the moderates regard only *vikalpābhāva*, i.e. non-availability of option, as the necessary condition. In case of *niṣedha* (absolute negation) all these three conditions are fulfilled. For example in the situation of prohibition of *kālanja bhakṣaṇa* i.e. eating of poisonous food or taking arsenic it is based on free will. It is prohibited not as an option but absolutely. And the prohibited has end-value as its eating harms the eater. In case of taking alcohol the prohibited thing has the earlier stated conditions to regulate its practice. And there it is not a case of *niṣedha*. In case of *niṣedha* which is categorical and which admits of no option, the prohibited thing is necessarily evil-some or harmful, no matter whether it is derived from free will or rule or whether it has end-value or means-value. If, on the other hand, the negation is as an option the prohibited thing must not be harmful. Further the options should be sanctioned by the rules.

## IX

### *Paryudāsa and Upasamhāra*

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā draws a distinction between *paryudāsa* and *upasamhara* the common feature of which is restriction of the scope of a general rule to a specific area (*samkocana*). In *upasamhara* there is restriction of the general rule to the thing stated in the specific rule excepting the others (*tanmātra samkoca*). In *paryudāsa*, on the other hand, the restriction is to cases other than the one stated in the specific rule (*tadanya mātra samkoca*). *Upasamhāra* is positive whereas *paryudāsa* is negative. *Upasamhāra* names cases to which general rule is restricted and where alone the general rule is to be followed. *Paryudāsa*, on the other hand, mentions the cases which are excluded from the operation of the general rule.

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## REFERENCES AND FOOT NOTES

1. Gangānāth Jhā in his scholarly work 'Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in its Sources' makes a very significant observation as follows: "Unfortunately for us, the examples that Jaimini and his commentators chose for illustrating the rules of interpretation were all drawn from sacrificial rituals. Naturally, during their time, every serious student was familiar with these rituals and hence these were regarded as providing most suitable examples. Laterly, however, sacrificial ritual has gradually all but disappeared from the life of the Hindus: and this has led to the neglect of the study of the *Mīmāṃsā*-Shastra itself. Attempts were made off and on to illustrate the more important of Jaimini's principles (Nyāyas) by means of examples drawn from the practices current among the

latter Hindus; and we have a number of manuals, called ‘Adhikarana Kaumudī’ – by Devanatha Thakur and Rama Kṛṣṇa among others – where the principles are illustrated by examples drawn from other fields of human activity.- All along however these Mīmāṃsā Nyāyas have continued to exercise their due influence on other matters – in fact on all matters that are affected by the right interpretation of authoritative texts. This has been specially manifested in the domain of law” Pp.8-9. Also refer P 323.

2. Sahi nihsreyasena puruṣam samyunaktīti pratijānīmahe. (Sabara-bhasya I.1.2)-
3. Refer (i) Hindu Law by J.N. Bhattacharya  
(ii) Hindu Law by V.N. Mandalika  
(iii) Mimamsa Rules of Interpretation by Kishori lal Sarkar.  
(iv) Purva Mimamsa in its sources by G.N. Jha.
4. Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyaṇām buddhijanma tat pratyaksam. On the basis of this definition of perceptual cognition one can legitimately infer that all norms derived from human experience are to be called as man-made (puruṣa tantra).
5. (i) Phalamūla pravṛtīḥ arthalakṣaṇā rāgamūla, na tu vidhyadhīnā. (Adhvara Mīmāṃsā Kutūhalavṛtti on Jaimini.Sūtras,. IV.1.2.  
(ii) Apauruṣeyam vākyaṃ vedah (Artha Samgraha)  
(iii) Tatra nirapekṣa ravah śrutīḥ. (Artha Samgraha).
6. Codana hi bhūtam bhavantam bhaviṣyantam sūkṣam vyavahitam viprakṛṣṭamityevamjātīyakam artham saknotyavagamayitum, nanyat kincaṇendriyam-----Na caisa kālāntare puruṣantare avasthāntare deśāntare vā viparyyeti, tasmādavitathah. Yattu laukikam vacanam, tacceta pratyayitatpuruṣāt indriyaviṣayam va, avitathameva tat. Athapratyayi tat anindriyaviṣayam va tāvat puruṣabuddhiprabhavamapramaṇam. (Śabarabhāṣya, I.1.2)
7. Loke yeṣvartheṣu prasiddhāni padani tāni sati sambhave tadarthānyeva sūtreṣvityavagantavyam (Śābhara-bhāṣya, I.1.1.)
8. Anye tu codana sabdena pravartakam nivartakam ca vakyamucyate. (Adhvara Mīmāṃsā Kutūhala vṛtti on J.S. I.1.2).

9. Tatra nirapekṣo ravah śrutih. Sa ca trividhaḥ-vidhātṛī, abhidhātṛī Viniyoktrī ca. (Artha Samgraha)
10. Tatsādrśyamabhāvaśca tadanyatvam tadalpatā.  
Aprāsastyam virodhaśca nañarthāḥ ṣaṭ prakīrtitā.
11. Tathāhi yathā vidhiḥ pravartanām pratipādayan svpravartakatva nirvāhārtham vidheyasya yāgāderistasādhanatvamākṣipanpuruṣaṁ tatra pravartayati, tatha 'na kalañjam bhaksaye' ityadi niṣedho' pi nivartanām pratipādayan svnivartakatvanirvāhārtham niṣedhyasya kalanjabhakṣaṇasya paraniṣtasādhanatvamākṣipan puruṣam tato nivartayati (Artha Samgraha).
12. Na hi anyopasarjanena upasthitamanyatra anveti. (ibid)
13. Tatrapī nākhyātatvaṁsa vācyārtha bhāvanayastasya līnaṁśavācyā pravartanopasarjanatvenopasthiteh, kintu līngāṁśavācyā sabda bhāvanāyāḥ tasyāḥ sarvāpekṣaya pradhānatvat. (ibid).

## MURTY'S CRITIQUE OF ADVAITA

ANANDA MISHRA

In the *Philosophy of K. Satchidananda Murty* (1995) few serious attempts have been made to analyze and assess Murty's critique of Advaita<sup>1</sup>. Sangaku Mayeda's "Murty and Advaita Vedanta" and N. Isayeva's "Sitting at the Feet of Shankara" are totally devoted to this theme. Besides the above two scholars Sibajiban Bhattacharya, R. Balasubramaniam and John Grimes have also discussed Murty's contribution to the understanding of Advaita in their articles. Any attempt towards correct understanding of Murty's critique of Advaita cannot be complete without taking notice of all these works. Here special mention should be made of Sibajiban Bhattacharya and John Grimes. Sibajiban Bhattacharya who is the editor of the book together with Ashok Vohra provides a brilliant exposition of Murty's philosophy in his article "The Philosophy of K.Satchidanand Murty". The article is all comprehensive and touches almost all important aspects of Murty's philosophical contribution. Bhattacharya has divided his whole paper into five main sections. Out of these one section is totally centered on Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta. This section is further divided into two parts. First part is Murty's Critique of Advaita Vedānta where Bhattacharya has tried to give a correct account of Murty's position regarding the main tenets of Advaita Vedānta where as in the second part he gives his own observations on Murty's critique. Here it is to be noted that this division follows the style of *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta*, for the book itself is divided in two parts where in the first part of the book, *Book One*, an exposition of Advaita doctrines has been presented and the second part, *Book Two*, comprises Murty's own assessment and critique of the system<sup>2</sup>. It is generally

accepted that Murty is quite faithful and right while giving an exposition of the system, only his own assessment and critique regarding it is challenging and demands enquiry. My contention is that Murty's harsh criticism of the Advaita rests on his misunderstood exposition of the system presented in Book One .In the following paper I have tried to present a critique of Murty's understanding of Advaita Vedānta. I have mainly confined myself to his *Reason and Revelation in Advaita Vedānta* and studies thereon by learned scholars referred to above.

My contention is that the very foundation of religious experience lies in the idea of two truths. Empirical reality is not the only reality. There is something transcending this empirical reality. Though the transcendental reality is not perceived in the same manner as the objects of this world, though it is neither experienced nor has proofs in the same way as the world of experience, yet it is this realm which is explored by Religion and Philosophy. In fact Murty himself accepts that science and theology have two separate subject-matter. But in spite of that he is so obsessed with so called scientific theology that he resorts to the conclusion that personal theism is the last word of religion. When he makes assessment of Advaita on the criterion of modern theism, he finds all its major principles standing on shaky ground. But why should we take it granted that theism is the last word of religion and spirituality. There are a number of world religions viz. Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism, Taoism who do not believe in a personal God. Murty argues that if faith of a devotee is to be secured then God should be conceived as personal and responsive. But the issue is whose faith is to be protected whether it is of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Vaiṣṇavas and Śaivas or faith of every religious people? Murty could himself give a satisfactory answer to this. Since everyone's faith is absolute for him; all revelation is

revelation of Absolute truth. But he would unfortunately not like to accord Advaitic revelation the status of absolute truth.

According to Murty, the doctrine of non-dual Brahman is contradictory and so logically untenable. Neither scripture nor does logic provide any proof for this non-dual Brahman. Here Advaitins may like to claim that intuition or *anubhava* is the greatest proof for non-duality. Murty suggests that intuition too does not prove the falsity of duality; neither does it succeed in proving non-duality. Advaita is no way supported. It is supported neither by sense-experience and logic, nor by scripture and intuition (*anubhava*).

Murty rejects that there is any experiential dimension of Advaita. He argues that since for an Advaitin *Shruti* is the only source of knowledge regarding transcendence, he cannot base his Advaita either on his personal experience or on the experiences of others. Experience has to be moulded in accordance with the Upanishadic declaration. Only that experience is true (says the Advaitin) which leads us to the truth taught by scripture. Thus according to Murty independent personal experience has limited role in Shaṅkara Vedānta. An Advaitin cannot take resort to our experience for 'non-dual Brahman'. Analyzing the nature of experience as accepted in Advaita Murty says that it cannot be accorded as the status of mystic experience. Shankara's '*anubhava* is a reasoned conviction arising from deliberation over scriptural texts'. Here (in the *anubhava* of Shankara) emotion plays little part. It is assurance gained by removing the notion of improbability (*asambhāvana*) and contrariety (*viparītabhāvanā*) from the teaching of the Upanishads. So Murty like Otto will prefer to say that Shankara's mysticism is no mysticism in the usual sense. Hence *anubhava* cannot be door to the mystic experience of non-duality.

Advaitins say that even if experience is rooted in scripture, it does not fail to be proof of Advaita. Now taking the Advaitic answer granted Murty analyses the *anubhava* of Advaita and says that even in this stage multiplicities do not vanish. Hence *anubhava* cannot prove the duality unreal or prove non-duality. However, even if Advaitic account of experience of unity of being is granted, even if it is accepted that there is a state of mind where there is only unity of being, even there, Murty remarks, the real difficulty remains as before, for on the one hand there is the unity of being and on the other side mental state (*cittavrtti*) perceiving it. The Advaitin never succeeds to get over this difficulty.<sup>3</sup>

Murty further says that even if Advaitin's *anubhava* is granted, it will not be a lived reality. Advaitic *anubhava* is very much like experience of deep-sleep and hence not a living reality. For Murty the waking world is more comprehensive, rational and harmonious and hence is criterion of truth. He like Naiyayikas rejects that there is any consciousness of deep sleep.

Murty rejects the Advaitic contention that Brahman as the abstract unity excluding all distinction is the final teaching of the sacred scripture. Upanishads never teach the doctrine of non-duality. Upanishads do talk about the Brahman, but this Brahman is not *nirguṇa* but *saguṇa*. Brahman is Purushottama, the supreme person. He is personal God. Only such a theistic God has been propagated by the sacred scripture. Advaitins totally failed to decipher the true import of the Vedas. Advaitins' failure lies in their very approach to the scripture. How a scripture can be thought of without author. How can a scripture be eternal? The whole idea of revelation without a revealer or revealed is completely incomprehensible.

Murty says that Advaitins cannot claim any monopoly to the experience of unification, for, all religion seeks to achieve

wholeness. No doubt ultimate religious experience is experience of unification. But it is union and not identity of Jiva and Brahman as is proclaimed by the Advaitins. Murty finds Suffis giving a better interpretation of this *anubhava*. They believe that this unification should not be taken literally and not to be confused with identity. "The Suffis --- believe that a state, where nothing but *alhaqq* (the one real ) exists, can be realized; but they are careful to point that though in that state one may feel *ittihad* (union) with God, and say, 'I am God', what is really experienced is the realization of God's unity or *tawhid*." <sup>4</sup>The suffis give a correct interpretation of religious experience than Advaitins.

Thus 'non-dual Brahman' is an untenable conception and *anubhava* does not establish an Absolute without the manifold world. Murty further finds that the arguments offered as proofs for the existence of God are not proofs, and that they presuppose a belief in God.

Murty believes that there is universal awareness of God. Every one of us is aware of God. But this God is not indeterminate or impersonal. God is personal. To the question how man is aware of God, Murty's reply is that God, being spirit, cannot be known in any way other than a spirit, that is, in the same way in which we know ourselves and other persons, through immediate awareness. Murty finds Shankara correct regarding the knowledge of ourselves. The self is not known through inference, but through an immediate apprehension. No one doubts one's own self. The self is the most immediate and intimate. It is the foundation of our all experience. Though one is always aware of oneself, yet it is not object of our knowledge. It is always knower. Self-awareness is presupposed in all knowledge. Murty agrees with Shankara in respect of all these. But Murty's point is that one cannot be aware of oneself unless one is aware of others. Self-awareness is never possible without the awareness of other selves, and things. From

Hegel to existentialists like Sartre the perspective of 'other' has been accepted as indispensable regarding knowledge of one's own self. Murty repeats those arguments. However, Murty does not pause here. He advances this argument farther and says 'in all cognition there is an awareness of all these-the self, other selves, the world experienced by all these, and the Supreme self'. Now how God, the Purushottama is revealed in all our experiences Murty does not elucidate. Murty only says "self-awareness can never be awareness of the self as an independent entity, but(as Sureshvara himself recognized) of an 'I' in relation to other things and other 'I's , as well as to an 'other I', who is wholly unlike the other 'I's. We may call all these 'I's persons, while the supreme 'I' is the Supreme Person - the *Purushottama*, God."<sup>5</sup>

Murty's point is that Shankara failed to grasp the true nature of self-awareness. Shankara is right when he says that self-awareness is presupposed in all knowledge. But self-awareness always involves the awareness of other selves, as well as 'things'. That we live in a 'common world' shared by ourselves and others only proves that others are indispensable in every experience. Murty's point is that man is born with other fellows in this world supported and sustained by the Supreme God. So man is always tied to a relation with the world, other fellow beings and the Supreme God. Only such a person or 'I' related with all these is revealed in every experience. That is why he says that in all cognition there is an awareness of all these-the self, other selves, the world experienced by all these, and the supreme self.

Murty is of the view that we know God in the way we know ourselves and other fellow men. Knowledge of God is not of intellectual type .It was a mistake of Shankara that he could not differentiate the knowledge of God from the intellectual type of knowledge found in science etc. God is personal according to Murty, so he is best known in our personal relationship with Him.

'If we wish to know God more and more we should develop a loving trust in him (*bhaktyā mām abhijānāti* -Gītā)'. Murty seems to endorse Rāmānuja's view that knowledge of God must be of the nature of devotion-*bhaktirupapannam jñānam*. Now again the way Murty chalks out the structure/nature of knowledge by giving an analysis of religious consciousness (knowledge of God) he only tries to prove that God is personal. Murty says that the conception of God which the religious consciousness justifies and demands can only be a God who is personal. By upholding the view that God is not the highest reality, Shankara only makes religious consciousness a mockery.

For Murty God is the supreme reality. He is personal. He is *Puruṣottama*, the supreme person. As God is spirit, he can be known only as spirit. We are aware of God in the same way as we are aware of ourselves and other fellows. As a person is best known in relation which we have with him, God too, is best known in our relationship which we have with him. In order to have full knowledge of him we have to develop a loving relation with him. Like Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins Murty would like to maintain that God has absolute reality while individual souls and the world have dependent reality. The world and souls depend on God for their being. Murty seems to be correct when he says that the concept of creation needs revision. God should not be understood as an efficient cause of the world. Similarly individual souls too are 'uncreated'. He is right when he says that none of the Hindu schools except Pancaratra maintain that souls are created. In fact souls and the world are coeternal with God. God supports and directs the individual souls of the world. As accepted to most of the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins Murty almost accepts the principle of Tattva-traya. God is independent while the world and souls are dependent. God is controller and these are controlled. A coherent theism can be supported only by a pluralistic realism. The existence of

external world and the individuals are, that is why, very important for Murty. It is most immediate and intimate fact. Scripture, logic, perceptual experience only suggest that there is a plurality, manifoldness, individuality. There is a material world outside lying us inherited by so many jivas and supported and controlled by the supreme God. Only this God has absolute reality, but it is not the one and non-dual reality. Besides him there are ‘things’ and individual jivas who have dependent reality and who depend solely on God’s being. It is true that God and souls both are similar, for both are person, but this does not mean that they are identical in their true nature. Their difference is true; it is true in this world and persists even in the world beyond. God is God and we are ourselves.

Murty agrees with the arguments advanced by Ramanuja and Madhva against the Advaitic interpretation of ‘*Tattvamasi*’. ‘That Thou art’ does not have the meaning which Shankara and his followers have given to it. God’s supremacy and man’s individuality are not illusion, as an Advaitin finds. They are real. These can never be purged of them. Murty is against ‘thinking away’ of real properties of a man and God and then declaring the identity of these two. This is just abstraction. Murty says “there is no sense in this kind of abstract thought, for supposing we do ‘think away’ all that makes an orange an orange, and all that makes a stone a stone; then we may argue that both are non-different because both are mere ‘things’; but have we gained any insight there by”<sup>6</sup>. God is creator, omniscient, omnipotent, while a jīva has certain body, mind and personality. How can these two be identical? To say that creatorship, omniscience and omnipotence of God is just illusion and consciousness is its only true nature, similarly to ‘think away’ all that which makes an individual individual and to think of the jīva as having no body, no mind, and no personality and to say that his true nature is consciousness and

hence being consciousness as their true nature God and man are identical is just a false abstraction of thought. If we argue in this way, anything can be proved to be identical with anything. So Murty's conclusion is that a jīva can never be God. God is God and we are ourselves; and this difference should be relished by religions and not 'evaporated' or 'thought away' as has been done by the Advaitins.

Murty defends a personal theism throughout his whole book. He seems to uphold the view that personal theism is the last word of religions. Religious consciousness can be supported, defended and maintained if we accept theistic world-view. He is so obsessed with this idea that he could not provide an impartial account of Advaita. For him this personal theism is not only the teaching of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, it is the teaching of Vedas as well. The whole religious and philosophical tradition of India- the Vaiṣṇavas, the Shaivas, the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas – all endorse this personal theism. This is the culmination of religious consciousness. Advaita totally fails to explain this and succumbs to false abstraction of metaphysics.

Murty does not find the belief in a personal God unjustified. Similarly the theistic conception of 'revelation' made by personal God to human beings is not incredible. In fact Murty in his book, by giving an analysis of Advaita theory of revelation tries to establish personal theism as accepted to Abrahamic religions and to some extent to theistic Vedāntins and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. He is of the opinion that revelation without revealer is non-sense. Revelation (knowledge, consciousness or thought also) involves three factors. Revelation implies revealer as well as the persons to whom it is revealed. Now since in Advaita Vedānta, there is only one reality, there would be no possibility of revelation. Not only the difference between revealer and revealed or God and individuals is essential for the very possibility of revelation, it is

also required that God should be personal, for only a personal and responsive God can reveal itself. Thus by the very analysis of the fact of revelation Murty tries to establish personal theism. God is personal and not impersonal or attribute less. This personal God is revealed universally. There is no one who does not have the conception of God. This God is presupposition of all presuppositions. Though it is neither proved by inferential proofs, but nor does it demand so. For as the very postulate of reason, it (God) is postulated. Without this postulation experience will not be possible. Shankara says that every one of us is aware of oneself. One is always aware of oneself and can never doubt one's own experience. Now Murty would not have any objection to the above view of Shankara. But he would like to add that by being aware of oneself, one is also aware of other fellows, the external world and the God. One cannot be aware of oneself without being aware of 'other'. This 'other' includes the external world, the human beings and God without which no experience of this world would have been possible.

So the real issue which Murty holds is the conception of self-consciousness . He is of the opinion that consciousness is always consciousness of some thing and at the same time it is consciousness of some one. Non-egological view of consciousness cannot be accepted. Consciousness is always self-consciousness. Now this self-consciousness if on the one hand suggests that there is some self-conscious reality that has the awareness of 'I'; on the other hand it also proves the reality of an 'other', for without that there is no experience or consciousness. So the very fact of consciousness does prove a pluralistic world having innumerable souls and no doubt God as a presupposition of experience. Consciousness suggests some conscious reality. God, too, for Murty being spirit is conscious and not consciousness as is upheld by the Advaitins. Similarly consciousness being self-consciousness

again does prove that God so established is always endowed with 'I know' and hence he is personal and not impersonal. Thus by the very fact of consciousness and self-consciousness Murty establishes that God is personal.

Now this God is presupposition of all presuppositions and is revealed in our every experience. For no consciousness at the realm of even empirical is without self-consciousness. And the existence of an 'other' is indispensable condition of self-consciousness. One cannot be aware of oneself without being aware of the external world, other fellows, and God. Murty says that no proofs can demonstrate the reality of others unless they are revealed in our every experience. Our personal relation with others (including the external world and God) is necessary postulation of this fact that we are not living in a solipsistic world. Unless this is accepted no human experience or knowledge can be explained.

If on the basis of the analysis of the structure of revelation Murty finds an argument for theistic God, he advances further and says that the very faith in God demands that God should be responsive and self-revealing, otherwise that (faith) can never be supported. So if on the one hand Murty pleads for a theistic God by analysis of our experience/revelation, on the other hand he deduces 'revelation' by the very nature of God. 'If God is a silent and unresponsive deity, faith in him can never be supported'. So an Advaitic or 'Aristotelian God who does not respond to man can hardly be said to exist, and even if he does, he does not concern us'. Thus Murty points out that religion without revelation is impossible to conceive.

Revelation is disclosure made by God. There are various ways in which God may disclose himself. He may disclose himself in verbal inspiration or scripture, incarnation or *avatāras*, in our experiences and living personal relation. Scriptures are believed to be authored by God directly or on his inspiration by sacred people.

Now this version of scriptures that they were revealed to mankind by God and that every word of scripture is a word of God is unaccepted to Murty, for he finds that scriptural texts often contain self-contradictory, meaningless and tautological statements and as such these could not be called in toto a work of God. Revelation is not a one-sided activity. Man's role in receiving and assimilating it is very crucial. We can say that God's revelation is adjusted to the capacity of those to whom it is made. As man is limited, revelation too is limited by man's conditions. Hence, Murty argues that whether it is Veda or the Bhagavad-Gītā, these cannot be free from limitations of the men who write them. Scriptures are not the only revelation of God. God discloses himself more directly through his incarnations (*avatāras*). But here again Murty finds Shankara's theory untenable. Consistently with his Advaita, Shankara cannot accept the *avatāra* of Brahman. For Shankara an *avatāra* is an illusion in double sense, while the appearance of Brahman as Jīva is an illusion in one sense only. Murty puts it in the hand of faith to decide whether in a particular event God discloses or not.

No doubt we know someone from what he says but it is only by having direct personal encounter and feeling the full 'impact' of his activity, we come to know him much more fully and adequately. Such is the disclosure of God made to the devotee who has faith. Quoting Gītā Murty says 'by devotion alone can I be perceived, *known and seen* in essence, and entered into.' 'By devotion he knows me in essence who and what I am'. Summing up his position Murty says "God reveals himself fully only to those who 'appropriate' him as their father or friend through loving trust."<sup>7</sup>

So ultimately the responsive and personal God is best revealed in our personal and direct (immediate) contact. Revelation for Murty is not *sui generis*, it is a kind of direct awareness, which is essentially similar to our awareness of ourselves and our

neighbours. All our knowledge of God is self-disclosure of God. 'It is futile to search for anything which can tell us about God in more adequate way than analogues drawn from the realm of personal relations'.

Does revelation involve some intellectual content? Murty will answer in positive. He believes that religion is neither dogma or practice, nor mere emotion or feeling; it is theory. There is certainly some knowledge element involved in revelation, for it is truth that is revealed in it. Revelation is revelation of Truth. But this revealed truth is not universal truth, such as is found in the sciences, but it is absolute truth. Murty after the manner of Jaspers makes a distinction between universal truth and absolute truth. Former is subject of intellectual knowledge whereas the latter is of religious knowledge. Absolute truth is that by which a man lives and for which he dies and from which he derives integration in himself and harmony with reality. On the other hand universal truth is relative, particular, and propositional and obtained by fix inferential method. Absolute truth is the primal awareness of a real presence that confronts man as holy and good. Absolute truth is not provable, though it is not irrational.

Murty believes that everyone has belief in God. All arguments given as proofs for the existence of God are not proofs. Really speaking these proofs presuppose a belief in God. Every one has belief in God and only this can explain religious consciousness. This universal belief in God is called by him 'general revelation' which is presupposition of 'special revelation'. Murty brilliantly defends this notion of 'general revelation'. He is of the view that everyone has belief in God, though it may be the case that some might not be conscious of that. And this is the case with atheists. As no awareness of God is possible unless God discloses himself to us and as everyone has some awareness of God, so everyone is blessed with God's revelation. This revelation

is called by him 'general revelation'. Murty says "no body is deprived of this revelation, -----those who say that they do not have it are perhaps not conscious of their own belief in God". Pascal says that one would not seek God if he had not already found him. Now Murty charges that Shankara is unaware of this evident truth of 'general revelation'. Murty says 'so what Shankara ought to have said is that we are already aware of Brahman to some extent, only we do not know him fully, and fuller knowledge is to be had from scripture.' As Vedānta believes that Brahman is known from scripture alone, it misses the truth of 'general revelation' that God is somehow revealed to everyone. Now as we know that Shankaracharya too has discussed in details the above issue in his commentary on the first aphorism of Brahmasūtra *Athāto Brahmajijñāsā*. Here he makes the point that one cannot have curiosity of knowledge of Brahman unless he has some prior conception of Brahman. He says further that as every one has consciousness of his own self, the self cannot be said as completely unknown. However, its fuller knowledge can be obtained only by Vedānta. So the charge that Shankara does not believe in 'general revelation' is based only on ignorance of his principles. It is really unfortunate that Murty could discern the insights inherent in thoughts of Pascal and St. Bonaventura but fails to find the most beautiful exposition of this doctrine in Shankara Vedānta. The doctrine of universal awareness of Brahman was for the first time presented by Shankara.

Here, it should be accepted that Murty has very brilliantly presented his thesis that a special revelation presupposes general revelation. Unless there is a prior belief in God it is impossible to believe in any particular revelation. Revelation through a particular book or person cannot be judged to be genuine without a knowledge of God derived independently of that book or person. By giving examples from so many religious beliefs Murty

establishes that ‘unless there is a general revelation, there can be no special revelation’. Now Murty’s analysis of general revelation and its foundational nature, undoubtedly paves the way for religious harmony and tolerance. Much of religious fanaticism and fundamentalism is due to the false belief that one cannot have knowledge of God independently of the revelation granted in a particular religion.

Murty is right when he says that ‘it is an intolerable idea to say that God exclusively disclosed himself to one people and left the others in darkness.’ So any claim to exclusivity has been thoroughly rejected by Murty rightly. To say that there has been only one revelation is only making a fundamentalist statement. Almost all religions claim some sort of exclusivity and their claim should be rejected. However, Murty’s charge against Advaita Vedānta that it denies universal awareness of Deity should be rebutted. Shankara, again and again, emphasizes this fact that every one has experience of Brahman as one’s own self. Shankara would further like to say that though this is a general revelation (knowledge), special knowledge of self can be had only by the Vedānta.

Murty has been very much influenced by Vedāntic theism. Though he has written a lot on Advaita system and his *Reason and Revelation in Advaita Vedānta* is fully centered on Advaita Vedānta and in *The Advaitic Notion* he presents a brilliant exposition of Advaita like Vāchaspati Mishra, his favor towards Vedāntic theism can be perceived in all his writings. His critique of Advaita rests on theistic presuppositions. On the pattern of theistic Vedāntins he finds Advaitic conception of Nirguṇa Brahman untenable. He attacks the doctrine of Māyā very much in the fashion of Viśiṣṭādvaitins. Like the Madhva he believes that God is God and man is man and that a jīva can never be God. God is personal and the best way for reaching to him is through personal

relations. There can be nothing like eternal scripture because it will jeopardize the eternality of God. Revelation cannot be possible without a revealer and revealed and hence Advaitic notion of revelation is unjustifiable. To sum up, Murty presents a theistic critique of Advaita Vedānta. When I started reading *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta*, I thought it would help me having a proper understanding of the Advaita and would give the readers Advaitic account of religious experience. But what I found in the book an unsympathetic and partial or rather a hostile critique of Advaita based on so called theistic beliefs.

The whole book may be interpreted as a disguised glorification of theistic religions . Murty thinks as though personal theism is the last word of religion. He is so fascinated with theistic beliefs that whenever he praises Advaita, he interprets Advaitism as theism. He openly favors ‘a personal, responsive God to an impersonal, non-responsive one’. Though the book is about Advaita, what is defended there is a rigorous form of personal theism. Mayeda says “in this book Murty is not at all an Advaitin but a theistic Vedāntin”<sup>8</sup>. Murty himself is not hesitant to accept this. He says that his view on revelation is very much like that of Naiyayika Jayanta and his concept of God hardly differs from that of Rāmānuja.<sup>9</sup> In fact Murty is so critical of Advaita Vedānta that Prof. S.C. Chatterji wrote to him “But I wish you had a more sympathetic understanding of Advaita and of the eternal and impersonal character of Vedic authority”<sup>10</sup>. Here a few words should be said in favor of Murty. Murty never claims that he is an Advaitin. He openly accepts that even after his forty year career of teaching Advaita, he is not sure whether he has any Advaitic *vāsana* or decided preference for *Abheda*. Murty is right when he locates the issue between monastic idealism and realistic pluralism. Throughout the book Murty defends this realistic pluralism and

favors for a form of theism where there is a place secured for difference and pluralities.

One of the major charges against Advaita has been raised again and again by its critiques that it does not abide by the rules of Logic. Traditionally there have been accepted three basic laws of thought, they are also considered to be the laws of reality. Now by making a distinction between Reality, Empirical reality and non-existents; and accepting the empirical world as real as well as unreal, Advaitins violate the basic laws of thought and reality, Murty accuses. Now as we have seen, this charge has been again and again and repeated. Out of the three laws, it is argued that Advaitins do not obey the law of excluded middle, as their conception of Māyā is explicitly the violation of this rule.

Enough have been said in rescue of Advaitic position regarding the law of excluded middle. However, I would like to refer to Prof. S Bhattacharya who rightly upholds that Advaitins never disobey the basic laws of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle regarding their conception of reality. Though it is true that that the world of appearance has been accepted by them as full of contradictions. But that is the realm of appearance or unreality and not of reality.

I have nothing to disagree with Bhattacharya. I will only add that Murty here seems to misunderstand the Advaitic position. According to Advaita empirical world or the realm of Māyā is neither real nor unreal, and not real as well as unreal as has been described by Murty. Similarly Advaitins never ascribed to 'sky-lotus' or 'square-circle' any kind of existence. Non-being has never been a level of reality for the Advaitins. Murty's statement "modern logicians have shown that non-existent things such as 'square-circles' are not just another class of things and that these are no *kinds* of existence. To say that the 'barren-woman's son is unreal' means that he has no existence; it does not mean that he has

a special kind of existence” is unsympathetic to Advaita<sup>11</sup>. Advaitins never say that ‘sky-lotus’ has special kind of existence. Murty seems to include in Advaitic classification *asat* as a kind of reality which Advaitins have never ascribed. They did talk about *sattā-traividhya*, but *asat* is out of this. It is mere non-existence.

For Advaitins knowledge is pure and devoid of all distinctions. The triple distinction of knower, knowledge and the known is not accepted to Advaitins. Knowledge in its true nature is without knower and object. Realists cannot accept this, that is why we find Naiyāyikas arguing against it. Murty also finds himself in the later camp. Murty argues that ‘Brahman knows itself’ is as nonsensical as ‘I know I’. But as Bhattacharya says, this is not a criticism of Advaita. According to Advaita the triple distinction between knower, knowledge and the known is inconsistent and illusion. “So if there is only one reality, it must be knowledge or consciousness. Brahman is not conscious, but is consciousness. Brahman does not know, it is not a knower, Brahman is knowledge.”<sup>12</sup>

Murty finds difficulty in understanding the Advaita Vedānta theory of deep sleep or dream. His point is that waking experience and not dream or sleep should be taken as the standard. He finds even Shankara endorsing his view when he holds that ‘the waking world is more comprehensive, rational and harmonious’. Bhattacharya charges that Murty misunderstands Advaita Vedānta position. “It is true that in deep dreamless sleep there is no personal identity, yet this state is not a state of unconsciousness. If deep sleep were a state of unconsciousness, then there would be no evidence of deep sleep.”<sup>13</sup> When Murty says that there is no consciousness in deep sleep, he seems to agree with the Nyāya position which on this point, says Bhattacharya, is not satisfactory. In fact by analysis of our dream and deep sleep Advaitins succeed in establishing that personal identity is accidental for

consciousness. A non-egological and objectless consciousness is not mere a theory but an experienced fact. Personality, egoity, rationality do not characterize the essence of consciousness. Murty finds it difficult to understand knowledge or consciousness in its pure form. It is true that he does talk about spirit, and God for him is spirit and he also does maintain that God can be known only as spirit. But spirit for him is necessarily endowed with egoity and personality. For Shankara too, ultimate reality is spirit and he would also say that this can be known only as spirit. As spirit is necessarily endowed with personality, God for Murty is personal and is revealed in our personal relations with him, which according to Advaita is only false. Personality never forms the essence of spirit. Subjectivity is not mere bodily subjectivity or psychic subjectivity. Murty misses to reach the level of transcendental or pure subjectivity.

Murty is of the view that Advaitins fail to refute 'difference'. What is witnessed by our senses cannot be refuted by any scripture. Bheda is ubiquitously present and cannot be denied by anyone. Even Shankara, says Murty, has given this argument while refuting the idealism of Buddhists. So 'difference and pluralities cannot be rejected. Murty's argument is (1) reality is of difference and pluralities and not of non-duality; (2) even if there were non-duality, no individual would have knowledge of this, for there is only non-duality and hence no individuals; (3) even if some one had realized 'non-duality', he would not teach it others, for there would be no others for him; (4) even if 'non-dual Brahman' were true, there would be no scriptural testimony at all. For if there is only one Brahman, there will be no world, no humans and no scripture to tell this.

As there is one eternal consciousness (Brahman) without a second, there would no one else to whom it could reveal anything. Revelation without a revealer and a recipient is unintelligible.

Really speaking in Advaita, there can be no Veda, no God and no man. Now the Advaitin's reply to the above objection is that from the absolute standpoint there are no scripture and no knowledge of Brahman, but from the empirical standpoint both of these exist. Now according to Murty, the Advaitin cannot give a satisfactory answer to the above question of how an unreal scripture give an absolute knowledge. Murty says "Advaita Vedānta seems to lead to the absurd conclusion that an illusory individual illusorily knows from an illusory scripture that what he previously regarded as 'himself' is an illusion, and that he is something other than 'himself'<sup>14</sup>.

Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharya, the noted Naiyāyika finds Murty's arguments unsatisfactory and his thesis weak. One of the major theses of Murty (1974) was that 'a revelation without a revealer and recipient is unintelligible'. This thesis is just the repetition of the beliefs of theistic religions like Christianity etc. Bhattacharya gives a detailed analysis of the above statement and comes to the conclusion that the concept of revelation 'does not logically preclude the possibility of self-revelation. It is logically possible that the Brahman reveals himself. However, this self – revelation of Brahman does not mean that Brahman knows itself, as is understood by Murty. Murty totally fails to understand the Advaitic position and criticizes it. Bhattacharya writes "Murty has argued that 'Brahman knows itself' is as nonsensical as 'I know I'. But this is not a criticism of Advaita position, for according to Advaita Vedānta, the question 'what does the Brahman know?' is not a proper question at all. According to Advaita, the triple distinction between a knower, knowledge and the known is inconsistent."<sup>15</sup> Unnecessary to repeat, that for Advaitins, Brahman is not a knower or conscious, it is knowledge or consciousness itself. Like Naiyāyikas for Murty too knowledge without a knower or object is not possible, so he finds this a significant question to

ask about the object of the cognition of Brahman. But this is not the Advaitic position. Brahman is of the nature of knowledge and not a knower.

As the concepts of Brahman and its revelation have been found unintelligible by Murty, the Advaitic concept of Māyā too has been rejected by him. Murty very much like Rāmānuja finds Advaitic doctrine of Māyā unsatisfactory. He almost repeats the arguments presented by Rāmānuja. What is the locus of Māyā? Neither Brahman nor jīva can be the locus of Māyā. Brahman is absolute consciousness and so it cannot have ignorance. Jīvas are themselves product of Māyā, so how they can be said as its locus. If Avidyā or Māyā is beginning less, it cannot have an end, for only produced things come to an end. By whom and how was it known that Avidyā has an end? In fact if Avidyā or Māyā is a positive principle, it can not be destroyed. Murty also finds Advaitic answer to the question of the falsity of falsity unsatisfactory. He repeats the argument ‘is the falsity of the world false or true? If ‘falsity’ is false, the world is real; if ‘falsity’ is true, there is another real entity besides Brahman.” Now all these questions have already been answered by the great Advaita Achāryas. Vidyāranya says that at the realm of the transcendental which is revealed only by the Shruti there is only Brahman and here at this level there is no question of any relation with Māyā. Maya exists only at the realm of empirical and here there would be no difficulty in upholding that it belongs to jīvas. Madhusudan Saraswati has already addressed as the *pūrvapakṣa* the question of falsity of falsity raised by Murty. I am not going to discuss here the answer given by him. Various other attempts have been exercised by contemporary Indian scholars taking recourse to Russellian analysis of liars paradox. Philosophical language cannot ignore the possibility of meta-language and levels of language. Advaitins only advance this argument and are of the opinion that levels of

language presuppose the levels of reality. Brahman and Māyā are never at the same level and hence no problem of the explanation of their relation ever arises in Advaitic tradition.

Among few studies devoted to Murty's *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta*, John Grimes' study deserves most attention. Grimes has presented a brilliant critique of Murty's *Reason and Revelation in Advaita Vedānta* in his article "Two Paradigms of Religious Language"<sup>16</sup>. John Grimes locates/addresses the issues raised by Murty correctly. The real issue is between Philosophical Absolutism and Religious Theism. Murty is in favor of Religious Theism and favors personal and responsive God to impersonal and attributeless Brahman which he finds a sheer abstraction. Non-duality is neither supported by perception or experience nor does it have any proofs behind it. On the other hand a theistic God is presupposition of all presuppositions.

Grimes is of the view that there are 'two paradigmatic approaches to the question of religious language'. Either religious language refers to an 'other' and the approach to this remote and foreign 'other' must be through perception and mediated concepts or religious statements may refer to the very constitutive Being of anything whatsoever and as such will be self-sufficient, immediate, and certain. The first approach postulates a gap between the Reality and the individual and the latter approach emphasizes identity. Now if the reality is an 'other' knowledge about this 'other', says Grimes, must be conjectural and hypothetical, experience becomes downplayed and reason is extolled, proofs become necessary, a relationship is sought and its orientation is rooted in difference. On the other hand if Reality is non-dual, it must be a fact of direct experience, knowledge of it is certain, it presupposes all proofs, knowing becomes identical with Being, and relationship becomes identity.

Now as we have seen earlier that for Murty God is God and we are ourselves. An individual can never become God. God is omniscient, omnipotent and creator, whereas individuals have limitations regarding these and they are dependent on God. Murty outrightly rejects any identity between the two. Thus God for Murty ever remains an 'other' to us. Now if God is an 'other', its knowledge will be conjectural and not certain. It will ever demand some proofs and demonstration. On the other hand Advaitins maintain that their Absolute/Ātman is involved in each and every experience as the experience's as well experiencer's ground and substantive Being, it is not open to the charge of being but a hypothetical postulate. The Absolute is a fact of direct experience. As long as there is distinction between the knower and the known, the object can never be completely known. It is only when the knower and the known are not different that certainty is established.

As said earlier the controversy is between a non-anthropomorphic Absolute and a theistic God. To which of these two does religious language refer? Grimes is of the view that a non-anthropomorphic Absolute is more consistent and logical than a theistic God. The charge of anthropomorphism can never be completely wiped out from theism. If we say that Abrahamic God is a non-anthropomorphic infinite, which is true, still this God is conceived as an 'other'. And if the Reality (God) is an 'other', 'entire legion of difficulty arise'. Knowledge of this 'other' would be conjectural, hypothetical. Grimes says "Yet, no one has able to prove or demonstrate, in any philosophically plausible sense of these terms, the existence of this 'other'. Flaws, inconsistencies, and contradictions mar the doctrines and traditions which have tried."<sup>17</sup>

Murty on the one hand charges that a non-dual Brahman is neither proved by perception or personal experience, on the other

hand he says that even if perception or inference do not prove it , a theistic God must be postulated, presupposed. This presupposition is the ultimate presupposition of all experience. Now Grimes remarks that both Murty and Advaita speak of a presupposition of all experience. In Murty's case it is personal God whereas in Advaita it is Brahman or Atman. But as theistic God is an 'other', the presupposition becomes mere presupposition whereas in Advaitic case as it is Atman itself, it does not need any proof, it being the very constitutive of one's own being, is an indubitable fact of experience and fundamental and prior to all proofs.

Murty is right when he says that science and theology are just two languages which seek to describe reality from two different standpoints. But he fails to draw the necessary implications of his own position when he is making assessment of Advaita. A presupposition of an 'other' is necessarily needed only in the field of science. Those religions who talk in reference of an 'other' are still not free of presuppositions of science and reasoning. The greatness of Advaita lies in this that it could exclude the perspective of the 'other' from the field of religion/religious language. Hence, here no proof is sought, no demonstration is needed, and no relation is demanded for real. What is presupposition of all presuppositions and foundation of all certainty, how could that be proved. Yet it is most immediate and intimate and no body can deny it, for it is the very self of one's own.

Murty charges that Advaitic Absolute is sheer abstraction. "It is an abstraction from which personality has been evaporated away-----there is no sense in this kind of abstract thought."<sup>18</sup> However, when we notice that this Brahman is individual self itself and there is identity between the two, the charge of abstraction evaporates. Nothing can be more direct and intimate than experience of our own self. Advaitic Ātman is not a theoretical or

abstract; it is most immediate and intimate. 'It is the most empirical of all empirical realities. Being grounded within each individual's own personal experience-not as an object-but as self-luminously evident, it is an indubitable fact of experience.'

Where did Murty's failure lie? He failed to understand that Advaita, too, is a religion and Advaitins too talk about revelation. As each revelation is absolute to its receivers according to Murty, Advaita too is absolute true for Advaitins. But Murty would not agree to accord the Advaita a status of revelation. Advaita for Murty is neither a science nor a religion but a metaphysics. Now this Advaitic metaphysics is not true according to Murty. But Advaita is not mere a hermeneutics or metaphysics. It is religion as well. For Advaita is primarily meant for realization of one's own true self. I think Murty's unsympathetic attitude towards Advaita is due to his understanding of Advaita as metaphysics and not as religion. He failed to understand that it is religion of all religions.

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3. Even if we concede the point, and suppose that there is such a state of mind, the main difficulty remains ;for in spite of the fact that there is an experience of the unity of being , there is , on the one side, the said unity and, on the other side, the mental state (cittavṛtti) perceiving it. The Advaita school advances some clumsy similes to get over this difficulty. *Ibid.* p. 256.

4. *Ibid.* p.258.
5. *Ibid.* p. 261.
6. *Ibid.* p.266.
7. *Ibid.* p.283.
8. Sengaku Mayeda, “Murty and Advaita Vedānta”, in Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Ashok Vohra, eds., *The Philosophy of K. Satchchidananda Murty*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi,1995, p.122.
9. “In general, my views on Revelation in this book are in agreement with those of the Nyāya writer Jayanta, while my conception of God differs very little from that of Rāmānuja”. K.Satchidananda Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1974, p.ix.
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## IS NĀGĀRJUNA AN ANTI REALIST OR A SCEPTIC?

SREEKALA M. NAIR

*Nāgārjuna has been considered as a marked skeptic in Indian Philosophical Tradition. He has popularly criticized Nyāya analysis of knowledge, specifically its foundationalist epistemology, pointing out that the Nyāya attempt to use pramāṇas to construct a metaphysical realism is illegitimate for it presupposes a conception of reality while constructing pramāṇas theory. This gives scope for a reading of Nāgārjuna as an anti realist, for like Michael Dummett, he too argues that we cannot give content to the metaphysical realist's notion of mind independent reality. Granting that there are indications of anti-realistic approach in Nāgārjuna's writings, the paper argues that, still it is more suitable to call Nāgārjuna a skeptic than an anti realist, also keeping in mind the fact that in Indian philosophy skeptics have had a positive role to play in knowledge analysis and they share the same concern for truth with epistemologists.*

SKEPTICS have been traditionally considered as intruders into the temple of truth. There is a common consensus among philosophers that skeptics are negative, destructive and unconcerned about the cognitive progress of human civilization as such. This is a misnomer. It is known to all that one of the chief concerns of epistemology is to determine how we can be sure that the means we employ to acquire knowledge are appropriate. This suggests that it is imperative even for epistemologists to look carefully at challenges to all knowledge acquiring enterprises and this is exactly what skeptics also do. In this sense, skeptics are helping epistemologists in their endeavor to identify adequate means of knowledge. The traditional role of skeptics as those who

maintained that no knowledge is possible stands revised now for two reasons: primarily it is self defeating, though in a trivial manner; if we can know nothing, we cannot also know this- that we know nothing. Secondly, there has come up a general consensus that skeptics have a genuine case to present before the philosophic community that deserves a serious hearing. Therefore, when skeptics propose that our ordinary standards of justifications are vulnerable in many ways it makes a serious demand on us. On the other hand, in the name of skepticism, if anyone goes to assert that we do not know this or that, well, we have the right to be skeptical about it.<sup>1</sup> As B. K. Matilal observes, a philosopher may better learn to live with the skeptics, for they both are engaged in the same activity, namely the search for knowledge.<sup>2</sup> He says, “A skeptic shares same concern for truth with the philosopher and is reluctant to accept anything else. A skeptic is first and foremost an enquirer”.<sup>3</sup> Though both the skeptic and philosopher alike are involved in seeking and probing the possibilities of knowledge, the skeptic’s efforts are distinguished by his unyielding and persistent nature of enquiry, which according to the philosopher is severely blown out of proportion. This in turn, fetches him the ill fame of being impractical. But this accusation, as rightly pointed out by the skeptics, is beside the point. It is one thing to search earnestly for truth, without compromising on the application of methods chosen, and quite another to worry about the pragmatic inputs of such inquiries. Further, as Indian skeptics would point out, it is not that skeptics chose to embrace uncertainty; it is just that they refuse to pre-judge the issue at hand prior to experience. It is here that we need to place Nāgārjuna as a marked skeptic among Indian philosophers. In *Vigrahavyāvartani*, he provides a series of arguments that coherently provides a critique to the Nyāya epistemology, and anyone who goes through these attacks on the Nyāya analysis of knowledge would summarily conclude that

Nāgārjuna is indeed a skeptic. Mark Siderits in his paper titled ‘Nāgārjuna as Anti Realist’, proposes that a wider reading of Nāgārjuna would reveal that his aim was not to establish the possibility of universal doubt, rather his motivation, quite similar to that of Michael Dummett, is to propose an anti-realist position in Indian metaphysical scenario. Countering Matilal’s depiction of Nāgārjuna as a skeptic Siderits argues that Nāgārjuna’s real intentions were not to prove the impossibility of knowledge, but rather to close off a common route to metaphysical realism via Nyāya theory of *pramāṇas*. In this paper I wish to argue the following theses: It is true that Nāgārjuna’s theory exhibits elements of anti-realism. But beyond that it goes up to refute the very possibility of knowledge, which hinders or at least place hurdles to human cognitive progress, which has been effectively resisted by Vātsyāyana, once again reinstating Nyāya Analysis of knowledge. The paper gets divided into three sections. The first section deals with Matilal’s thesis on Nāgārjuna as a skeptic, the second section provides the anti thesis of Siderites’ depicting Nāgārjuna as an anti-realist and in the third section I shall place Vātsyāyana’s counter position to Nāgārjuna’s critique in order to save Nyāya analysis of knowledge.

Nāgārjuna popularly claims that all *bhāvas* (existent entities) are empty of their *svabhāva* (devoid of meaning). This skepticism of Nāgārjuna about all existent entities/all philosophical positions was accused of paradoxically/inconsistency by Naiyāyikas. Vātsyāyana for instance, in his commentary points out that if all philosophical theories are devoid of their *svabhāva* or essence, as Nāgārjuna claims, his own theory is no exception to this, and therefore, the thesis gets cancelled at once. On the other hand, if Nāgārjuna claims exception to this particular theory, well, we will have to say that there is at least one counter example to what he wants to prove. To this Nāgārjuna gives a befitting reply. In

*Vigrahavyāvartani* he is found raging like this “I’ve no proposition, no thesis to defend (which may lack any essence). If I had any thesis, I would have been guilty of the faults you ascribe to me. But I do not therefore, I have no fault”.<sup>4</sup> In other words, he seems to be arguing that no philosophic thesis has *svabhāva* is itself not a thesis. Matilal is of the opinion that this is admissible for, as he says, “It is quite possible that every thesis lacks essence or *svabhāva*, and this will remain so even if there is no body (not even Nāgārjuna) who asserts it as a thesis. To put in another way, this thesis will get falsified only if anyone asserted it. We can imagine a possible world when all assertions made are empty, but there is nobody to make the crucial assertion that all assertions are empty”.<sup>5</sup> Probably Nāgārjuna wanted to assert that everything lacks *svabhāva* or empty of content, but this must remain unsaid because, to assert it is to falsify it.<sup>6</sup>

From his basic thesis that all *bhāvas* are *svabhāva śūnyas*, Nāgārjuna precedes further to question the very concept of *pramāṇa*, the Nyāya method of knowing. Note that Nāgārjuna did not choose, like many of his Western counterparts, to point out the fallibility of our endeavor to attain knowledge, nor like Descartes raised an argument from illusion, but rather chose to shake the very foundations upon which the superstructure of knowledge is erected. In simple language his argument can be put this way: If *pramāṇas* are the ones that reveal the nature of the world, that bring us the knowledge of the world as it is, we should stretch out the reasoning further and ask ourselves, what bring us knowledge of these means? In other words, we need to know what is the causal route through which these means are produced and revealed to us? Naiyāyikas often concede that at times *pramāṇas* also function as *prameyas*, thus opening the possibility of the means of knowing becoming the object of knowing. But this does not set the problem to rest, if the means of knowledge are

supported by other means there need to be a further set of standards that sanction these, which leads to an infinite regress. To quote Nāgārjuna himself: “If the proof of the *pramāṇas* were by means of other *pramāṇas*, then there would be an infinite regress (*anavasthā*). There would be no proof of the first or of the middle, or of the last”.<sup>7</sup> Nāgārjuna’s this critique should be identified as the most ancient critique against foundationalism.

The *pramāṇa* theorists have defended the charge of infinite regress, like their Western counter parts, by insisting that there are some means of knowing which do not require any further means for knowing them as they are self-evident. These basic, self-supporting theories happened to be the rock bottom, the foundation which has the function of supporting anything that is erected on them, all the while providing self-support. In brief, the *pramāṇas* belong to a privileged class, the set of the self-evident, self-supporting items, while the other items, viz. *prameyas*, are not so. Nāgārjuna questions this dichotomy as well as the validity of the principle lying behind it. Thus, we have arrived at the fundamental question: why is it that certain theories, like the theory of *pramāṇa* have a privileged status. The foundationalists, according to Nāgārjuna, have the responsibility not only to distinguish the basic belief and the superstructures, but should also tell us why are they distinct? <sup>8</sup> Nāgārjuna clearly demands that the reason for such differentiation may be spelled out. Yet another problem raised by Nāgārjuna is that this type of foundationism proposed by Nyāya contradicts their original thesis, that everything is made known by some *pramāṇa*. Worldly objects are defined as objects of knowledge (*prameya*) and there is a category distinction between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. At the same time Nyāya foundationalism urges that *pramāṇas* are not absolutely independent, but are mere stopping points in the causal justification chain. If this is the case, then, asks Nāgārjuna, how could they draw the desired distinction

between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*?<sup>9</sup> Nyāya proclaims that they follow the method that commences with an initial doubt, and subsequently, by applying some *pramāṇa* or the other moves ahead to reach certitude (*Nirṇaya*). Quite unlike Cartesian doubting, in the Nyāya system the doubt takes us ahead. The initial doubt gets removed through the standard means of knowing. But they seem to have dropped this method at some point (precisely when they arrive at the *pramāṇas*) abruptly. Therefore, if someone charges Nyāya for crediting preferential/privileged status for *pramāṇas*, she cannot be accused. If Naiyāyikas were to say that *pramāṇas*, at the rock bottom need no further evidences, as there exists an inner certitude for them, it cannot be granted, for one thing subjective certainty cannot be taken valid for ascertaining universal certitude.

An alternative to the self-evidence (foundationalist) theory may be that a piece of knowledge derives its authority from something other than itself. Matilal points out three such possibilities.

1. A piece of knowledge deriving its justification from another piece of knowledge.
2. A piece of knowledge being validating by its object.
3. Means of knowledge and objects validate each other.<sup>10</sup>

The first alternative is rejected on pain of the infinite regress. The second alternative involves circularity since we posit the *pramāṇas* to validate the world and use this very world to validate the *pramāṇas*. The third alternative of mutual dependence has the great possibility of establishing the Buddhist idealism, including that of Nāgārjuna's. As Matilal observes: "If the object depends upon the means and the means upon the object, then both may be said to be knowledge dependent... If we locate the object in what appears in experience and identify knowledge with what makes it appear the way it does, we court some sort of mutuality between

knowledge and its object, which may point up their essential non-difference.”<sup>11</sup> In fact Matilal foresees a possibility for Nāgārjuna to avoid embracing skepticism. The third possibility would have saved Nāgārjuna from plunging into skepticism all the while remaining in his own metaphysical camp.

## II

Mark Siderits, in his paper ‘Nāgārjuna as Anti realist’ takes issue with Matilal in characterizing Nāgārjuna as a skeptic. It is of course true that in *Vigrahavyāvartani*, Nāgārjuna questions the very possibility of giving a consistent account of pramāṇas, thus posing a critique to the Nyāya theory of knowledge. But a wider reading of Nāgārjuna, Siderits claims, would reveal that his aim was not to establish the possibility of universal doubt, as done by the skeptics in the Western camp. Curiously enough, one could trace anti-realist elements in Nāgārjuna’s theory, and concludes that Nāgārjuna in fact, should be understood as an anti-realist, as someone pointing out that the realist’s route to metaphysical realism via pramāṇas should be closed for good.

Realism exercised in Indian philosophy engages three key theses-

- 1) Adoption of correspondence notion: that truth involves a correspondence between belief and the factual representation of the world.
- 2) Mind-independence of the reality: that physical reality exists independently of our awareness of it.
- 3) Truth exist independent/beyond assertion: that there is one true theory that perfectly fits the reality.<sup>12</sup>

Nāgārjuna counters (1) arguing that pramāṇas cannot be established without committing the logical flaws of circularity or infinite regress. With regard to (2) he points out that the Nyāya attempt to use pramāṇas to construct a metaphysical realism is

illegitimate as it carries over the assumptions about reality while constructing *pramāṇa* theory itself. Therefore, the journey from correspondence theory of truth to reach upon metaphysical realism fails. Hence he advises the Naiyāyikas to give up correspondence and resort to coherentism for justification. This suggested replacement of correspondence intuition with that of coherentism is not to block the possible routes to knowledge, argues Siderits, but to impress us that our empirical world is nothing but a conceptual fabrication (*prapañca*).<sup>13</sup> If *pramāṇas* cannot be established escaping the faults of circularity/infinite regress, it implies that the use of them necessarily involves our conception of reality. Therefore, knowledge can be justified only in a coherentist manner.

In the previous section we have seen that among the four possible ways to establish a *pramāṇa*, Naiyāyikas prefer the 2<sup>nd</sup> in the list, viz., one *pramāṇa* establishing another. In order to protect it from the flaw of regress they seek the aid of an analogy: just as light illuminates itself, so too a *pramāṇa* may establish itself. If Nāgārjuna succeeds in proving that this claim is false, then, in the absence of any other counter example, and in the presence of such positive evidences as the fact that a knife cannot cut itself, we will be justified in rejecting the assertion that a *pramāṇa* establishes itself.<sup>14</sup> Countering the light analogy employed by Naiyāyikas, Nāgārjuna promptly points out that an object can be illuminated only if it exists in darkness, since light cannot, by definition exist in an unilluminated state, this condition cannot be met. Hence it is meaningless to say that *light is illuminated*. Matilal, observes Siderits, countering Nāgārjuna's argument, posits that 'light illuminates itself' is a mere stylistic variant of 'there is light' or 'there is illumination of objects', for, the two events, occurrence of light and the illumination of objects are inseparable events. Siderits now examines this problem: Is it true that the occurrence of light is

nothing over and above the occurrence of the illumination of objects? Let Physics stay aside for a while and commonsense prevail. Moving along with commonsense it is reasonable to maintain that we need not posit a power as a separate entity in order to explain the occurrence of some phenomenon, if the only evidence for its existence is just that phenomenon whose occurrence is to be explained. Arguing in this line, we cannot posit light as having separate existence, if the illumination of objects is the only evidence. However, in the case of light, there is independent evidence for its existence, diffraction phenomenon occurring with transparent media being the best example. Having concluded that the light and illumination of objects are distinct events, Nāgārjuna's argument that light does not illuminate itself is once again back with same force. Siderits also stretches out a different line of argument: even if we were to grant that light is nothing more than the objects illumined, the analogy of light does not hold water here, for *pramāṇas* are, for sure, distinct from their result, the cognition of objects. Naiyāyikas, in fact, speak of a causal relation between *pramāṇa* and its resultant product *pramā* or veridical cognition.

Naiyāyikas attempt to stop the regress also by way of denying the KK theory (Knowing that one Knows), the theory that in order to have knowledge one must know that one knows. Nyāya in their *pramāṇyavāda* clearly pronouns that it is only contingent that a given cognition is verified as a piece of knowledge; one may not choose to do this and yet may possess knowledge. Such a position is consistent with the Nyāya theory of knowledge; the causal theory of justification subscribed by Nyāya maintains that knowledge is a matter of having a true belief with the right sort of causal ancestry. This externalist version of justification allows them to claim justified status to their belief without being able to show justification.

Many a philosophers think that the rejection of KK thesis secures the *pramāṇa* theory from falling prey to infinite regress. The argument is that, being a Buddhist, Nāgārjuna subscribes to KK theory, which results in subjecting knowledge analysis to infinite regress. But here we go wrong. Nāgārjuna raises the issue of the fallacy of infinite regress not from an epistemic position. The intension behind the regress charge, according to Siderits, is not to prove the impossibility of *pramāṇa* theory, but to bring before light the underlying metaphysical presuppositions involved in an otherwise innocent and fair looking epistemological theory. Through a forceful argument he exposes the arbitrariness involved in the *pramāṇa* theory. The force of the argument that he employs in *Vigrahavyāvartani* was purely intended to persuade us to recognize that our *pramāṇa* doctrine is nothing but a convenient myth-making or make-believe, the inherent value of which lies only in making day-to-day life work smoothly, and rendering inter-subjective communication.<sup>15</sup> By this we are not to judge that Nāgārjuna is utterly against the very possibility of knowledge. On the contrary, he concedes that we do have knowledge secured through valid *pramāṇas*, but a journey from *pramāṇa* theory to the world as such, which Nyāya theory proposes, is something objectionable.

A closer look at the theory of correspondence established between *pramāṇa* and the state of affairs in the external world would make it clear that a reflective equilibrium is largely being used: we start with a set of basic beliefs and trace the causal conditions that produce such belief in us. Having arrived at this provisional causal account, we observe whether it accords with other fresh beliefs we arrive at about the world. And what follow would be a series of adjustment either in our *pramāṇas* or in our beliefs or both, and the process continues until we arrive at a perfect equilibrium—a one-to-one correspondence. Nāgārjuna

observes that following this method any belief could be justified. Hence the correspondence they proclaim is quite unwarranted. It would be spurious to consider this position maintained by Nāgārjuna as a skeptical challenge. To put it in Siderits own words, “It may sound as if the claim made is this: since we cannot know which of these schemes - the one we have arrived at, or one of the alternatives we might have arrived at under different assumptions is correct, we do not in fact possess knowledge about the *pramāṇas*, and *prameyas*. The point is rather that since, on any of the multiplicity of possible schemes that might be arrived at through the process of reflective equilibrium, our beliefs would accord with our practice, it follows that the notion of the *one right fit* between beliefs and world is empty.”<sup>16</sup> In brief, Nāgārjuna merely denies the possibility of arriving at one right fit for our beliefs, in the external world. Here he seems to echo the anti-realist reflection that if there are different sets of beliefs, each having equal epistemic warrant, then the notion of a right fit between beliefs and world must be idle and useless. To put in other words, it is quite not possible to give a conceptual understanding of the way the world is independently of our knowing.

This way Siderits convincingly argue his case that Nāgārjuna’s intention behind forcing infinite regress argument against *prāmāṇavāda* is to impress us that both *pramāṇas* and *prameyas* are mutually dependent. *Pramāṇas* can be established only with the help of certain assumptions about the world and vice versa, together leaving us the message that it is hard to make a watertight compartmentalization between the phenomenal world and our cognitive apparatus. If we reduce this position of Nāgārjuna to mere subjectivism, a theory that proposes that the subject with her partial viewpoints fail to see the truth undistorted by personal biases, we would miss the point. Now does this amount to saying that there can be no distinction between

knowledge and error within an epistemic system? Not at all. On the contrary, even while granting that there is/can be knowledge arrived at as a result of this aforementioned epistemic program, it wouldn't warrant the claim that this also mirrors the nature and enables us to constitute a mind-independent reality. The point highlighted here by Nāgārjuna is simply this: in order to draw a correspondence between cognition and the world, we need to establish both of these in isolation from each other. Reflecting Nāgārjuna's contention, Siderits writes: "The fact that *pramāṇas* and *prameya* are mutually dependent in the manner described above shows that we can have no such conception of cognition and world, to say of a set of beliefs that they correspond to reality is to pay them an empty complement. We would do better to say that they help make things go smoothly for us, that they cohere with other beliefs we hold and with our needs, interests and institutions".<sup>17</sup>

The metaphysical realist may raise an objection, which at the surface at least, sounds genuine: they may argue that even if we grant that *p* belong to *S* by sheer virtue of the epistemic method, and not by virtue of the nature of world, truth outruns justification. It's our experience that often we take propositions to be justified, and subsequently find them untrue; also there are cases where we find ourselves improving our justification on a particular proposition. Arguing in these lines we may also proclaim that these unjustified true propositions would never be justified for us, no matter what epistemic practices we may employ. With these arguments realists attempt to establish that truth outruns justification. This argument that truth outruns justification can be granted. But in such cases we are smuggling in an omniscient agency, perhaps God, who is in possession of all truths, who is justified in accepting it employing his own epistemic method. Once this presupposition is exposed, Nāgārjuna's original problem

reappears with greater vigor. In brief, according to Nāgārjuna the Nyāya account of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are mutually dependent, and therefore, they must abandon either their *prāmāṇavāda* or their metaphysical realism. As a true epistemologist Nāgārjuna suggest that they may retain the *prāmāṇavāda* and abandon their metaphysical realism. Siderits argues that Nāgārjuna here is very clearly suggesting an anti-realist alternative, for like Dummett, he too argues that we cannot give content to the metaphysical realists' notions of a mind independent reality that can be mirrored in our cognition.

### III

Even as I Acknowledge the merit in the argument posed by Siderits, I see that Nāgārjuna, unlike the antirealists in the Western camp poses serious threat to the possibility of knowledge. Vātsyāyana truly identifies this and raises effective stoppers to this attempt of Nāgārjuna. Matilal in fact vividly describes this attempt made by Naiyāyikas to safeguard knowledge analysis. He labors much to prove that Nāgārjuna is a skeptic, but a skeptic in the broader sense of the term. Definitely Nāgārjuna in his opinion is not a skeptic who, as Descartes characterized, doubts upon as many fundamental beliefs of the *pramāṇa* theorists as possible. He in fact, proposes a probable extension of the application of the term skepticism to accommodate Nāgārjuna, and further appeals not to pay too much attention to these labels, instead concentrate on the formation of the position and the arguments adduced in favor of it. Giving what is due to both the parties Matilal observes that the charges Nāgārjuna makes against our standards of knowledge do not suggest that they work badly or that there are others which work better. It only suggests that they are logically defective or at least logically questionable.<sup>18</sup>

Let's note that Vātsyāyana does not interpret light analogy in the way we normally approach it for, it would stand in contradiction with the prevailing Nyāya theories of *paratah prakāśavāda* and *paratah prāmāṇyavāda*. According to Nyāya, knowledge is neither self-revealing nor self-validating, and is always appraised or known through another episode. Therefore, Vātsyāyana comes up with the interpretation that the lamp post may play two different roles – the role of a means as far as objects are concerned, and the role of an object as far as the sense of sight goes. Thus, light for instance, may play a dual role, the role of a means when it helps us to see objects, and may become an 'object', when it is itself seen by the sense of sight. This understanding that the same ontological entity may play different roles reveals that the difference between means of knowledge and object of knowledge is not to be analyzed in terms of ontological type distinction, but as different linguistic expressions. Vātsyāyana clearly pronounces that the different use of Kārikas does not refer to distinct ontological entities, but the different roles the same object may play in multiple linguistic usages. Similarly, "... to be a 'means' signifies nothing but playing the role of an instrument in the generation of knowledge, and to be an 'object' means to fill in the role of an accusative case in a knowledge situation".<sup>19</sup> Thus, the problem raised by Nāgārjuna, to strike distinctive features for *pramāṇa* and *prameya* seem amicably resolved by Vātsyāyana by reducing it to a mere grammatical distinction.

The problem of infinite regress with regard to foundationalism is also resolved by Vātsyāyana. He starts with a general thesis that one needs not possess a prior knowledge of means to arrive at a piece of knowledge generated by it. It is epistemically inessential to have knowledge of the means through which cognition gets generated. For instance, our visual perception does not depend on our prior knowledge of the sense of sight.

Often it is through inference that we get to know (contingently) about the means.<sup>20</sup>

Vātsyāyana also uses the analogy of weighting scale (*tulā*) to impress us the distinct roles played by *pramāṇa*. In a weighting machine a lump of gold is first measured as the ‘object’ of knowledge and later as the instrument or as the scale to measure other objects. Similarly the *pramāṇa* (which literally means excellent measuring means) may take different roles, as *prameya* and later as *pramāṇa* without causing any logical difficulty. Uddyotakara offers an interesting analogy to show that a piece of evidence need not be itself justified to act as evidence: just as the sample water collected from a pool may justify the purity of the lake along with its own purity (without any implication of self-justification) so too *pramāṇa* which functions as the causal justificatory evidence stands justified pragmatically.<sup>21</sup> The Nyāya position is clearly this: the inferential justification chain need to be extended only if practical life (*Vyavahāra*) calls for it, not otherwise.

The upshot of the argument is that while Nāgārjuna’s writings show a lineage to antirealism, it cannot be branded as a case of antirealism proper as, he does not share many positions upheld by antirealists. And also a fair evaluation of his writings clearly reveal a skeptic outlook with regard to the very possibility of knowledge, for we find him asserting that means of knowledge like perception and inference are self defeating for, they do not reveal the objects in past, present or future. Naiyāyikas point out that Nāgārjuna will not be able to establish this without harming his own theory for it is self-reflective: his statement ought to be a means in itself, in order to negate other means, and gets burned to ashes by its own assertion before causing danger to others. It is quite like one burning one’s own finger in order to burn others. Some philosophers have felt that Nāgārjuna may choose to burn his

finger if he could point at others. But alas! He gets destroyed prior to this. Nevertheless his contributions to Indian knowledge analysis are significant, as he awakened our scholastic philosophers from their dogmatic slumber.

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# THE RITUAL PERSON

CLEMENS CAVALLIN

The following text was originally written as a chapter in my book *Ritualization and Human Interiority* (published 2013 by Tusculanum Press), but as the manuscript was rewritten to become focused on one single argument, the philosophically inclined discussion of the human person became a project of its own, while still retaining a close connection to the thrust of the larger project.

This article is primarily a discussion of personhood as a preparation for the larger concern of interiority and ritualization; and the book and the article are favourably read in relation to each other, while, at the same time, the two discourses are independent enough to thrive on their own.

Before dealing with the concept of person in earnest, it is necessary to briefly discuss the dichotomy of subject and object, and the consequent distinction between subjective, intersubjective and objective as this has been a prime locus of debate concerning the dynamism of inner and outer in regard to the human person. In extending the theoretical focus in this way, one treads on highly disputed ground, the battlefield of ‘anthropology’ in all its varieties: philosophical, psychological, biological and religious. The aim here is, however, not to ultimately solve these, as it seems, perennial questions once and for all, but to punt ourselves along the course which serves the present theoretical purpose best, that is, that of outlining a model which can function as a fond for an elaboration of forms of ritual interiorization.

## *The Subject and the Intersubjective World*

Subject as a philosophical concept has a history of change; in scholastic thinking, it denoted the substrate or the substance, the

thing which has accidental qualities. In modern philosophy, on the other hand, it acquired the meaning of soul or consciousness, the bearer of its own conscious experiences, a new sense which is, nevertheless, related to the previous meaning (Lübcke 1988: 529f).

One lens through which to understand modern western philosophy is actually the subject: from its constitution (Descartes, Kant) to its death (Foucault, Derrida), or the escape from it into an intersubjective realm as language (Wittgenstein).<sup>1</sup> Though the subject was made the starting point in order to provide stability and certainty to philosophical reasoning, this was from the beginning united with a sceptic attitude, which only temporarily or partially could be held at bay (cf. the whole philosophical project of Kant). It is this sceptic attitude which erupted in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century under the label of post-structuralism and as a wider phenomenon, postmodernism. What is at stake in this disenchantment of subjectivity (Farrell 1994; Archer 2000: 17–50) is not merely whether the subject, in the modern usage of the term, is a substance (subject according to the older meaning), but also reason itself is called into question: its freedom and its ability to gain knowledge. Postmodern scepticism, therefore, gnaws at its own heart, because the total loss of a foundation for reason makes doubt itself impossible (doubt without a doubter), and without freedom emancipation is unattainable (cf. McNay 2000: 76f.).

One way to go if introspection cannot provide certainty is to turn the attention to the intersubjective world, making that primary and the subject secondary. The subject is then constituted in and through social interaction; it is seen as constructed, thus reversing the position of idealism that postulates the subject as constructing the world. In this way, however, the burden of supplying a fundament falls on the notion of intersubjectivity, as in the turn away from the subject, the primacy is given to what is between

subjects, to the inter-subjective field: everything that is accessible for at least two subjects. This is, consequently, potentially the whole of the physical world, but in actuality within a group for the most part only a small segment of it, even if this has changed dramatically with global communications. Also the world of ideas, symbols and narratives which is mediated through language is intersubjective, and the cultural realm is as the material world not open in the same manner to all subjects, as access is restricted, for example, by linguistic competence and the level of understanding. To take as one's point of departure these shared worlds can be felt as a relief, as an escape from the esoteric nature of the inner. However, the temptation is then almost irresistible not only to argue that the subject is secondary in relation to the intersubjective, but to radically challenge its interiority by trying to make it wholly part of the exterior domain. This is relatively easy to achieve with the physical interior of the human person, but the conquest of human interiority can be extended to limit more and more the private sphere of the mind.<sup>2</sup> A philosophical position taking the intersubjective as its point of departure has, actually, a problem with allowing the subject any interior sphere at all. It must insist that all that is, is intersubjective, otherwise the subject can be resurrected at the margins of intersubjectivity through the constitution of intra-subjectivity – a zone of mental interiority. Such a view of the subject as transparent and public is basic in Nick Crossley's book *Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming*, in which he states:

Firstly, that human subjectivity is not, in essence, a private 'inner' world which is divorced from the outer (material) world; that it consists in the worldly praxes of sensuous, embodied beings and that it is therefore public and intersubjective. (Crossley 1996: 24)

This drastic formulation is modified in that he introduces two forms of intersubjectivity: radical and egological. The former is the type of intersubjective interaction in which self-awareness is lost and the latter in which it emerges in reflexivity. True to his radical statement above though, Crossley holds the view that radical intersubjectivity is basic and egological only secondary:

It should be added here that the egological attitude always necessarily entails the radical attitude as an underlying foundation. /.../ Egological intersubjectivity is only a relative reflective distancing. It is never absolute. (Crossley 1996: 71)

In this way, he wants to make certain that the autonomous subject is not constituted once more through the admission of the egological dimension. His basic statement is, therefore, that human subjectivity is *necessarily* intersubjective (Crossley 1996: 24). This position, however, has to face the metaphysical problem that intersubjectivity, though linguistically a noun, does not refer to a substance, but to a type of relation, namely that between subjects. Despite that a subject is seen as always in relation, the notion of intersubjective relies upon the meaning of subject in order to refer to what is *between* subjects. The subject is then not 'dead' but defined as necessarily standing in relation to other subjects.

One can interpret this approach as being foremost epistemological and not necessarily ontological, in the sense that the best way to understand the subject is through the intersubjective world in which it lives, and not through the fantasy of a solipsistic consciousness. The turn from the subject to the intersubjective world is then mainly a question of choosing the adequate starting point for analysis. The question is, nevertheless, whether such an epistemological stance does not imply a specific ontology of mind and world. This ambivalence is, for example, present in the introduction to a reader in a paradigm within psychoanalysis called *inter alia* intersubjectivity theory. One is left

to wonder whether the rejection of objective truth does or does not entail some form of constructivism:

Analysts embracing an objectivist epistemology presume to have privileged access to the essence of the patient's psychic reality and to the objective truths that the patient's psychic reality obscures. In contrast, the intersubjective viewpoint, emphasizing the constitutive interplay between worlds of experience, leads inevitably to an epistemological stance that is best characterized as "perspectivalist" /.../. (Stolorow 1994: xi)

The tension between the notion of subject and that of the intersubjective is also the main point of Robert Dunn's (1997) comparison between the theories of George Herbert Mead and Judith Butler on the nature of the self. Dunn argues both for similarities and decisive differences between the symbolical interactionism of Mead and the poststructuralism of Butler. They are alike in that they are both evidence of a "shift from notions of innate consciousness to a strategy of locating the subject in a system of external relations, that is, a relocation of subjectivity to the exterior world of collectively shared symbols" (Dunn, Robert 1997: 689). But, when for the poststructuralist the subject is a fiction begotten in the web of discourse, Mead retains a notion of the subject as self; that is, the self is constructed, but not illusory. Interestingly for our theoretical purposes, Dunn argues that "Discerning the difference between Butler and Mead hinges on how we understand the meaning of 'internalization' (Dunn, Robert 1997: 693). Internalization is the process in which an interior is built up with the help of material from the social world as norms, attitudes, roles and values. An identity with an interior sphere is in this way constituted, the Self according to Mead's terminology.

To retain the notion of interiority and thus self or subject seems wise as there are major difficulties inherent in the poststructuralist approach. One is that when killing the subject,

discourse acquires a subject-like character, and we find ourselves being once again in the ontological field. For what is discourse and in what sense can *it* (as there are no subjects) raise a claim to an existence besides that gained through the use of it by subjects? Discursive or not, reasoning always requires a reason, in the same way as language cannot exist without people speaking or reading it. We can be fooled by the invention of writing into thinking that language can exist without users, but a library full of books in an unknown language to which we have no translation key into any for us understandable language is merely a lot of systematically discoloured paper.

If we, then, follow Dunn in this respect, we can say that ritual interiorization depends on the previous and ongoing process of internalization: through internalization the interior is constituted, while by interiorization the interior is given special importance. The question in what way this interior is private is another matter which we will have to postpone to the discussion of personhood. Because private carries with it two meanings: first the sense of being accessible only to the individual person (cf. Ayer 1963), and second private in the sense of belonging properly to the person, but being not in principle outside the reach of others, giving private a moral and not only an epistemological dimension.

The concept of intersubjective is, as we have seen, connected to discourses of epistemology and ontology, but it also leads, in contrast to the notion of subject, quickly into a philosophizing over human social life, as seen in Nick Crossley's book where the final chapters deal with topics such as power and citizenship. However, if we take with us the concept of intersubjectivity into a consideration of social life, there is always the danger that it is seen as the interaction of disembodied subjects and not of human persons. This is the case also in regard to ritual activity, as what we

meet are not merely subjects performing together, but I would like to argue persons.

*The Object and Being Objective*

The relation discussed up to this point has been that between subject and subject, that is, the relation between conscious agents. But if the object is precisely that which one is conscious of, what is presented to my consciousness, then the question is whether other subjects are objects to me, and if my consciousness when being conscious of itself (being self-conscious) is having itself as an object.

The position chosen in this study as one of the building bricks for a model of the ritual person is that the subject *qua* subject cannot in a direct sense be an object of its own consciousness nor of others. This is because the subject is not the same as the psyche, I can be conscious of feeling anger in all its psycho-physical aspects, and at the same time argue in my head against acting according to that feeling, but I cannot at will in a pure act know myself as knower.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the subject becomes self-conscious when in act, for example, when reflecting upon its anger. The subject considered apart from the mental act is then an abstraction, in the word of Husserl, a pure or transcendental ego, and hence not present in the mind as an object. Also when engaged in intersubjective relations, the transcendental ego of the Other does not enter into the field of objects for my consciousness, for it is not the abstracted knower that we relate to but to fully fledged persons with personalities that have psychological and bodily as well as social aspects.

The subject as knower can thus have its own psyche, the inanimate material world, the cultural world and other persons as objects, but it can only have indirect knowledge of the content of

other person's minds. And it is here that we find the realm of the subjective, that is, the mind as object for its own consciousness, but only indirectly knowable to others. The notion of objective seems then at first glance to denote the opposite of subjective, what could be the object of at least two subjects, but this was defined before as the intersubjective and comprises also deliberate falsehoods and collective delusions. Objective is, therefore, here defined as what has being, and as a correspondence theory of truth is chosen, the truth or falsehood of a statement is determined by its relation to what is objective, to what exists.<sup>4</sup> The extension of objectivity does then include the whole subjective and intersubjective worlds. According to this account, there is no necessary opposition between subjective and objective; subjective is in the order of epistemology and contrasted with what is intersubjective, while objective is in the order of ontology and contrasted instead with that which does not have being.

This distinction between the intersubjective and the objective leads quite naturally to the question in what sense the intersubjective realm is coextensive with reality, whether the universe is intersubjectively accessible in its totality or if it could harbour some radical mystery other than the human interior. Perhaps the universe is accessible *in toto* potentially, but not actually, so that an optimistic view of human intellectual history is to see it as the gradual expansion and correction of the intersubjective world to the final goal of making it coextensive with being.

Nevertheless, to contrast subjective with intersubjective instead of objective could seem a little confusing, because subjective is often used not only to refer to the content of the mind as the feeling of pain over a particular grievance, but also to the qualities (*qualia*) of an act of knowing or perceiving which

pertains to the subject and not the object. In seeing a blue sky, the bluishness is subjective in the sense that it is an experience had by the subject, but, on the other hand, it is caused by the perceived object; thus varying with the frequency and intensity of the light refracted. A bundle of questions is connected to this distinction as, for example, to what degree bluishness is objective, in the sense of being true, that is, if it corresponds to a quality of the object; furthermore, we find the discussion whether the existence of *qualia* is a strong argument for the *sui generis* nature of mental phenomena, thus supporting the rejection of materialism. *Qualia* are, nevertheless, intersubjective, or so it seems at least, as we can speak with each other about different shades of blue skies and collectively admiring the manifestation of the whole colour spectrum in a rainbow.<sup>5</sup>

Subjective is also used as denoting a judgment done according to the preferences and desires of a person, instead of what is best for the community or what is true. In this context, the quality of being objective, impartial, is to be able to disregard one's own preferences and interests and to judge what is in accordance with justice and truth.

The two senses of objective outlined above are both related to what has been chosen as the basic sense of objectivity, viz. what has being and what in a second step represent being in a correct way (i.e. truth). This opens up many exciting avenues of enquiry due to the centrality of the subject-object dichotomy in western philosophical discourse, but as we then are in the danger of venturing too far from the concerns of the ritual person and to become lured deep into the brushy woods of philosophical debate, it is necessary to conclude this section and proceed to a discussion of the notion 'person'.

The main outcome of the discussion of subject and object that is important for our conception of the ritual person is the interplay between the subjective, intersubjective and objective. In the radical forms of the postmodern approach, objective reality is left out and the subject deconstructed, while the choice here is to retain the concept of subject as the abstracted centre of consciousness, and subjective as denoting the mental world to which the subject has privileged access, while intersubjective points to what is accessible actually or potentially to at least two subjects. As the subject is not considered as dead, neither is the object in the sense of what is present to consciousness, nor the derivative 'objective' referring to that which has being: comprising the subjective sphere and the intersubjective cultural world, plus what lies beyond them both. The concept of the objective puts constraints on the subjective and the intersubjective as in the case of death, which marks the disappearance of a person (and indirectly a subject) from the intersubjective field, an occurrence which is of prime interest to religious discourse. To retain the notion of the objective points to the limitations of the intersubjective realm and preserves an aspect of mystery, at the same time as this affirms the possibility of an expansion of the intersubjective field, a necessary condition for the human quest of making the intersubjective coextensive with being, with what is objective. In the Christian tradition, this fusion of the epistemological dimension with the ontological is reached in the beatific vision of God, corresponding in Indian philosophy to the tendency of spiritual monism, everything being one unified subject, and one could interpret the postmodern tendency of making discourse absolute and the flattening of reality by naturalism as immanent versions of these transcendent goals.

#### *From Subject to Person*

The term subject carries with it, as we have seen, a marked emphasis on mental life, something which distinguishes it from the

concept of a human person, which refers to the embodied mind or the minded body, that is, a totality of mind and body. This is crucial for the treatment of ritual interiorization, as the inner is both mental and physical, and as the interior is manifested and enacted through material and bodily signs. The subject and its subjective domain are, therefore, not alone in the interiority of the human person, but share this condition of being hidden with the inside of the human body. To conceive of the ritual person as solely or primarily a subject (i.e. as consciousness) is to open up for some form of idealism which makes both intersubjectivity and embodiment unnecessarily problematic.

Thus, to the triad formerly introduced consisting of the subject, the intersubjective realm and objective reality, we have to add the person. The person as a conscious agent is clearly a subject and as having being it is objective, but it is not in its totality intersubjective. Therefore, it can become a microcosm in which the quest for a fusion of knowledge and being can unfold, at the same time as it holds out the prospect of radical mystery, of a transcendent nucleus, as suggested if not affirmed by the notion of a subject.

### *The Individual Person and its Self*

In moving from subject (consciousness) to person (embodied mind), we have not exhausted the number of concepts used to single out and characterize a human being. As these terms tend to overlap and compete for the primary place, there is a need to comment upon some of them – and in this way also move along the elaboration of the concept of person – before taking on personhood in a ritual context.<sup>6</sup> Spencer Cahill (1998: 135), for example, in his reading of Ervin Goffman's writings on personhood, makes the comment that Goffman uses the words individual, self and person

in an inconsistent way and Cahill, therefore, proposes the following conceptual clarification:

I will use the term “individual” to refer to an organic bodily being. Following Harre (1984: 26), the term “person” will refer to a “socially defined publicly visible embodied being.” Finally, I define “self” as such a being’s reflective awareness of personal agency and identity (Giddens 1991: 35–55)

In light of these distinctions, it becomes apparent that up to this point we have not clearly differentiated between individual and person. In Cahill’s definition and article, the emphasis is on the constructed nature of the person: personhood is socially conferred or denied of the individual. The difference seems to introduce a split between the basic material living being, a body, and the social defining of that material as a person. However, the definition interestingly neither singles out *human* bodies nor *human* personhood.<sup>7</sup> As discussed in the article, the favourite pet, for example, the poodle Sophie, could also be given personhood, as evidenced in the custom of giving pets a funeral. Consider the following text found on the website of the Los Angeles Pet Memorial Park under the heading “Words of Comfort”:

The Rainbow Bridge

There is a bridge connecting Heaven and Earth. It is called the Rainbow Bridge because of its many colors. Just this side of the Rainbow Bridge there is a land of meadows, hills and valleys with lush green grass.

When a beloved pet dies, the pet goes to this place. There is always food and water and warm spring weather. The old and frail animals are young again. Those who are maimed are made whole again. They play all day with each other.

There is only one thing missing. They are not with their special person who loved them on Earth. So, each day they run and play until the day comes when one suddenly stops playing and looks up! The nose twitches! The ears are up! The eyes are staring! And this one suddenly runs from the group!

You have been seen, and when you and your special friend meet, you take him or her in your arms and embrace. Your face is kissed again and again and again, and you look once more into the eyes of your trusting pet.

Then you cross the Rainbow Bridge together, never again to be separated.

~ Author Unknown ~ <[www.lapetcemetry.com/](http://www.lapetcemetry.com/)> 2006-08-23

To consider animals as persons is of course not a new phenomenon, the Saami hunters of northern Scandinavia, for example, ceremoniously buried the skeleton of the killed bear and had a myth elaborating on the kinship between men and bears (cf. Willerslev 2007 for a Siberian example). A ‘bodily being’ in Cahill’s definition, therefore, does not require the potentiality for rational thought, but incorporates even molluscs. Also, when he characterizes a person as an embodied being socially defined, the focus is on the body and not on consciousness or capacity for conceptual thinking. This relation between the organic body of the individual and the category of embodied being (person) is challenged in a religious context when the statue of a god is treated like a person: washed, given food, entertained and put to bed. It is mostly considered not merely as a symbol, but as somehow inhabited by the god, and in this way also inorganic entities can be socially defined as persons. The individual in Cahill’s terminology is more clearly an animal of some sort, an organic being, and individuals constitute the foremost material for the conferring of personhood, but not the only as we have seen.

At this point a number of oppositional positions clash as those of the constructivist and the more objectivist, and that of the ‘animist’ and the materialist. If we follow Cahill in considering personhood as something which is conferred rather than inherent, then of course anything can be made into a person. However, according to a definition of personhood which requires an

objective capacity for rationality in the entity socially defined as a person, one could argue that many such bestowed personhoods are mistaken. Therefore, it seems wise, as we have retained the difference between the intersubjective and the objective, to acknowledge two types of personhood. The first is the ontological, either an entity has the potentiality of rational thought or not. The second is social personhood which could be conferred on both animals and inanimate objects, but also denied of ontological persons, for example, when according to a racist ideology ‘primitives’ are not considered as rational, that is, persons, but only individuals in Cahill’s terminology. There is thus a basic tension between the intersubjective cultural conferring and refusal of personhood and the objective nature of the capacity for rationality and self-consciousness.

If we consider human personhood more specifically, there is also a problem with saying that personhood is socially conferred on the individual, because an individual human being, who is not a person, is not a human being at all. The basic point is that when singling out a human individual, we use personhood as a criterion. When personhood is denied mostly also humanity is denied, as sometimes in the case of slaves or aborted fetuses.<sup>8</sup> In Michael Tooley’s discussion of abortion and the right to life, he, consequently, considers the basic question to be “When is the member of the species *homo sapiens* a person?” His answer makes mature subjectivity the criterion of personhood; the right to live is, hence, dependent not upon being human (a member of the species) but upon being a person:

The claim I wish to defend is this: An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself a continuing entity. (Tooley 2007 [1972]: 428)

Somewhat ironically this puts into question not only whether the mentally retarded have a right to life, but also denies advanced Theravada Buddhists this human right. A somewhat perplexing result which follows as Tooley in the phrase above does not base personhood on the potential for rational reflexive subjectivity, but on the actual possession of the concept and the belief in that one is a continuing subject. If he, on the other hand, had decided for potentiality, it would have been much more difficult to differentiate between being human and being a person.

The question of species identity and personhood becomes different in regard to animals as rationality and self-reflexivity does not, for example, enter into the definition of what a duck is, to define a duck as a person is then to give it a status it did not have by virtue of its duckishness. An individual duck and Donald the personal duck are thus both ducks. A human, on the other hand, who is not a person puts into question the very concept of being human as in the case of a dead body, a human body in a vegetative state, or a savage. The human body without reason, but still breathing, is it a person or not: is it a living dead, a human person having lost its personhood and with it also its humanity, lingering on as a morbid caricature of the person it once was? Or is it a person still and should have the rights of a person?

Consequently, an animal is an individual duck by virtue of its having the characteristics pertaining to the definition of what a duck is; and an animal is an individual human being by having the basic features of humanhood of which personhood is one. The notion of individual is thus connected to the process of individuation, the making of the individual (ontological), or the ascription of individuality (conceptual). On the one hand, we have the general concept of human person and on the other hand we have individual persons; it is, therefore, not feasible to distinguish

between an *individual* human being and a *personal* human being.<sup>9</sup> An individual human is at the same time a particular person. If not considered as an instance of a person, then it will not qualify as a human being at all; instead, perhaps a monster, an uncanny disguised creature, a zombie, or a robot. But if a robot would achieve ontological personhood this would not automatically make it into a human due to that ‘person’ is a more generic concept than ‘human being’; there could, for example, be aliens who qualify as persons, but not as humans.

Though the difference between personhood and an individual human person has now been delineated, it still remains to comment on the nature of self in distinction to person, and in this respect it is advisable to follow Cahill. The self is thus the picture a person has of itself. This is of course something which to an overwhelmingly high degree is generated by the social systems that an individual is situated within, but this fact should not lead us to deprive the individual of agency, however limited it may be (cf. Archer 2006). The definition of self as the picture the individual has of itself is in accordance with the distinction between self psychology and personality psychology as summarized by Jonathon Brown:

Self-psychology is concerned with subjective experience (with what people *think* they are like); personality psychology is more concerned with objective experience (with what people are *actually* like). (Brown, J. 1998: 3)

But if the self is the picture of myself which I think is true, and my personality is the way I as a psychophysical being is objectively formed, we need also concepts for the picture of myself that I try to project, but which I do not necessarily consider true, perhaps wanting to make it true – and, on the other hand, the representations other persons have of me. The first is the persona and the second, following Brown, the social identity. Persona carries here the original meaning of person, that is, the theatrical

mask and in a second step the social role or appearance assumed by an individual.<sup>10</sup> Of course, for an individual, the self and the persona could be more or less identical and both quite different from its real personality. Such a lack of insight into one's own personality combined with the effort to convince others of the truth of one's delusion could easily create a comical effect or turn into a mental disorder, or merely social catastrophe. On the other hand, the persona could evince social ambitions and thereby an aspiration of changing one's social identity. This identity is foremost the result of an evaluation of the individual on the basis of its real or presumed membership in a number of social categories such as sort of occupation, social class, race and ethnicity, but also personality traits as benevolent, generous or greedy could be included and combine as in the concept of the greedy Scotsman. The modern notion of 'image', for example, that of a politician, refers both to the active effort to project a persona, in this way establishing a profitable social identity for the politician, and to that person's actual social identity. A disclosure of the real personality could then be disastrous.

However, if we take a look at the complementary notion of personal identity, we must ask ourselves in what sense it differs from the concept of self as formerly defined. In the same manner as social identity, personal identity can be viewed as having an inclination toward denoting a collection of memberships in social groups, but as also psychological characteristics were included in the social identity, there seems to be little difference between self and personal identity. The choice here is to let personal identity denote the internalized social identity of the individual, while the self refers to the whole physical-psychological-social profile. A change in the social identity as unemployment, thereby, probably causes a change in the personal identity, threatening the foundation

of the life project of the individual. In this sense, the personal identity constitutes one important aspect of the self, but not its totality. The self contains aspects of me which are socially irrelevant and which do not come into question when forming my social identity or the internalized personal identity.<sup>11</sup>

The persona can in certain situations be seen as a proposal for a new social identity hiding as a screen the internalized old social identity, that is, the personal identity, with the intention of letting the persona become the new personal identity. The figure of the bourgeois gentilhomme ascending on the social ladder as described by Molière comes naturally to mind and meeting him, but descending and thus less cheerful, we find the impoverished aristocrat, who by his noble persona tries to uphold his former social and personal identity though these now lack material and social foundation (cf. Riggs 1986). Both types of discrepancies between social identity and persona have great potential for comical as well as tragic effects.

#### *From the Intersubjective to the Interpersonal*

If we shift our attention from the subject to the person this entails a simultaneous move from the intersubjective to the interpersonal, the world as related to persons, stopping at the limit of the person, which hems in the sphere of the intrapersonal, the interior of the person. What is intrapersonal can partly be intersubjectively perceived and made into an object, giving birth to the curious sense of discrepancy between personal (i.e. me, mine) and object (i.e. this, that), a feeling of alienation – which essentially is a conflict between the individual as subject (consciousness) and as person. And it is this limited range of the intersubjective gaze that provides the person with an interior both in a physical and mental sense. The surface of the person, its parts which enter the intersubjective field, becomes then a canvas on

which signs are enacted *inter alia* in order to mediate between what is interior and exterior. This semiosis is of fundamental importance for ritual interiorization, as symbols oscillate between being used as signs of the interior and being ritualized to the point where the symbol collapses signifier and signified in itself.

We, hence, have to change focus from an emphasis on epistemology, the subject being the knower, to the instable boundaries of the person and their semiotic character. The notion of intersubjective has to give room for the interpersonal, to what is between persons, to the relations between persons, which brings with it a shift of attention from an epistemological to a social and moral dimension. At the same time, we have to retain the epistemological aspect as the tension between intersubjective and interpersonal is of importance for the understanding of the ritual person.

In order to flesh out the implications of the interpersonal, two aspects will be dealt with in the following. First, the moral dimension of personhood will be explored, hence, bringing the rights and obligations of the person to the fore. Second, the semiotic nature of the person will be revisited, a feature which is intimately linked to the person due to, on the one hand, the need for bridging the more or less broad gulf between the intrapersonal and the interpersonal, and, on the other hand, as a means of connecting the intersubjective world of culture with the subjective understanding and use of it.

### *Moral Personhood*

If the surface of the body is seen as the limit of the person, then private in the sense of hidden and interior is both bodily and mental, but importantly only relatively so, as during a surgery the hidden nature of the bodily interior is effectively transcended. If such an epistemological understanding of private basically gives

birth to a discussion of what is perceivable and knowable, an understanding of private as what belongs to the person entails more a focus on actions and their legitimacy or illegitimacy, with other words: the moral dimension.<sup>12</sup>

This moral aspect is intimately connected with the inherent social nature of the person as the moral quality of an action is mostly discussed in relation to how it affects other persons. For example, all the Ten Commandments endorse or prohibit actions toward persons (God and fellow humans) and their property. A discussion of morality and personhood could, however, take two basic forms. First it can centre on the question whether there are rights and obligations flowing from the person *qua* person, as argued by the proponents of natural law (e.g. Rourke 2005: 100–107). Second, one could analyse what concrete norms are considered as pertaining to a person in a specific culture, that is, what constitutes positive law. The latter question is more interesting for us in this context as in religious rituals very different versions of what moral status a particular person should have are enacted. As in the everyday life of society, rights and obligations mostly depend on the social identity, and in rituals this relation becomes accented in a radical way, as in rituals social identities are manufactured and destroyed, internalized and engraved on the person through signs as circumcision or affixed to it as royal insignia.

It is, therefore, not enough to be recognized as an individual human person in order to gain a private sphere, inclusion in certain social groups is also required. And with them more or less privacy is concomitant as the difference between the slave and the king bears witness to. For the slave not even his own body is private and he lives on the border of personhood only having minimal rights and could easily become classified as an animal, a non-person. In a

totalitarian society, this is extended also to the mind, not even the thoughts are private in the moral sense, though they may be private to some extent epistemologically. If we earlier alluded to the perplexity that emerges when a part of the body is viewed as an intersubjective object and not as an undifferentiated element of the whole of the acting person, we now meet a similar dissonance, viz. that between an organ of my body as belonging to someone else and it as being a proper part of my person. For a pregnant woman this is a process which culminates in the delivery and the cutting of the umbilical cord, but in a psychological and moral-legal sense this is a much longer process.

Though the moral status of the individual is mostly dependent on its social identity, the basic classification is of course to be included in the category of human being and in a second step to be part of the most generic social group in question: the family, clan, nation, state or empire. We should, however, expect that in cultures where a universal order transcending the local society is not elaborated, the concept of barbarian and nonhuman tend to converge. In all these categorizations (human, citizen and social position), we can progressively see a fuller version of moral personhood emerging, a growing intensity of privacy: of what belongs properly to the person.

#### *The Legal Person and the Totem*

At this point, it could be interesting to dwell for a moment on the notion of legal person which is the moral aspect of personhood abstracted from the other characteristics of the individual human, for example, embodiment and consciousness. As August Reinisch remarks in his book *International Organizations before National Courts* (2000: 37): “Legal personality is generally regarded as the capability to possess rights and duties under a specific system of law.” Thus, also social groups as nations and corporations can be

considered to have moral or legal personhood, as having rights and running the risk to be punished for transgressions of laws. But, in principle also animals could be defined as legal persons having rights (animal rights movement) and obligations thus running the risk to be condemned for breaches of laws and regulations as in a proposal of a new law in Belgium.<sup>13</sup>

The discussion of an extended notion of moral personhood is foremost a legal discourse in which the personality of corporations is considered as an instance of legal fiction. But, as we are focusing on religious rituals, we must note similar strategies within a religious context. We can even choose a topic that has been used as bridge between the secular and the religious, viz. the practice of totemism (e.g. Durkheim 1912; Freud 1913). The basic belief of group totemism is that there is a bond of kinship between a human group (family, clan) and a species of animals or plants. The totem animal functions often as the symbol of the social group and is guarded by special taboos (rights).

In a first step, we may focus on the extension of personhood to animals or plants through the notion of kinship. This could be attributed to a primitive mentality of sorts as alluded to in the article on totemism by Josef Haekel in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*:

Generally speaking, totemistic forms are based on the psychomental habits of the so-called primitives, on a distinctive "thought style" which is characterized, above all, by an "anthropopsychic" apprehension of nature and natural beings, for instance, ascribing to them a soul like man's. Beasts and the things of nature are again and again thought of as "persons," but mostly as persons with superhuman qualities. (Haekel 2006)

If the raven is considered a kin, it can be considered to possess personal attributes as consciousness, language competence and rationality. However, another aspect is its protection by taboos. The animal then also has a moral personhood: if a raven, the totem

of the clan, is killed, the injury to the totemic species has to be redressed, or at least explained away. The human group in question probably also expect the raven to act in ways beneficial to its human relatives, in this way implying its duties.

In a third sense, the raven is parallel to the legal person of a corporation or a state, because the raven is not only considered as a person, but as a token of the human social group, as the embodiment of it. And if we continue to probe the religious sphere and leave totemism proper behind, we find deities as representatives of cities, nations and empires. This is of course a variant on the general theme of personification in which abstract entities are given personal characteristics such as the goddess of victory or of the plague. But the main point here is the necessity of extending the moral aspect of personhood to supra-human structures as evinced by the legal person and the totem of the clan.

The fullness of moral personhood varies with the social identity of the person, reaching its apex in the person that embodies the social group: the king, the totem or the legal fiction the state; this order is, however, transcended, or merely extended, when we take into full consideration the religious sphere. The god has potentially an even higher level of rights and fewer obligations than the highest ranking human. The culmination of this development is reached in a voluntarist view of morality according to which moral norms are decided solely by the will of the supreme god; the god then has no obligations toward principles outside his or her own will. The whole world could be viewed as the body of the god, that is, his or her private domain. But mostly also the superhuman world is conceived of as graded and we find a hierarchical set of levels of perfection, inhabited by various gods and spirits. This naturally often functions as an ultimate legitimatizing ground for the human moral and political order, but

it could also make it possible with an earthly career of personhood that aspires to the superhuman level, channelling the resources of the individual in the quest for deification. If this is a particular way of life for the ascetic or the hermit, it is also an intrinsic part of religious rituals. One can, therefore, see deification as a variant on the theme of sacralization, a process at the very heart of the religious ritual as argued by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1899) in their theory of sacrifice. The problematic nature of ritual deification is that it is often achieved by extensive taboos that restrict the allowed behaviour of the individual to the extreme point of immobility. Ritual sanctity is, therefore, eminently unpractical, and is mostly a temporary condition checked by rituals of desacralization. To combine everyday life with the desire or obligation toward deification is, hence, a fundamental question for some religions as witnessed by the anxiety of Arjuna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra torn between the perfection of ascetic life and the moral muddle of internecine warfare.

The notion of the divine king constitutes another attempt to combine both the earthly peak of personhood with its ultimate apex in the yonder world, while at the same time trying to avoid the extreme consequences of terrestrial divinity. The latter objective can be brought about through that it is merely the office which is divine, or divinely instituted, and therefore the king itself does not have to be subjected to extreme ritualization (cf. Feeley-Harnik 1985).

### *The Semiotic Person*

Connected to the social identity and the moral status of the person formed in the laboratory of ritual proceedings is signification. The person as we have dealt with it has in a sense been naked; we must, hence, clothe our model. In that way, we are not dealing only with a tabula rasa and signs as in tattooing, but we

find that the body is more or less covered with layers of artificial skin. Through bodily modifications, clothing and other attributes a cocoon of signification is woven around the person. They signal both social and personal identity, self and persona. As a consequence, it is idle to think that the removal of the cloths would necessarily undo their meaning, as the meaning is interior (internalized) while the clothes are exterior. We can actually question the very metaphor of the cocoon, that is, the idea that beneath the social identity, both in its external signification and in its interior manifestation as personal identity, the true person slumbers only waiting to be realized in manifest behaviour. This might perhaps be ontologically true to some extent, but when considering socially conferred personhood the result is more probably a non-person. And this becomes all the more marked as the social dimension of the person is an intrinsic part of it and not superficially added to it as an attribute. This means that the social identity is a manifestation of the nature of the human person and that it is problematic to remove it without mutilating or at least depriving the person. Perhaps, the individualistic myth of the true inner person is particularly strong within societies profoundly affected by modernity, especially in the form of functional differentiation with its often swift changes of occupation and locality leading to an erosion of traditional ways of organizing life (Giddens 1991). One way to handle the threatening anomy is then to insist on that beneath the functions and roles temporarily fulfilled by the person there lays a basic kernel providing a more stable identity: the real person, subject, self or individual (cf. Nédoncelle 1984: 31). Another strategy, however, is to reject any notion of essence and indulge in the fleeting constructed qualities of the social identity, that is, to embrace the ethos of fashion (cf. Pippin 2005: 307ff.).

A successful undressing of the ‘superficial’ layers of the person must thus proceed also to the interior of the person, the personal identity must be removed together with the old persona, in this way undertaking a radical restructuring of the self, the representation the individual has of itself. But such a penetrating peeling of the person makes the simple thought of uncovering the real person problematic, and when combined with attention toward the moral nature of the human person, it could instead manifest itself as a purification of the individual, as its moral regeneration. In this way, it is not only a question of refashioning the self, but the much more troublesome transformation of the personality. This is, then, not a hunt for the true person, but an emphasis on the remaking of the person building on the moral thesis that human nature is wounded at its core. Such a process of regeneration is naturally very laborious if undertaken without any prospect of divine grace, but in the non-essentialist approach the individual in an idealistic vein merely has to think his or her new personality in order for it to materialize, even if also this type of thinking require some consistent exertion. Consider the following quotation from the webpage *SuccessConsciousness.com*:

Positive thinking is a mental attitude that admits into the mind thoughts, words and images that are conducive to growth, expansion and success. It is a mental attitude that expects good and favorable results. **A positive mind anticipates happiness, joy, health and a successful outcome of every situation and action.** Whatever the mind expects, it finds.

<[www.successconsciousness.com/index\\_000009.htm](http://www.successconsciousness.com/index_000009.htm)> 2006-10-09.

Another type of laying bare the true person is that of a social striptease which do not proceed from a spiritual motive of liberation, or the more worldly desire of success, but instead focuses on insight, which though could have liberating and progressive features. One literary example is H. C. Andersen’s

often quoted tale of the emperor's new clothes telling how the emperor was fooled into believing that he had magnificent new clothes invisible to the stupid, but visible only to the clever, while he actually had put on no clothes at all. In the parade, he was hence made to suffer public ridicule after the pertinent remark of a small boy that the emperor was naked. In this way, the nakedness of the royal body becomes a means of social critique: behind the social identity is not a more perfect person, the butterfly escaping from the cocoon, but merely raw vanity and stupidity. The undressed body could then become besides an object of desire, a symbol of the horrifying or liberating prospect of a person without social identity. The latter can be exemplified with Francis of Assisi who took off all his clothes and gave them back to his father, the cloth salesman, in this way renouncing his social identity, and literally shielded by the bishop's mantle embarked on a new career.

But, if the naked body itself is made into the liberating condition of human personhood, as in nudist practice, this is not ultimately a safe refuge, because the body as a system is in constant interaction with its environment; it takes in food, water and air and has to expunge the waste in solid, liquid and gas form. The limits of the body and of the person are, therefore, unstable. For example, there is great anxiety in many cultures connected with bleeding, cutting the nails and the hair: the basic question being whether the hair is an integral part of the person or not. In the story of the nazir Samson in the Book of Judges, his strength is clearly portrayed as related to his hair. When the hair is cut off, he becomes weak and can be captured, but when it has grown out again, he brings down the temple of Dagon crushing both himself and his enemies.<sup>14</sup>

When discussing the signs on the body of the person, we can move further and further away from the body encountering layers

after layers, and at a certain point the question becomes whether these are to be considered as parts of the person or not. This question of the outer limit of the person is clearly connected to the previously mentioned thought of undressing the person in order to lay bare its genuine kernel, a process which we saw could penetrate deeper and deeper still, perhaps without any final result, as in the peeling of an onion. But, now we move in the opposite direction, probing how far we can proceed from the body without leaving the person behind. Perhaps it is wise then to reconnect to the notion of private, as what belongs to the person, not only in the sense of ownership as in private property, but as an extension of the limits of the person. In the interest of avoiding confusion, one could as Jonathan Brown in his comment on William James's Self psychology introduce a distinction between the bodily self and the extracorporeal, extended, self (Brown, J. 1998: 21). Although this seems advisable, it is not always easy to uphold the distinction, as indicated in the case of hair as part of the bodily self and the wig as part of the extracorporeal self. A distinction which comes to the fore in the comical cliché of the toupee unexpectedly flying off, something which can be contrasted with the wig used by the judge in an English court. And as we have defined the self as the picture a person has of itself, the artificial hair in both these cases is part of the self, though in the first case there is a discrepancy between the persona as basis for a social identity and the personality, while in the second there is probably none. The removal of the toupee exposes the individual's vanity, whereas the wind suddenly lifting off the wig of the judge accents the distinction between the individual and its social function.

To insist on an absolute distinction between the bodily person and the extended person is also not especially fruitful when analyzing religious discourse where spirits unite with bodies and

then leave them, and sometimes instead unites with natural objects such stones, in accordance with the logic of what has been characterized as an animistic world view. As earlier remarked, the king could be viewed as owning the whole land, which, therefore, constitutes a part of his person; which is indicated by notions of a correlation between the health of the king and of the land, that is, its fruitfulness. This is, for example, born out by the following description of the Jukun king in Nigeria made by Luc de Heusch in an article trying to partly rehabilitate the Frazerian theory of sacred kingship:

The Jukun king (Nigeria) is the living source of agriculture since he is called 'our millet, our groundnuts, our beans'. He controls the rain and the wind (Meek 1931: 129–30). He possesses a particularly powerful magical charm which is none other than a part of the body of one of the former kings. Moreover, he is supposed to nourish himself periodically by eating the heart of his predecessor. (Heusch 1997: 214)

We can also see this vitalistic nature of the extended person in relics which are not only made of the body of the saint, but also of her or his clothes. One story told to me by a Franciscan friar started with the fact that in the convent in Assisi nobody of the friars had permission to handle on his own the habit of St. Francis, which is kept there, due to the fear that pieces of it would be taken as relics. But one day, when he was there with another friar, they looked mischievously at each other and then both of them simultaneously pulled forth a pair of scissors. The poor garment of Francis had hence become in one sense an important extension of his person, mediating contact with his soul: paralleling in a spirit of divine irony Francis' rejection of the trade as a cloth merchant.

Now, it is time to leave the discussion of the limits of the person, of what is properly considered as belonging to the person, and to focus more explicitly on the sign value of these parts of the

person. Let us begin with an example: In Denmark, a Sikh youth, Ripudaman Singh, was in 2005 fined for carrying a dagger in public, but this dagger thus forbidden by Danish law was a *kirpan*, a traditional symbolic sword worn by khalsa Sikhs. The crucial point was whether the *kirpan* was a weapon or merely a sign, or both at the same time. This little sword is clearly an important and obligatory part of the person who is a khalsa Sikh, together with the long uncut hair rolled up in a turban, the likewise uncut beard, a special comb for the hair, a bracelet and a pair of knee length shorts. The *kirpan* as a sign points inwards toward the self and the personal identity; at the same time, it points toward the intersubjective realm, to his social identity and more broadly to the religious discourse of Sikh religion and culture. When the *kirpan* was taken from Ripudaman, a part of his person was hence confiscated. In being charged of paying a fine, the moral and legal dimension was activated, in the way that a right was taken away, the right to carry a religious symbol, something which ultimately rests on the right of religious freedom. At the same time, this prohibition affected the level of the intersubjective cultural-religious identity of being a khalsa Sikh. The law suit thus became the concern of a whole social group. It is this anchoring function that the layers of signs of the person fulfil; they mediate between the intersubjective and the subjective, between the social identity and the self, thereby facilitating internalization and externalization. So Ripudaman would probably continue to be a dedicated Sikh without his *kirpan*, but a wedge has been driven into the relation between inner and outer identity.

If this is an example of how a secular law intended to restrict public violence can come into conflict with the use of religious symbols, then the French prohibition against religious symbols in public schools is directed straight at the symbolical function. If a religious symbol is not used, the discerning (he is a Sikh) and

conferring of social identity (you are a Sikh) becomes difficult in regard to religious belonging. The denial of the morally private character of the personal religious semiosis makes religious identity in an epistemological sense private, that is, hidden. In order to make religion private, the state has to undertake a limitation of the person's privacy, increasing its obligations and lessen its rights. In this way, one strives after making religious and epistemological privacy coextensive: what belongs to the person as religious is confined to the subjective or domestic realm. In such a conflict, the question of a natural personhood, and with it natural rights, resurfaces as a way to argue for the Sikh community, when the legal system and the legislative powers of the state are not on their side:

Bhai Subeg Singh of Singh Sabha Copenhagen and himself an Amritdhari Sikh commented on how this ruling would affect the whole Sikh community of Denmark, as any and every Sikh practising their faith would be seen as breaking the law. He said this was an infringement on the Sikh community's right to practice their faith and a breach of the basic rights of the free expression of one's religion.<sup>15</sup>

The extension of the person is thus closely connected with the moral-legal dimension and processes of signification. It is easier to clip one's nails, thereby losing a part of one's body, than to lose a religious sign as a sword, for with it a connection to the inner identity, the self, is lost, and at the same time a connection to the intersubjective world of social identity and religious meaning. The sign is a link connecting inner with outer, something which gives it tremendous importance for processes of interiorization, and all other attempts to connect the intersubjective with the subjective.

### *Performance and Persona*

As previously mentioned, the notion of person has a theatrical origin, viz. the mask worn by Greek actors, the *prosopon*, which in Latin became *persona*. Persona then developed into the

concept of social role, the combination of social identity and function. In a third step, the idea of person, a conscious rational being, came into being. Boethius, in his classical definition of person as an individual substance of a rational nature, explicitly referred to the use of masks in Roman theatre so that the scholastic tradition inherited a performance aspect of the concept person, if only in an etymological and historical sense (Marshall 1950).<sup>16</sup> On the conceptual level, we hence move from theatre to society and arrive at metaphysics. If we leave the heights of abstraction and the humdrum social space and retrace the conceptual evolution, in this way returning to the theatre, we also come closer to the ritual persona and person. In a theatrical setting, however, the persona is only temporarily upheld and has validity merely within the limits of the scene, the transcending of which can become funny or uncanny, as when the actors of, for example, a horror movie do not change outfit before going out for lunch at the local pizzeria.

The mask, the theatrical persona, makes it possible for the individual to be somebody else for a restricted time span, and from the social perspective it makes it possible to see certain agents acting that it otherwise would be impossible to perceive, due to their spirituality, absence or death. The theatrical mask is parallel to the use of a persona in the social space outside the theatre, but there it is often constructed with the intention of providing a longer lasting identity. The theatrical persona could hence, as the emperor's new clothes, emphasize the disjunction between person and social identity, on the other hand it makes it possible for supra-individual persons to act in a cultural space, as they do in a legal one. The character is, therefore, often a type, a symbol of a social group, social function or role (cf. Geertz, A. 1990: 329).

It is not necessary that the relation between actor and mask is conceived in a modern way as wholly arbitrary. In a religious

festival, to take on a mask and to act a character can be simultaneous with being possessed by the spirit represented (cf. Rozik 2002: 76). In this way, the spirit, who is closely connected to the mask due to symbolical reference or analogy, acts through the human body. In one sense, there are then two masks: the human body and the mask proper, both used by the spirit (e.g. Emigh 1996: 14).

These two ways of seeing the relation between the actor's persona and his personality create a dilemma confronting modern skilful acting, as the more successful an enacting of a character is, the more closely the public conceives the mask to cling to the face of the actor. The performer becomes ultimately identical with the figure acted, and if wanting to insist on the arbitrary relation between persona and person, he or she must exorcise the spirit thus united with the actor – for example, by donning a mask embodying the contrary character: the comedian trying on the persona of a tragic personality. As in an exorcism, the outcome is, however, not decided beforehand and instead of tragic the result could become pathetic (cf. Kitto 2003: 29).

#### *Final words*

By the chiselling out of a notion of personhood above, taking the step from the subject as defined by consciousness to the embodied moral and legal person inhabiting a semiotic world, created and upheld in performative and ritual contexts, we have come to a point in which processes of ritual interiorization can be begin to be outlined. This is, however, not the place to do this, and I must thus direct the interested reader to the book *Ritualization and Human Interiority*.

Furthermore, also this step from personhood to ritualization can be seen as part of a larger project which aims at arriving at a basic theory of religion. This is something which I hope to return

to and I would be very happy to carry out that ambition in the context of my work within religious studies in India, which provides an ideal counterpoint to the Swedish situation. That the part of my work on ritual interiorization which deals with personhood is published in India is, therefore, I think, significant. It is a piece in a more extensive jigsaw puzzle of which the larger structure and organization of the plethora of details are not quite in place yet – being a true work in progress.

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#### NOTE & REFERENCES

1. For an objection against such a characterisation see Carr 1999: 4, and for the acceptance of it see Cascardi 1992; for a discussion of the death of the subject see Heartfield 2002 (the book contains also an argument for the existence and necessity of the free subject in a political context). For a history of theories of the self which takes *the longue durée* starting with the classical Greek civilisation but ending in resignation, see Martin and Barresi 2006: “The story of Western theorizing about the self and personal identity is not only, but centrally, the story of humankind’s attempt to elevate itself above the rest of the natural world, and it is the story of how that attempt has failed.” (305)
2. Perhaps parallel with the totalitarianism of the 20th century which not only tried to control public discourse and practice, but that also laboured to extend the power of the state to the interior thinking of its subjects giving inspiration to fictional narratives such as Georg Orwell’s 1984.

3. In this way, however, the possibility of the ultimate goal of some mysticism to transcend the subject-object division and establish a pure consciousness is not categorically excluded; such a condition, nevertheless, lies beyond what can be characterised as rationality in the ordinary sense.
4. That this is not an uncontroversial position is borne out by Mark Sacks' remark on ontological objectivity in his book *Objectivity and Insight* (Sacks 2000: 169): "I will continue to take it for granted that in proceeding to assess the available scope of objectivity, the discussion should take its initial bearings from the well-motivated and almost universal shared withdrawal from such metaphysics." However, he still struggles on the very last pages with this connection between ontology and objectivity, wanting to resist relativism.
5. For an overview see Crane 2000.
6. For a similar undertaking see Harré 1998: 68–94.
7. Many of the basic questions concerning personhood vis-à-vis humans and other animals are activated by Peter Singer's utilitarian ethic which has been foundational for the animal liberation discourse. For a general discussion see Petrinovich 1998.
8. However, for an analysis of the Japanese ritual of *mizuko kuyo* in which *inter alia* aborted fetuses are treated as persons through the votive offering of a small statuette of the bodhisattva Jizo see William R. LaFleur's (1992) book *Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan*. The basic opposition is between giving the foetus the status of person through a ritual and on the other hand taking its life (1992: 11).
9. This position of course becomes problematic if one espouses a monistic view of the human intellect in the way that there is only one intellect, but many individual human beings; one can then argue that there is actually only one person, plurality being illusory as in Advaita Vedanta, or as Averroes that the individual soul (intellect) is composed of two parts one human and perishable and one eternal. The universal concept of intellect is hence both one

and many. Coplestone 2003 [1950]: 198. For a neothomistic discussion of the relation between individual and person see Maritain 1966 [1946].

10. For a discussion of the legal protection of one's persona, dealing with the question of who has the right to the use the persona, image and name of a particular person see Smith, Simon 2001.
11. This could be contrasted with Margaret Archer's distinction between self-identity and personal identity (2000: 10). The former being the universal human capacity for having a continuous sense of being a self (a distinct person) something which comes naturally, while the latter constitutes an active achievement relative to our choice of ultimate concerns. Furthermore, her use of the notion 'social identity' incorporates both social and personal identity as defined in this book, which gives a more marked flavour of choice and agency to her notion of personal identity.
12. Cf. the notion of private life in distinction to public life; the former being a zone which is partly defined by restricted access partly by ownership and freedom. A sphere of domesticity to which considerations of gender can be united. See e.g. Ariès 1992, an edited volume focusing on antiquity and the Middle Ages.
13. E.g. <[www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=061125192946.9d76ak6g&show\\_article=1](http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=061125192946.9d76ak6g&show_article=1)> 2007-03-13.
14. Hair is naturally a topic of its own in anthropological and sociological research see e.g. Leach 1958, Hallpike 1969 and Synnott 1987.
15. <[www.panthic.org/news/124/ARTICLE/1278/2005-0501.html?sid=e1cbbdd9befa5b94f6a965c7ffd6cc92](http://www.panthic.org/news/124/ARTICLE/1278/2005-0501.html?sid=e1cbbdd9befa5b94f6a965c7ffd6cc92)> 2006-10-10
16. For an overview of the concept of person from the viewpoint of literary studies see Elliot 1982: 19–32.

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## THE UNIQUE SPIRIT OF JAINISM

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Jainism is an important Śrāmaṇika tradition which has its own immense philosophical richness. The sophistication of its philosophy is clearly evident in its epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. At the same time, Jainism is also an explicitly spiritual tradition. The spiritual emphasis of Jainism is clear from the fact that the grand objective of this tradition is to obtain liberation, which, in turn, consists in realizing the innate four-fold grandeur of the spirit or jīva. The proclamation of this grand objective in Jainism is sought to be justified expressly with reference to the highest intuitive insights of the perfected masters of this tradition. Further, as a Śrāmaṇika tradition, Jainism also highlights the point that one can obtain liberation only through the requisite efforts for realizing the highest level of purity of the self.

These aspects of Jainism are foundational to its character; yet, these aspects are also common to many other religious and philosophical traditions in varying degrees. However, the real challenge for any spiritual tradition lies in formulating an effective way for communicating the crucial intuitively revealed spiritual truths to the spiritually ignorant masses in such a manner that they may become motivated to undertake the necessary self-reforms for the sake of achieving the highest spiritual objective. It is at this juncture that the uniqueness of Jainism, as a religious and philosophical tradition, should be appreciated.

Now, various religious and philosophical traditions profess different kinds of one-sided views about the nature of reality and the means of knowing it, e.g. the commonly known world may be sometimes treated as completely real or unreal or material or transitory or fundamentally immutable etc. Each one of these

various possible conceptions of reality gives rise to its corresponding metaphysics and epistemology and these two, in turn, give shape to its religious and secular ethics. As such, these various religious philosophical traditions have their own characteristic frameworks. Nonetheless, one may note a very interesting common characteristic among them. All of these traditions seek to present a conception of the world that appears to be at loggerheads with the worldview of an ordinary uninitiated person. These traditions, effectively, exhort the ordinary person to give up his faith in the commonly accepted worldview and substitute it with the proclaimed worldview of that tradition. This expectation is explicitly there as the very first step of initiation into that tradition. But, this is an extremely big and difficult expectation to fulfil for the ordinary person since it effectively implies that his ordinary means of knowing the world, namely rationality, language, sense-experiences etc., have to be accepted as misleading and hence, ought to be relegated. Any person in his proper senses can hardly afford to take this decision easily. It is certainly possible to visualize an intensely miserable, depressed or frustrated person doing this in a fit of emotion, but it will then lack the necessary foundational strength and solidity. It can then be treated only as a religious and philosophical superstition.

As such, it becomes imperative to find a suitable way to persuade the uninitiated person such that it does not degenerate into mere superstition or fanaticism. He must not radically reject the authenticity and authority of his ordinary means of knowledge without proper justification. It would be like abandoning your small floating log in the ocean in the hope of boarding a big ship, while completely overlooking the immense gap between them and thus eventually drowning yourself in that ocean. The spiritual journey of an uninitiated person must start only from where he

actually finds himself situated at the beginning of that journey. He must traverse that entire path step by step and hence the acceptance of the spiritual worldview must be a smooth and gradual process. It should not demand unjustified quantum jumps of thoughts and emotions.

It is at this critical juncture that the uniqueness and excellence of Jainism, in comparison with the other traditions, becomes evident. The unique spirit of Jainism is reflected in its all-encompassing theory of non-absolutism or Anekāntavāda. Anekāntavāda represents the great accommodating spirit of Jainism which seeks to harmonize the worldview of the common uninitiated person and the esoteric worldview of the perfected Tīrathāṅkaras and Jinas. Jainism recognizes the importance of such harmonization and realizes it in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Its great effort to formally situate the phenomenal aspects of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics alongside their esoteric aspects is certainly fraught with its own logical pitfalls and has very often been a point of criticism and rebuttal. But, such criticism has actually overlooked the compulsions and sensitivities underlying these steps, as well as the potential benefits implicit in them.

This accommodative spirit of Anekāntavāda is reflected even in the sequence of spiritual disciplines prescribed in the Tri-ratnas. Appreciating the psychology of human motivation, Jainism presents right faith or Samyak darśana as the first discipline. This consists in believing in the seven or nine basic categories of Jainism. These categories consist of both the commonly accepted as well as the mystically intuited truths. The categories of Jīva and Ajīva are comparatively easier to accept for the common person, whereas the categories of Āśrava, Baṁdha, Saṁvara, Nirjarā, Mokṣa, Pāpa and Puṇya are matters of mystical intuition. Thus, the broad effort is to add on to the

commonly accepted categories rather than substituting them with an entirely fresh list of categories. Similarly, in the fields of epistemology Jainism accepts both mediate or Parokṣa and immediate or Aparokṣa kinds of knowledge. Mediate knowledge comprises of the ordinary kinds of phenomenal knowledge, whether perceptual, inferential or testimonial, but by terming them all as mediate cases of knowledge, Jainism gently draws attention to their conditionality, incompleteness and inevitable mediating links. Such mediate knowledge is contrasted with immediate knowledge since the latter is free from mediating factors of phenomenal nature. All the three kinds of immediate knowledge viz. Avadhi, Maṇḥparyāya and Kevala-jñāna, are cases of spiritual knowledge. As such, here too, Jainism seeks to add on to the commonly accepted view about the kinds of knowledge. The epistemic theory of relativity or Syādavāda, amply highlighted by Samantabhadra, too builds up upon the common observation that all cases of phenomenal knowledge are inevitably perspectival, conditional and incomplete and hence they cannot claim absoluteness. Syādavāda is the epistemic corollary of Anekāntavāda. Here too, Jainism is found adding on to the common epistemic viewpoint by way of highlighting the deeper implications of what is already accepted rather than trying to replace it altogether.

In the field of metaphysics Jainism accepts both the plurality of the basic metaphysical categories as well as the reality of both the changing and unchanging aspects, the Paryāyas and the Guṇas, of the basic substances or Dravyas. Now, both of these metaphysical conceptions represent the viewpoint of the common uninitiated person. It is only to this already available foundational metaphysical structure that Jainism adds on the finer details about the various metaphysical categories. The metaphysical claim of Jainism that any given thing has an infinite number of

characteristics also echoes the metaphysical understanding of the common uninitiated person. As such, in the field of metaphysics too, one finds Jainism only building up further on the already available and acceptable metaphysical framework of the common people. It only fine-tunes, elaborates and supplements it. All this ensures a smooth transition to a higher and more sophisticated metaphysics.

In the field of ethics too, Jainism accepts the foundational concepts of moral propriety which ensure the harmonious sustenance and development of family, society and the world at large. All the five vows of Jainism, namely Ahimsā, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacharya and Aparigraha, are representative of the ethical code accepted by the uninitiated masses for the purpose of ensuring a harmonious and symbiotic development of both the human and non-human components of the world. It is only to this ethical edifice of the common people that Jainism adds on the finer details regarding these ethical disciplines and also shows the necessity and desirability of elevating them to new heights in the light of intuitively realized spiritual truths. Jainism highlights non-violence or Ahimsā as the greatest of all virtues and justifies it on the ground that one should do unto others what one would expect from others. The desirability of universally practised Ahimsā is one of the basic features of Jainism so much so that various exceptions and relaxations in its practice have been pointed out by scholars as later aberrations. For example, S. M. Jain says,

“The relaxation for Jaina laity (householders), condoning violence towards one-sense life forms appears to be a discrepancy in view of the basic concepts... . In Jainism all life forms have been put on the same pedestal without any inferiority or superiority as regards innate capabilities of every soul... . The injunctions that unripe fruits and attached to plant body

(Saccita) should not be consumed recognises this aspect though it is generally not followed. The plants deserve maximum concern and attention as plants are the only primary producers of food etc. and all others including humans are consumers and dependent on products of plants. This erroneous concept is the concept (tual) product of change from forest (kalpavṛkṣa) based model to agriculture based model... . The discrepancies, aberrations, relaxations were introduced by learned saints though with stringent riders only to cope with the evolving, retrogratory situations. However, the aberrations are aberrations and should not be mistaken with the fundamental timeless principles.”

(S.M. Jain, *Pristine Jainism*, pp.74f).

Further, the Jain advocacy of the kalpavṛkṣa economy is another superlative development of the basic Ahimsā doctrine. All these elaborations in Jain ethics are ultimately based upon the basic ethical edifice of the common uninitiated people.

In view of the above discussion it becomes amply clear that unlike many other religious-philosophical traditions, Jainism has desisted from adopting a holier than thou attitude and has not sought to utterly reject or denigrate the worldview of the common uninitiated people. It has not only strenuously made room for these viewpoints but also added on many important spiritual insight based concepts and practices to that very worldview. This unique feature of Jainism itself seems to be a great form of Ahimsā wherein the foundational convictions and sensitivities of the common people are not unduly hurt or jeopardised.

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